Thursday, October 12, 2023

3623. Was Marx an Ecosocialist?

By Kamran Nayeri, October 12, 2023

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Museum-Karl-Marx-Haus

Preface: This essay is the expanded version of chapter 22 of my book Whose Planet? Essays on Ecocentric Socialism. 

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Since the turn of the twenty-first century, a few authors whose books have been published by Monthly Review Press (hereon, the Monthly Review authors) have provided a new reading of Marx. While initially it was argued that Marx had “ecological insights” (Burkett 1999; Foster 2000), more recently it is suggested that Marx was in fact an ecologist and ecosocialist (Saito 2017). 

 

I consider their contributions valuable for a better understanding of Marx’s intellectual development and initially supported the focus on Marx’s notion of “metabolic rift.” However, I have considerable reservation about this approach for the following reasons. 


First, the project of the Monthly Review authors is essentially an exercise in Marxology. Their focus is on how a new reading of Marx’s well-known texts and those that have come to light recently may show his relevance or even vital importance for understanding the root causes of the ecological crises. 

 

Second, Saito’s claim (2017) that Marx was an “ecosocialist” is implausible. Why generations of socialists including Marx himself and his lifetime collaborator Engels always considered him a socialist and never described his intellectual contributions in any way implying ecosocialism in the sense we understand it today? Why Engels cited only two intellectual contributions for Marx: historical materialism and the theory of surplus value? Was he less familiar with Marx’s intellectual development than Saito and the Monthly Review authors? Why neither Marx nor Engels made much of the notion of “metabolic rift?” Could it be that they did not consider it central to Marx’s theories as the Monthly Review authors now argue? 


Despite such obvious concerns, Saito claims that ecology is foundational to Marx’s labor theory of value. This claim does not fit the facts either. Marx’s concentrated effort in writing his critique of political economy began with Grundrisse (1857–58) and continued with Contribution to Critique of Political Economy including “Preface” completed in 1859, Theories of Surplus Value in 1861, Economic Manuscripts of 186163, and he saw the publication of Capital Volume 1 in 1867. Engels edited and published Capital Volume 2 in 1885 and Volume 3 in 1894. 

Yet, the term oekologie (ecology) was coined only in 1866 by Darwin’s disciple, the German zoologist Ernst Haeckel, just a year before the first volume of Capital was published. Sevn years before the publication of Saito’s book (2017), Foster, Clark, and York (2010, p. 313) wrote, “[T]here was hardly any mention of the new term [ecology] for a couple of decades [after Haeckel coined the term in 1866]. Not until 1885, did a book appear with it in its title. Hence, ecology as an organized discipline cannot be said to have existed prior to the early twentieth century.” Clearly, ecology could not have been the foundation of Marx’s “political economy” as Saito claims. 

 

Moreover, Saito’s use of the word “ecology” is murky as he uses the term to express culture and nature relationship as in his discussion of Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Saito 2017, p. 14). While humans are part of the planet’s ecosystems, the culture and nature discussion is distinct from the much broader scope of what is meant by ecology. The Cambridge dictionary defines ecology as “the relationships between the air, land, water, animals, plants, etc., usually of a particular area, or the scientific study of this.” Nonetheless, Saito claims that the twenty-six-year-old Marx who had not yet undertaken any study of natural sciences as an ecologist.


Eager to make a case for Marx as an early ecologist and ecosocialist, Saito conflates “ecology” with “metabolism.” But Encyclopedia Britannica defines metabolism as “the sum of the chemical reactions that take place within each cell of a living organism and that provide energy for vital processes and for synthesizing new organic material.” Cleary, ecology and metabolism are separate fields in biological sciences. 


Third, it appears that the Month Review authors’ interest in Marx and ecology with a focus on metabolic rift and Saito’s interpretation of Marx as an ecologist and ecosocialist are motivated by the much wider interest in the notion of metabolism and the intellectual history of metabolism in many fields (e.g., Fischer-Kowalski 1998; Bundy, et al. 2009; Martinez-Alier 2009; Pauliuk and Müller 2014; Richter, et al. 2018). As Fischer-Kowalski (1998, p. 64) states there were scattered studies of metabolism in the second half of the nineteenth century Europe that recently have gained attention in a number of fiends: “In connection to varying political perspectives, metabolism gradually takes shape as a powerful disciplinary concept.” The Monthly Review authors’ rereading of Marx represents this growing interest in metabolism both figuratively and as the movement of material and energy is an extension of this trend to ecosocialist literature. That is perhaps why Saito tends to over stated the role of ecology and metabolism in Marx’s theorizing. 

