Monday, February 16, 2026

3677. Foreign Policy of the Second Turmp Administration

 By Kamran Nayeri, February 16, 2026



In this essay, I will discuss Donald Trump’s foreign policy, with a focus on his second presidential term. There is a growing body of literature on Trump’s second-term foreign policy. A question of interest is whether Trump’s strategy and tactics are largely his own or a response to the changing international structure.

Safavipour and Jalalirad (2025) argue that Trump espouses a new “philosophy” aligned with his America First view: a protectionist, anti-globalist stance favoring bilateral deals. Thus, he is dismantling the multilateral post-World War II international arrangement.

Ghafarizadeh (2025) similarly argues that Trump seeks “peace through strength” using tariffs and military might to achieve his goal.

Nedeljković & Živojinović (2025) analyze the strategic motivations behind Trump’s foreign policy in 2025 by situating his decisions within broader grand strategy options (e.g., isolationism, selective engagement) and argue that his actions reflect consistent strategic priorities shaped by both continuity and adaptation in the global context.

Jasmin & Hosen (2025) provide a systematic analysis of Trump’s “America First” approach, explaining his motivations as rooted in a nationalist, selective-engagement logic that challenges liberal internationalism and reshapes U.S. global commitments.

Smolinski et al. (2025) apply negotiation theory to a set of expert analyses of Trump’s 2025 tariff campaign, showing how motivations rooted in transactional leverage and hard-bargaining logic shaped U.S. foreign economic policy.

The shortcoming of these approaches is their failure to examine the historical record of Pax Americana (American Peace) in the post-World War II period, which others have called the American Century. This period was marked by the United States supplanting Britain as the leading power in Western imperialism.  By 2008, this period of U.S. dominance over the global economy had given way to a rising multipolar world order. I submit that the relative decline of the U.S., and with it Western, explains the rise of the Make America Great Again movement, of which Trump is the leading voice, and therefore, Trump’s foreign policy strategy and tactics.

We can already see the crisis within the Western imperialist coalition. In the sixty-second European Security Conference (February 13-15), President Emmanuel Macron of France said: “Europe is rearming, but we must now go beyond.” He argued Europe must become a unified economic and military power to become a unified major power: “Europe has to become a geopolitical power.” (Landler, et.al., February 13, 2026).

Earlier, Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany suggested that the Trump administration’s actions over the past year meant that the United States’ claim to global leadership had been “challenged, and possibly squandered.” (ibid.) He admitted that: “The international order based on rights and rules is currently being destroyed…This order, as flawed as it has been even in its heyday, no longer exists in that form.”

Like Macron, Merz advocated a militarily strong Europe and sought to reduce its economic dependence on the United States. The Times reported that “Germany had begun talks with France, a nuclear power, on establishing a nuclear deterrent for Europe.”

France and Britain are the only European countries to possess nuclear weapons. Only France is a member of the European Union, although both countries are members of NATO. Macron had said last year that, at Mr. Merz’s request, he was open to the possibility of covering European allies with a French nuclear umbrella.

Currently, the United States provides a nuclear guarantee to its NATO allies in Europe. However, in the past year, the Trump administration's actions have undermined the trust in this relationship. In particular, Trump’s push to “acquire” Greenland, a Danish colony, by any means necessary, including force, raised the possibility of war between the U.S. and Denmark, which was backed by other European powers. That meant a breakdown of NATO, as temporary as it was, as the armed force of Western imperialism headed by the United States. Europe collaborated closely with the Biden administration through NATO in the war in Ukraine, with the excuse of containing Russian expansionism. In fact, in the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was NATO that has been expanding to Russia’s borders even though Moscow had disbanded the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact, formally the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, was a collective defense treaty signed in Warsaw, Poland, between the Soviet Union and seven other Eastern Bloc socialist republics in Central and Eastern Europe in May 1955, during the Cold War, to guard against NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) founded in 1949 is an intergovernmental military alliance between 12 member states. It was founded during the Cold War against the Soviet Union, its ally in World War II.  It currently has 32 members.

The relative decline of U.S. capitalism since the 1970s

The two world wars in Europe originated in Britain's relative decline as the dominant world power, as Germany and the U.S. industrialized and outcompeted Britain by 1913.