 

However, the interest in metabolism and ecology in all cases including the ecosocialist theorizing has been on the interaction of humans with their environment (“nature”) to better control it for the benefit of human society, whether capitalist or socialist. 

 

Fourth, Saito clearly conflates the realms of social and biological sciences when he claims that ecology is foundational to Marx’s critique of political economy and his labor theory of value. This must be obvious as value is a social category and Marx’s labor theory of value is about social and class relations under the capitalist mode of production. Ecology and metabolism both belong to biological sciences. To conflate them creates a methodological problems that I have discussed in my critique of Jason W. Moore’s Capitalism in the Web of Life (2017; see Chapter 8) and in my critique of E. O. Wilson’s sociobiology (2015)

 

Saito routinely writes about Marx’s “political economy” instead of his labor theory of value as a critique of political economy. There is an important difference perhaps lost to Saito. There have been market socialist currents that have argued that labor theory of value can be used to develop socialism. This view opposes Marx’s own view also shared by Rosa Luxembourg and Ernesto Che Guevara, that transition to socialism requires withering away of the law of value and its replacement with mass socialist consciousness and economic planning (Nayeri 2005). 


Fifth, although the notion of “metabolic rift” is central to Monthly Review authors’ new reading of Marx, it adds no new explanatory power to the socialist and ecosocialist discussion of ecological crisis. Michael Friedman, a biologist, writing in Monthly Review edited by John Bellamy Foster summarizes it as follows: 

 

Foster attributes the metabolic rift to the intrinsic dynamic of capitalist production with its private ownership of the means of production, drive for profits, ever-expanding markets, and continuous growth. Marx employed this idea to describe the effects of capitalist agriculture on the degradation of soil fertility. Foster and his co-thinkers have employed the concept in analyses of climate change, biodiversity, agriculture, fisheries, and many other aspects of human interaction with our biosphere” (Friedman 2018, my emphasis). 

 

Saito (2017, p. 20) makes the same argument: 

 

“Marx’s political economy allows us to understand the ecological crisis as contradiction of capitalism, because it describes the immanent dynamics of the capitalist system, according to which unbound drive of capital for valorization erodes its own material conditions and eventually confronts it with the limits of nature.” 

 

However, almost half a century ago, Mandel (1977) offered exactly the same argument without having the benefit of the rediscovery of Marx’s “metabolic rift.” In other words, Monthly Review authors use the term “metabolic rift” instead of what ecologists, socialists, other ecosocialists, and the public have called ecological problem or crisis. 


Saito’s argument that capitalist accumulation and valorization process will reach natural limits (Saito 2017, p. 20) was implicit in earlier socialist writings on the ecological crises well before the current discussion of metabolic rift. Even the politically mainstream Club of Rome, a think tank headquartered in Winterthur, Switzerland, in its highly influential Limits to Growth report (Meadows, et.al. 1972) reached the conclusion that unlimited growth on a finite planet is not possible, and results in ecological crises. Thus, the notion of “metabolic rift” while useful for understanding an aspect of intellectual development of Karl Marx is not necessary to reach the conclusion of natural limits to growth, capitalist or “socialist.” As O’Connor (1998, p. 159) writes, “In 1944, Karl Polanyi published his masterpiece, The Great Transformation, which discussed the ways in which the growth of the capitalist market and economic relations generally impaired or destroyed their own social and environmental conditions.” 

 

Sixth, the polemical nature of some of Monthly Review authors tends to undermine their scholarly value. Saito, for instance, frames his book as a response to the criticism of those who find Promethean or productivist streaks in Marx. He does not discuss or refute their critique directly. He ignores the fact that socialist currents all over the world have long favored economic development and industrialization. Still, he does admit that the young Marx harbored Promethean views (Saito 2017, p. 13). However, in my view, the problem of Prometheanism or productivism in Marx as well as socialist and ecosocialist theories is real. Using Marx’s analysis in Capital and a fully developed argument in a section in Grundrisse, I wrote an essay to show how the rise of the so-called gig economy is anticipated by Marx’s theory (Nayeri June 2018). I coincidentally documented how Marx viewed ever more division of labor based on technical change which fuels economic growth, hence material abundance, as necessary for the development of his vision of socialism. Others who have studied this question confirm my incidental finding. Among them is Marxologist Paresh Chattopadhyay (2000), whom we recently lost, who insisted that to understand Marx, he should be read in the original language. Of course, there are also some who have argued that Marx’s vision of socialism is consistent with sustainable human development (Burkett 2005). Yet, Saito (2017, p. 11) ignores such tensions in Marx. Of course, an intellectual giant like Marx who continued learning and relearning, thinking and rethinking throughout his life must have tensions and shifting views in his massive writings, much of which Marx did not polish or even intend for publication. Those who, like Saito, attempt to provide a “systematic and complete reconstruction of Marx’s ecological critique of capitalism” (ibid., p. 12), tend to ignore or paper over such tensions. 

 

Seven, the contributions of Monthly Review authors are ultimately based on Marx’s labor theory of value. However, following a key revision of Marx’s theory that began with Hilferding’s Finance Capital (1910), Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (1966, pp. 5–6) argued that capitalist competition has long given way to monopoly capitalism. Although, I do not know what each one of Monthly Review authors think about monopoly capitalism thesis, Foster (1986) has written a book about it.  As it was shown in the late 1960s and 1970s, the monopoly capital theorists from Hilferding to Baran and Sweezy misunderstood Marx’s theory of competition as being the same as the neoclassical notion of Perfect Competition based on the idealized view of the capitalist market (Nayeri August 19, 2018). How is this going to impact the “systematic and complete reconstruction of Marx’s ecological critique of capitalism?” 

 

Eight, any “reconstruction of Marx’s theory” is of necessity more a theoretical development of its author(s) than “what Marx really said.” Is this not clear from a century and a half of debate on various aspects of Marx’s theoretical contributions? Aren’t there multiple interpretations of historical materialism, labor theory of value, theory of the proletariat, and of socialism, to name a few of the most important? There are even many more interpretations of “Marxism,” a label that according to Engels, Marx opposed in one occasion. The responsibility of turning Marx’s contributions into a doctrine and open the door to a cult of Marx belongs to Karl Kaustky.  


Despite the above criticism, I welcome any attempt to develop a unified theory of society and nature. There is no dispute that Marx could not finish his critique of political economy. The fundamental question is how to go about the construction of such unified ecosocialist theory. Saito’s claim that Marx was an ecosocialist continues what the Monthly Review authors have implicitly been arguing for that Marx’s theories are essentially what ecosocialists need.  


However, Monthly Review authors and ecosocialist critics of Marx who find weakness in his writings such as productivism or Prometheanism by-and-large pay no attention to the foundations of Marx’s theory, historical materialism which by design set nature aside to focus on the dynamics of class societies, in particular the capitalist mode of production (Nayeri 2023, especially chapters 18, 19, 21). In other words, historical materialism and its application to analysis of the capitalist mode of production, labor theory of value, are anthropocentric theories by design. In the latter, not only nature is objectified but even women’s work at home including in child bearing and child raising is set aside to focus on exploitation of wage workers at the point of production. It took the recent wave of feminism and its critique of androcentrism, the male centered view of the world, for Marxist theorists to develop the social reproduction theory to incorporate women’s work at home into Marxian theory.  Still, ecosocialist theorists refuse to take on anthropocentrism which gas been a foundation of civilization (class societies) seriously (Nayeri 2023, especially chapters 15, 19). As I have shown (Nayeri 2023, chapter 21) when we take nonhumans as part of our worldview and analysis of capitalist mode of production, Marx’s theory of exploitation becomes incoherent as it becomes clear that surplus value is not merely the result of uppaid labor time but also exploitation of nonhumans. Ecosocialism can only be built on the foundation of a new theory of history in which society is analyzed as deeply embedded in nature. Nineteenth century theories of Marx are not adequate for understanding the problems of the twenty first century be cause they were and could not have been constructed as such. 