The rise and global dominance of British imperialism began around 1750. In 1757, at the Battle of Plassey, Britain gained decisive control over Bengal, marking the beginning of large-scale British rule in India. In the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), Britain defeated France globally, gaining Canada and expanding its overseas dominance. In 1815, at the Battle of Waterloo, Britain defeated Napoleon Bonaparte, thereby becoming the world’s leading naval and financial power.  At the height of its dominance, Britain controlled 25% of the world’s land and population, including India, large parts of Africa, Canada, Australia, and strategic choke points such as the Suez Canal. Historians called this period Pax Britannica. This dominance was powered by the Industrial Revolution, 1760-1840.

However, the German and U.S. industrial revolutions began in the late nineteenth century, outpaced British productivity, and competed for new products and industries. German industrialization, especially from 1871 to World War II, excelled not in scale but in science-based, high-technology industries. This was made possible by the tight relationship between universities and industry. Germany pioneered research universities, industrial laboratories, technical institutions, and state-sponsored industrial coordination and investment banking.  New industries and products included synthetic dyes, pharmaceuticals (e.g., aspirin and antiseptics), industrial chemicals (e.g., from firms such as BASF and Bayer), and artificial fertilizers.  Germany also excelled in steel and heavy industries (something Britain lacked). Germany also excelled in electrical engineering, particularly in the production of electrical generators, power grids, industrial machinery, and telecommunications equipment (major firms were Siemens and AEG). After the unification of Germany under Otto von Bismarck, Germany rapidly became Europe’s leading industrial power. and the science-driven industry model became the blueprint for the industrialization of the U.S. and Japan.

U.S. industrialization, especially 1865-1913, was characterized by mass production, large-scale organization, the exploitation of natural resources, and productivity growth. If Germany led in science-driven industry, the U.S. led in scale, efficiency, and managerial innovation. The U.S. perfected assembly line production and standardized factory systems. Examples include Ford Motor Company and the moving assembly line, which enabled high output, lower consumer prices, and the expansion of a mass market. No other country matched American industrial scale before World War I. The U.S. also excelled in steel and heavy industries, the world leader by 1900 (Andrew Carnegie and U.S. Steel Company). By 1913, the U.S. produced more steel than Britain and Germany combined.  The U.S also built the world's largest railroad network, integrated continental markets, and developed modern logistics systems. The railroad stimulated steel, coal, finance, and telegraph industries. The U.S. also led in the oil and energy industries (John D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil Company). The U.S. became the world's largest oil producer by the early twentieth century.  The U.S. has developed large vertically integrated corporations, modern corporate management structures, and national financial markets. American firms were generally bigger than their European counterpart.

Thus, British dominance of the world economy was challenged by Germany, leading to World War I, in which the U.S. joined the British side. However, the humiliation of Germany after its defeat by the Allies contributed to World War II, thereby prolonging the rivalry for global dominance. With the defeat of German imperialism and the collapse of British imperialism, the United States became the leading power in Western imperialism.

Trump’s second term in office

The underlying ideological basis of the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement is the colonial settlers’ vision of the United States as a white Judeo-Christian nation as part of Western civilization. In this vision, the relative decline of the United States is due to mass immigration from the global South by non-white people, some of whom are not Christians. This has been central to Trump's criticism of European leaders (Burns, 2025; Wong, 2025).

Trump’s second-term presidency is characterized by social and cultural policies framed as efforts to restore “traditional” institutional norms. This is tightly linked with a more centralized, aggressive, racist, and anti-immigrant policy of mass deportation of non-white immigrants and effectively closing the border with Mexico to most asylum seekers. At the same time, Trump encouraged and welcomed the immigration of White South Africans who claimed they were being discriminated for their race. In this, Trump’s views merge with those of semi-fascist White supremacists in the U.S. and anti-immigrant rightists and fascists in Europe.

Insofar as foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy, that is, insofar as states act in their own interests, Trump's foreign policy is shaped by his vision of MAGA (Cadier, 2024) Trump’s second term presidency is focused on making the executive branch of the government central in policy making, as of December 15, 2025, he had issued 221 executive orders since returning to the White House, more than he did during his first four years in office, according to the American Presidency Project, an online database of presidential documents (Hennen, 2025).