In my opinion, there are two key reasons for such long delayed attention to the problem of anthropocentrism. Marxists like the general population are born into an anthropocentric culture where humanity is the center of attention. However, those who identify as Marxists also quite often embrace a cult of Marx. By that I mean the view widely held that by-and-large Marx has provides us with the theoretical foundation for addressing the problem humanity faces. It has barred them to question these theories. However, Marx (1865) himself taught us to question everything. Marx ends his Theses on Feurubach (1845) with what is central to his contribution: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”


In the same year, in collaboration with Engels, the drafted the German Ideology which outlines their theory of history and social change. In a letter to Joseph Weydemeyer (March 18, 1852), Marx wrote: “.. And now as to myself, no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society or the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists, the economic economy of the classes. What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production, (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society .”(emphasis in original) 


Today, more than 170 years later it is clear that what Marx wrote has in part 2 and 3 in the above statement have mot yet been born by history. How do we explain “Marxists” who ignore the importance of this problem and the need to address? Instead, such “Marxists” go on to use their own interpretations of his theories in the hope of changing the world or even worse claim that Marx was even an ecosocialist whose nineteenth century theories are adequate for the problems of twenty first century?


My own approach as a student of Marx is entirely different. I consider Marx as a revolutionary intellectual giant of nineteenth century and his theories bound by the knowledge of his time address for the problems of his time. I have argued Marx’s theory of history and its application to the analysis of the capitalist mode of production set aside nature to focus on the dynamics of classes and are inadequate for the problems we face today especially the ecological crises. In this, I follow earlier thinkers Max Horkheimer and Theodore of Frankfurt School (Jay 1973/1996), Perry Anderson (1983). I also go beyond those who tried to mend historical materialism, in my opinion unsuccessfully (for the case of Moore see, Nayeri (Nayeri 2023, chapter 8), including Ted Benton (1993) and Jason W. Moore (2017).  


Instead Marx’s nineteenth century materialism, I propose an animist materialism built on the basis of what we have learned from anthropology, archeology, biology since the middle of twentieth century which give agency to all being in their interconnection, not just human beings. Only on the basis of such philosophical-scientific materialism it is possible to overcome the methodological problem duality if society and nature. It is also on such basis that ecocentrism as the environmental ethics emerges from the theory of history itself because animistic materialism embrace inherent values of all beings which exists irrespective of human beings. Thus, Ecocentric Socialism is a guide to living as life of love for nature and a better humanity even in womb of the anthropocentric industrial capitalist civilization while it provides the path to fight for transcending it in the direction of withering away alienation from nature as well as social alienation and to provide for human development.  

 

References:

Anderson, Perry. In the Tracks of Historical Materialism. 1983.

Baran, Paul and Paul Sweezy. Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order.1966.

Benton, Ted. Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights & Social Justice. 1993.

Bundy J.G., Davey, M.P., and Viant M. R. «Environmental Metabbolomics: A Critical Review and Future Perspectives.» Metabolics. 5, 3-21, 2009.

Burkett, Paul. Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective. 1999.

__________. «Marx’s Vision of Sustainable Human Development.» Monthly Review, October 1, 2005.

Chattopadhyay, Paresh. “Marx and the Process.” marxism.org. September 2000.

Fischer-Kowalaski. «Society’s Metablism: The INtellectual History of Material Flow Analysis: Part I, 1860-1970.» Journal of Industrial Ecology. 2(1):61-78. 1998.

Foster, John Bellamy. Theory of Monopoly Capitalism. 1986.

__________________. Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature. 2000.

Foster, John Bellamy, Bertt Clark, Rucjard York. The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on Earth. 2010.

Friedman, Michael. «Metabolic Rift and the Human Microbiome.» Monthly Review, July 1, 2018.

Hilferding, Rudolf. Finance Capital. 1910.

Jay, Marin. The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research, 1923-1950. 1973/1996.

Mandel, Ernest. From Class Society to Communism: Introduction to Marxism. 1977.

Martinez-Alier. Social Metablism, Ecological Distribution Conflicts, and Lanugauge Valuation. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism. 2009.

Marx, Karl. «Confessions.» Zalt-Bommel. April 1, 1865.

Meadows, Donella H., Meadows, Dennis L., Randers, Jørgen, et.al. The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicment of Mankind. 1972.

Moore, Jason W. Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and Accumulation of Capital. 2015.

Nayeri, Kamran. «Socialism and the Market: Methodological Lessons from the Economic Calculation Debate.» Critique. Vol. 33, N0. 1. 2005.

_____________. «Karl Marx or Club of Rome: Why Naturalizing Causes of the Great Recession Undermines Efforts to Transcend the Capitalist Civilization?» Our Place in the World: A Journal of Ecosocialism. April 14, 2014.

_____________. «An Ecological Socialist’s Reflection on Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology.» Our Place in the World: A Journal of Ecosocialism.. October 16, 2015.