Trump’s foreign policy has been equally muscular.  Mainstream analysts have described it as “imperialist and expansionist” in its approach to the Americas, recalling the Monroe Doctrine. He has adopted an "America First" foreign policy toward Europe, thereby threatening the postwar Western alliance, particularly NATO. Stephen Miller, Trump's deputy chief of staff, explained their policies as "We're a superpower. And under President Trump, we are going to conduct ourselves as a superpower." That was the mindset that engineered the abduction of President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, on January 3. The U.S. assault was preceded by an aerial bombing of boats off the shores of Venezuela, with the claim that they were carrying drugs to the United States, with no proof of their claim. Then, Trump placed the USS Abraham Lincoln and five other battleships in the vicinity of the Venezuelan coast and ordered the CIA to participate in the plan for the abduction of Maduro.  All these were clear displays of gunboat diplomacy.  The term originated in the nineteenth century, when Western imperialism intimidated other, less powerful countries into granting concessions by threatening them with military superiority, typically through naval power. The U.S. Congress, which constitutionally has the power to declare war, remained silent throughout this period because both parties in Washington long wanted to overthrow Maduro.

As of this writing, Trump has stationed the USS Abraham Lincoln close to the borders of Iran and is sending a second battleship while his administration is in negotiations with the Islamic Republic. Trump is demanding the secession of nuclear enrichment, cutting back on missile development and production, and ending support for its Islamic allies in the Middle East.

Regarding the Middle East, Trump has adopted a firmer pro-Israel policy, backing Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, expanding regional normalization agreements by building on the Abraham Accords, and joining Israel in the 12-day war with Iran by bombing deeply buried nuclear facilities in Iran, which Israel was unable to do.

At the same time, Trump is stepping back from earlier U.S. foreign policy, which treated the entire globe as its domain, thereby partially conceding regional powers' spheres of influence. This is true in the war in Ukraine as Trump’s administration has rejected Biden’s anti-Russia policy, reduced open-ended military support for the Zelensky government, and demanded a negotiated solution to the war. Regarding China, he followed the bipartisan policy of long-term great-power competition framed in economic-security terms.  However, it does not challenge China’s dominance in the South China Sea, and Trump seems open to negotiations over the future of Taiwan.

In effect, Trump’s foreign policy has revived the focus on President James Monroe’s 1823 doctrine (the Monroe Doctrine), which viewed Latin America as the backyard of U.S. Imperialism, while withdrawing from the institutional arrangement of Pax Americana, in particular with Europe, which was largely shaped by the United States at the conclusion of World War II.  

Multilateral policies have been replaced by bilateral arrangements that leverage the U.S. advantageous position to make “new deals.” This has been most prominent in international trade, where the World Trade Organization has been set aside in favor of imposing high tariffs on a country or a set of countries to secure new trade arrangements more favorable to the United States or to pursue a protectionist policy.

Economic historian Douglas Irwin classifies U.S. tariff history into three periods: a revenue period (ca. 1790–1860), a restriction period (1861–1933), and a reciprocity period (from 1934 onwards). In the first period, from 1790 to 1860, average tariffs increased from 20 percent to 60 percent before declining again to 20 percent. From 1861 to 1933, which Irwin characterizes as the "restriction period", the average tariffs rose to 50 percent and remained at that level for several decades. From 1934 onwards, in the "reciprocity period", the average tariff declined substantially until it leveled off at 5 percent. Especially after 1942, the U.S. began to promote free trade worldwide. Following Trump’s 2016 presidential victory, the US increased trade protectionism.

Another example is Trump’s Board of Peace (BOP) project, which aims to replace the United Nations. In this project, which grew out of Trump’s Gaza Peace Plan ratified by the Security Council Resolution 2803. The BOP was proposed in September 2025 and established at the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in January 2026. Donald Trump has been appointed Chairman with veto power over all its decisions.  Membership in the BOP will require a pledge of one billion dollars over a three-year period, effectively excluding most governments worldwide that cannot raise sufficient funds to secure a seat on the BOP.  As of this writing, only 25 of the 62 countries invited to join BOP have accepted. The European Union and China have declined the offer to join it.

The relative decline of U.S. imperialism

In 1960, the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accounted for 40% of global GDP.  In 2025, the U.S. share stood at 12.4%. It is estimated that the U.S. share will decline to 11.6% by 20230. China’s share of world GDP was 12.4% in 2025 and is projected to reach 21.4% by 20230 (Purchasing Power Parity (Int$). This indicates that China has already overtaken the United States as the world’s largest economy, and that forecasts project further U.S. decline and China’s continued growth by 2030 (World Economics, accessed February 15, 2026).

Moreover, Western industrial capitalist economies, individually and collectively, have entered a new phase of long-term, slow growth due to economic, technological, demographic, and environmental factors (climate change-related damages are an increasing concern).

Conclusion

I have argued that the Make America Great Again movement and the rise of Donald Trump himself and his authoritarian, aggressive, and racist muscular domestic and foreign policies are rooted in the relative decline of U.S. imperialism, the rise of a multipolar world in which China is decidedly the rising power.  

Pax Americana (American Century) has ended. Yet increasingly, there is no reliable world order in its place. Rivalry among the top powers is intensifying. The last time this occurred was in the early twentieth century, when British world dominance was challenged by Germany, leading to two world wars.  The First World War saw the mobilization of more than 65 million soldiers, and the deaths of almost 15 million soldiers and civilians combined. Approximately 8.8 million of these deaths were of military personnel, while six million civilians died as a direct result of the war, mostly through hunger, disease, and genocide. In World War II resulted in an estimated total of 60–75 million deaths, including those who died from deprivation, famine, and disease. This represents about 3% of the estimated global population of 2.3 billion in 1940.

Today, another world war will be a nuclear war; a war that will end much of life on Earth. This idea seems so terrible that one would think no government would ever initiate such a war. However, on August 6 and 9, 1945, the United States detonated two atomic bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, during World War II. The aerial bombings killed 150,000 to 246,000 people, most of whom were civilians.

The world is entering a dangerous new nuclear age. This month, the New START treaty between the United States and Russia — the last major restraint on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals — expired. In its place, the Trump administration is substituting a policy of vague threats and dangerous brinkmanship that portends an unconstrained arms race not seen since the height of the Cold War.

The Trump administration has allowed the New START treaty between the United States and Russia — the last major restraint on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals — expire. The New York Times editors characterized this approach as a ”new, unbound era,” which

“is alarming in both its words and its mechanics. Rather than preserving the stability that has held for half a century, the administration is weighing the deployment of more nuclear weapons and, perhaps most recklessly, the resumption of underground nuclear testing. (The Editorial Board, The New York Times, February 16, 2026).”

The inter-imperialist rivalry is taking place as the world is facing other existential threats- catastrophic climate change, the Sixth Extinction, and recurrent pandemics-which will require close cooperation among key world governments.

These crises will not be solved unless the world transitions, beginning with the key countries involved, from the anthropocentric industrial capitalist civilization to an ecological socialist society in which anthropocentrism is replaced by ecocentrism.  

References:

Burns, Dasha.POLITICO's interview with Donald Trump.” POLITICO, December 9, 2025.

Cadier,  David.Foreign Policy as the Continuation of Domestic Politics by Other Means: Pathways and Patterns of Populist Politicization,” Foreign Policy Analysis. January 2024.

Ghafarizadeh, Mehrshad. “U.S. Foreign Policy During Donald Trump’s Second Term: The

Strategy of Peace Through Power.” World Politics. 2025.

Hennen, Mia. Trump has already issued more executive orders in his second term than in his first.” PEW Research Center. December 16, 2025.

Landler, Mark, Jim Tankersley, Aurelien Breeden and Richard Pérez-Peña. Macron Insists Europe Remains Central to Global Stability.” The New York Times, February 13, 2026.

Safavipour, Abtin and Helia Jalalirad. “The Philosophical Underpinnings of Trump's Foreign

Policy: Analyzing Key Influences and Implications.” Journal of Humanities and Education Development. January 2025.

The New York Times. Trump Risks Igniting a Nuclear Wildfire.” February 16, 2026.“

Wong, Edward. “Rubio Stresses Shared History to Europeans but Warns of ‘Civilizational Erasure’ in Munich.” The New York Times. February 14, 2026.

World Economics. “Share of Global GDP by Country.” Accessed February 15, 2026.

Tuesday, February 10, 2026

3675. Logical Fallacies

 By Ben Meer, no date. 