____________. «On Jason W. Moore’s «Capitalism in the Web of Life» Our Place in the World: A Journal of Ecosocialism. July 18, 2016.

_____________. Whose Planet? Essays on Ecocentric Socialism. 2023.

O’Conner, James. Natural CausesL Essays in Ecological Marxism. 1998.

Pauliuk, Stephen and Daniel B. Müller. «The Role of in-Use Stocks in Climate Change.» Global Environmental Change. Volume 24, Januray 2014.

Saito, Kohei. Karl Marx’s Ecosocialism: Capital, Nature, and the Unfinished Critique of Political Economy. 2017.


Friday, September 1, 2023

3622. A Climate Warning from the Cradle of Civilization

By Allissa J. Rubin, The New York TimesJuly 29, 2023



The word itself, Mesopotamia, means the land between rivers. It is where the wheel was invented, irrigation flourished and the earliest known system of writing emerged. The rivers here, some scholars say, fed the fabled Hanging Gardens of Babylon and converged at the place described in the Bible as the Garden of Eden.

Now, so little water remains in some villages near the Euphrates River that families are dismantling their homes, brick by brick, piling them into pickup trucks — window frames, doors and all — and driving away.

“You would not believe it if I say it now, but this was a watery place,” said Sheikh Adnan al Sahlani, a science teacher here in southern Iraq near Naseriyah, a few miles from the Old Testament city of Ur, which the Bible describes as the hometown of the Prophet Abraham.

These days, “nowhere has water,” he said. Everyone who is left is “suffering a slow death.”

You don’t have to go back to biblical times to find a more verdant Iraq. Well into the 20th century, the southern city of Basra was known as the “Venice of the East” for its canals, plied by gondola-like boats that threaded through residential neighborhoods.

Indeed, for much of its history, the Fertile Crescent — often defined as including areas of modern-day Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Iran, the West Bank and Gaza — did not lack for water, inspiring centuries of artists and writers who depicted the region as a lush ancient land. Spring floods were common, and rice, one of the most water-intensive crops in the world, was grown for more than 2,000 years.

But now nearly 40 percent of Iraq, an area roughly the size of Florida, has been overtaken by blowing desert sands that claim tens of thousands of acres of arable land every year.

Climate change and desertification are to blame, scientists say. So are weak governance and the continued reliance on wasteful irrigation techniques that date back millenniums to Sumerian times.

A tug of war over water — similar to the struggles over the Colorado River in the United States, the Mekong in Southeast Asia and the Nile in northern Africa — has also intensified water shortages for tens of millions of people across the regio

Another culprit is common to large regions of the world: a growing population whose water demands continue to rise, both because of sheer numbers and, in many places, higher living standards, increasing individual consumption.

Here in Iraq, the fallout is everywhere, fraying society, spurring deadly clashes between villages, displacing thousands of people every year, emboldening extremists and leaving ever more land looking like a barren moonscape.


In many areas, water pumped from below the surface is too salty to drink, the result of dwindling water, agricultural runoff and untreated waste. “Even my cows won’t drink it,” one farmer said.

Even in the north, where fresh water has historically been available, well diggers in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, bore down 580 feet last summer — and still found only salty water.

Iraq is now the fifth most vulnerable country to extreme temperatures, water scarcity and food shortages, the United Nations says. Next door in Iran, a province of two million people could run out of water by mid-September, Iranian lawmakers said, leaving few options beyond mass exodus.

And for the rest of the Middle East and some other areas of the world — including parts of Mexico, Pakistan, India and the Mediterranean — Iraq and its neighbors offer an unmistakable warning.

“Because of this region’s vulnerabilities, one of the most vulnerable on the planet, it is one of the first places that is going to show some kind of extreme succumbing, literally, to climate change,” said Charles Iceland, the director of water security for the World Resource Institute, a research organization.


PART 2

HOTTER, DRIER, FASTER

But, he added, “no countries, even the rich countries, are adapting to climate change to the degree they need to.”

Many people in the villages near the Euphrates River remember how, 20 years ago, the date palm trees grew so thick and close together that their leaves blocked the sunlight. The splashing of children in the irrigation canals and the sloshing of water jugs being carted home provided the backbeat of summer life.


Now, the irrigation canals are so dry in summer that the small bridges spanning them are barely necessary and the sounds of daily life signal water’s scarcity: the crackle of brown grasses and the rustle of dried out palm leaves. Some palms have no leaves at all, their bare trunks standing like the columns of ancient ruins.

Water comes from the government in red plastic barrels, in rations of about 160 gallons a month per family. Even when used sparingly, it barely lasts a week in the heat, said Mr. Sahlani, the sheikh and science teacher, who lives in the village of Albu Jumaa. Graffiti scrawled in Arabic on a half-destroyed concrete wall expressed the frustration: “Where is the state?” it read.

As recently as the 1970s and 1980s, Iraq’s water ministry built artificial lakes and dams to hold the immense annual overflow from winter rains and gushing snow melt from the Taurus Mountains, the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates.


Even today, traces of Iraq’s greener past can be seen every spring. In the Anbar desert, a brief winter rain can turn the shallow valleys green and speckle them with flowers. Along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, the water still nourishes trees beside the narrow banks, with bands of green fields on either side.


But even those bands have shrunk in recent decades.


The region is getting hotter — faster — than many parts of the world. By some estimates, the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean could warm by 5 degrees Celsius (9 degrees Fahrenheit) or even more during this century. In the worst months of summer, some places are already nearly unlivable.


Precipitation, already low, is expected to wane across the Middle East. The drought gripping Iraq is now in its fourth year, and the country is particularly vulnerable because most of its water comes from rivers that originate outside the country, holding it hostage to the decisions of its neighbors Turkey and Iran.


PART 3

WATER WARS

The chokehold on Iraq’s rivers has been tightening for decades.

Since 1974, Turkey has built 22 dams, hydroelectric plants and irrigation projects on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, modeled in part on the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States.

Then, in the early 2000s, Iran started building more than a dozen smaller dams and tunnels on tributaries to the Tigris, devastating Iraqi provinces like Diyala, which was known just 10 years ago for its peaches, apricots, oranges and dates. The tributaries from Iran are the only source of water in the province, other than the dwindling rainfall.

The impact has been drastic: The water flowing into Iraq has dropped almost 50 percent on the Euphrates and by about a third on the Tigris since major dam building began in the 1970s, according to statistics from Iraq’s water ministry.


Hashem al-Kinani and his family have felt the changes firsthand. For generations, they farmed 20 acres east of Baghdad, on the Diyala border, facing one trial after another.

First, the American invasion and the ouster of Saddam Hussein bit into the state’s support of farmers. Then in 2006, Al Qaeda moved in and killed many local men, leaving their headless bodies in ditches. Hashem lost an uncle, and the family house was bombed by Al Qaeda. Making matters worse, rainfall has become more erratic and gradually diminished. As the Iranian dams came on line, river water became too scarce to grow fruit.

The fig and pomegranate trees have died. His family sold off their 1,500 head of cattle and their sheep, because it was impossible to feed them. He’s not sure how much longer he can hang on.

“Farming is over here,” he said. “I cannot stay, but what can I do?”

History is replete with water wars, and one of the earliest recorded conflicts took place here in the Fertile Crescent, where scribes documented a fight over water between Sumerian city states more than 4,000 years ago in what is now Iraq.


Many modern nations have gone on the offensive to ensure that their people have enough water. Ethiopia has spent years building a colossal dam on the Nile, inciting fear and anger from Egypt downstream. China has done the same with the Mekong. Central Asian nations have had a long-running feud over the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers, which have been drained to such an extent that by the time they reach the inland Aral Sea, there is little water left.


Worldwide, countries share nearly 900 rivers, lakes and aquifers, according to the United Nations, and though a treaty exists to govern their use, fewer than half of all countries have ratified it. Notably absent from the list are upstream nations like Turkey, Iran and China.


In 2021, Iraq’s water ministry threatened to drag Iran to the International Court of Justice for taking its water. But Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government, which is close to Tehran’s leaders, dropped the issHistory is replete with water wars, and one of the earliest recorded conflicts took place here in the Fertile Crescent, where

scribes documented a fight over water between Sumerian city states more than 4,000 years ago in what is now IraqMany modern nations have gone on the offensive to ensure that their people have enough water. Ethiopia has spent years building a colossal dam on the Nile, inciting fear and anger from Egypt downstream. China has done the same with the Mekong. Central Asian nations have had a long-running feud over the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers, which have been drained to such an extent that by the time they reach the inland Aral Sea, there is little water left.

Worldwide, countries share nearly 900 rivers, lakes and aquifers, according to the United Nations, and though a treaty exists to govern their use, fewer than half of all countries have ratified it. Notably absent from the list are upstream nations like Turkey, Iran and China.

In 2021, Iraq’s water ministry threatened to drag Iran to the International Court of Justice for taking its water. But Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government, which is close to Tehran’s leaders, dropped the issue.

History is replete with water wars, and one of the earliest recorded conflicts took place here in the Fertile Crescent, where scribes documented a fight over water between Sumerian city states more than 4,000 years ago in what is now Iraq.

Many modern nations have gone on the offensive to ensure that their people have enough water. Ethiopia has spent years building a colossal dam on the Nile, inciting fear and anger from Egypt downstream. China has done the same with the Mekong. Central Asian nations have had a long-running feud over the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers, which have been drained to such an extent that by the time they reach the inland Aral Sea, there is little water left.

Worldwide, countries share nearly 900 rivers, lakes and aquifers, according to the United Nations, and though a treaty exists to govern their use, fewer than half of all countries have ratified it. Notably absent from the list are upstream nations like Turkey, Iran and China.

In 2021, Iraq’s water ministry threatened to drag Iran to the International Court of Justice for taking its water. But Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government, which is close to Tehran’s leaders, dropped the issue.History is replete with water wars, and one of the earliest recorded conflicts took place here in the Fertile Crescent, where scribes documented a fight over water between Sumerian city states more than 4,000 years ago in what is now Iraq.

Many modern nations have gone on the offensive to ensure that their people have enough water. Ethiopia has spent years building a colossal dam on the Nile, inciting fear and anger from Egypt downstream. China has done the same with the Mekong. Central Asian nations have had a long-running feud over the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers, which have been drained to such an extent that by the time they reach the inland Aral Sea, there is little water left.

Worldwide, countries share nearly 900 rivers, lakes and aquifers, according to the United Nations, and though a treaty exists to govern their use, fewer than half of all countries have ratified it. Notably absent from the list are upstream nations like Turkey, Iran and China.

In 2021, Iraq’s water ministry threatened to drag Iran to the International Court of Justice for taking its water. But Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government, which is close to Tehran’s leaders, dropped the issue.

The Kinani family, whose farm withered as Iran built dams, still grows a little wheat, mostly for its own consumption. But the once-clear irrigation canal the farm uses now has nearly stagnant, viscous water with a brownish-green color and a nauseating smell.


“We are irrigating with sewage water,” Mr. Kinani said. 


Drought brings other, less obvious dangers, too. 

In parts of Iraq, rivers and irrigation canals once provided strategic barriers — their waters too wide, fast or deep for extremist fighters to traverse.

Today, if those waters are running at all, they are often low enough to walk across.

Militants who had been pushed back in recent years are taking advantage of the drying landscape to come back and attack with ease, according to Sheikh Muhammed Dhaifan, who has been fighting to keep his tribe northeast of Baghdad from leaving the 44 villages where they have worked the land for generations.

When Al Qaeda seized the tribe’s land in 2005, it used stones to block the irrigation canals fed by the Adaim River and forced many farmers to flee.

After Al Qaeda’s defeat, Sheikh Muhammed persuaded most of his clan to return. But then in 2012, as the Islamic State began to emerge, his tribe was forced to leave again.

Finally, after almost five years, ISIS was vanquished and the villagers began to come back. 


Now the chief enemy is drought, stealing not just their livelihoods, but also their sense of safety. In some places, the water hardly covers the pebbles lining the riverbed. ISIS barely has to slow down to get across.

“We used to be protected by the river,” said Sheikh Muhammed. “Now, sometimes they walk, sometimes they drive their motorbikes, the water is so low.”

Last year, Islamic State fighters crossed on foot at night and killed 11 soldiers, many as they slept, at an Iraqi Army outpost on the river’s banks.

This year, the fighters have moved farther east, attacking villages on the Diyala River, which is also low because of drought and Iran’s dams. More than 50 civilians were killed in the province in the first five months of 2023, most by fighters aligned with ISIS.


In the past, the snowmelt and rains sometimes swelled the region’s rivers, prompting Turkey and Iran to share more water with Iraq. But the future looks unlikely to offer much respite.

The current trend of a hotter, drier Iraq — and a hotter Middle East — is expected to last for decades, making the once-fertile crescent less and less livable.

Already, Iraq does not have enough water to meet its needs, the World Bank says. But by 2035 its water deficit could widen significantly, cutting into the country’s homegrown food supply and the economy as a whole.

Pleas to Turkey to share more water have largely gone unheeded.

In the summer of 2022, at the height of last year’s drought, Turkey’s ambassador to Iraq responded to Iraq’s requests for more water by complaining that Iraqis were “squandering” it, calling on the Iraqi government to enact “immediate measures to reduce the waste.” This year, when a similar request came, Turkey shared more water for a month before cutting back again.

Turkey’s complaints about Iraq are not unfounded. Iraq’s irrigation efforts lose large quantities to evaporation and runoff. Water soaks into earthen canals, leaks from rusted pipes and runs off after being used in flood irrigation — the 6,000-year-old method of saturating fields.

The fertilizer in the runoff makes the groundwater saltier. Studies in southern Iraq show large areas with salt levels so high that the water cannot be used for drinking, irrigation or even washing clothes.

Iraq’s population makes the forecast even more dire: It is one of the fastest-growing in the region.


Mr. Sahlani, the science teacher near Naseriyah, recalled how much of life in rural southern Iraq life was lived on the water just 20 years ago. Locals started their days in small boats, pushing off at first light to fish before returning after sunrise to tend the fields. While some still do, the river fish are often too small, their flesh too inundated with pollutants, to make it worthwhile these days.

The changes are especially evident in the vast marshes of southern Iraq. Some 60 years ago, they were the largest wetlands in western Eurasia. People have lived there for thousands of years.

Saddam Hussein drained the marshes of about 90 percent of their water to deprive his enemies of a place to hide in their thick reeds and small islands. In doing so, he stifled “the lungs of Iraq,” said Azzam Alwash, the Iraqi-American engineer who helped re-flood the wetlands after the United States invasion.

Surprisingly quickly, marine life rebounded, migratory birds returned and so did the people who had left. Once again, the mashouf — the long, narrow boats used by the Sumerians — glided through the waterways. Herds of water buffalo flourished.

But years of drought, along with the chokehold on river water from Turkey and Iran, have devastated the marshes again.


“The marshes are drying,” Mohammed Raed, 19, said as he left them behind, walking his family’s emaciated buffalo toward a neighboring province, where there was still the hope of feeding them.

Mr. Sahlani, the science teacher, said people now eyed their upstream neighbors with suspicion, accusing them of taking more water from the irrigation canals than they’re due and then shutting the sluice gates, leaving too little for residents downstream to grow crops.

Without realizing it, he was describing — on a much smaller scale — Iraq’s standoff with Turkey and Iran, which control much of the Euphrates and the Tigris.

“I understand the problem,” said Ghazwan Abdul Amir, the Iraqi water ministry’s director in Naseriyah, adding that the government was hoping to bring more water to residents in the area.

But water is scarce and money is tight, he said: “Maybe next year.”

Fixing Iraq’s outdated farming techniques, which waste as much as 70 percent of the water used for irrigation, according to a study done for Iraq’s water ministry, is paramount. But persuading farmers to change has been slow going. There were just 120 drip irrigation systems allotted to farmers in Mr. Sahlani’s province last year to save water — and the farmers had to pay for them.

Past the urban sprawl of northern Naseriyah, with its small auto repair shops and vegetable stands, the land empties out. Storm clouds gather in the late afternoon but then disperse without shedding a drop. Tufts of grasses, yellow and brown by late June, offer signs that crops grew here not so long ago.

The wind starts early each morning, blowing ceaselessly until dusk. It strips the topsoil, drying the land until all that is left is an earthen dust that piles on the quickly mounting dunes.

A short drive off the highway, deeper into the desert, lies Al Najim, a village being blown off the map. Thirty years ago, it had 5,000 people. Today there are just 80 left. The temperature hovered at 122 degrees.

Qahatan Almihana, an agricultural engineer, pointed at the town’s landmarks: buildings half-covered in sand, doors buried too deep to open. Sand piled halfway up the walls, poured in the windows and weighed down the roofs.

“That was the school,” he said. The teachers stopped coming in early 2022.

Sheikh Muhammad Ajil Falghus, the head of the Najim tribe, was born in the village. “The land was good, the soil was good,” he explained. Until the early 2000s, he said, “we grew wheat and barley, corn and clover.”

Now, all that grows are small groups of tamarisk trees planted as a bulwark against the sands.

“We are living now on the verge of life,” the sheikh said. “There is no agriculture, no planting possible anymore. This is the end of the line, the end of life. We wait for a solution from God, or from the good people.”