3674. Interview: Michael Pollan on Human Consciousness

By David Marchese, The New York Time, February 7, 2025 

Devin Oktar Yalkin for The New York Times

For as long as I can remember, I’ve wrestled with my own thoughts and feelings about identity. Why am I, David, the person I am? How changeable is that? Where do those thoughts and feelings come from anyway, and what purposes do they ultimately serve? I suppose it’s no coincidence then that I’ve also always been so curious about the subject of human consciousness. That’s the area of science and philosophy — of human thinking generally! — that burrows most deeply into similar questions and, to varying degrees of satisfaction, offers a plethora of possible answers. The best-selling author Michael Pollan has been thinking about these things, too. Throughout his work — which includes classic books like “The Omnivore’s Dilemma” (2006), about why we eat the way we do, and “How to Change Your Mind” (2018), about the science and uses of psychedelic drugs — Pollan has waded into ideas about the inner workings of the mind. Now, with his forthcoming book, “A World Appears: A Journey Into Consciousness,” which will arrive this month, he has jumped into the deep end. The book is both a highly personal and expansive multidisciplinary survey of questions around human consciousness — what it is, what causes it, what it’s for and what the possible answers might mean for how we choose to live. And as Pollan explained, with the rise of artificial intelligence as well as the relentless political pressure on our attention (that is, our minds), those questions, already profound, are becoming only more urgent.

I want to get some basics: How do you define consciousness? The simplest way to define consciousness is as subjective experience. Another one-word definition is “awareness.” Thomas Nagel, the N.Y.U. philosopher, wrote a piece back in the ’70s called “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” His idea is: If we can imagine it is like anything to be a bat, then a bat is conscious, because that means it has some sort of subjective experience. Why did he choose bats? Well, they’re very different than we are. Instead of using eyesight, they use echolocation. They bounce signals off of objects to move through space. We can vaguely imagine going through the world with echolocation. Whereas my toaster, I can’t do that. I don’t have a sense of what it’s like to be my toaster.

A big question of consciousness is what the philosopher David Chalmers has referred to as the “hard problem.” Can you tell people what that is? Basically how you get from matter to mind, how you cross that huge gulf from neurons to subjective experience — a gulf no one has managed to cross. Related questions are: Why don’t all these things we do go on automatically? Why do we have to be aware of anything? We could be completely automated and perhaps get along just fine. Your brain is monitoring your body and making fine adjustments in the blood gasses, in the heart rate, in digestion. There’s a lot going on that we don’t have to think about. So why do we have to think about any of it? Some interesting theories have been proposed. One is that some of the issues that we deal with have to be decided in a conscious way. When you have two competing needs — you’re hungry and you’re tired — which should take precedence? So consciousness opens up this space of decision-making. The other argument is that we live in a very complex social world where I have to predict what you’re going to say; I have to imagine my way into your head. You can’t automate human social interaction. It has too many elements. So consciousness is very helpful in navigating that world.

It seems likely to me that regardless of the source of consciousness, it’s probably a result of evolutionary processes — that consciousness evolved to make information available to certain parts of the brain, or to help us recognize patterns, or perceive threats, or maintain homeostasis. But are any non-evolutionary arguments for consciousness plausible to you? Oh, yeah. One is panpsychism.

Which could sound bonkers. It can sound bonkers. Panpsychism is the idea that everything, every particle, the ink on the page, the atoms, all have some infinitesimal degree of psyche or consciousness, and somehow this consciousness is combined in some way from our cells and the rest of our bodies to create this kind of superconsciousness. It sounds crazy. There are some very serious people who believe in it. You have to expand your sense of the plausible when you’re looking at consciousness. But we’ve done that before. How long ago was it that we discovered electromagnetism? This crazy idea that there are all these waves passing through us that can carry information. That’s just as mind-blowing, right?

I could happily talk about consciousness all day, but often when I do talk about it with people, I can tell that they view thinking about consciousness as almost akin to navel gazing. Like, it’s an interesting thing to think about, but really what difference does it make? What is your response to that? I’ve thought a lot about what good is it to think about consciousness, and I came to think that it’s more important than ever. Scientists are now learning that more and more animals and creatures — going all the way down possibly to insects — are conscious. So that’s one interesting issue: We’re sharing consciousness with more creatures. And then the big threat is artificial intelligence and the effort to create a conscious A.I., which is going to be an enormous challenge to this question of what does it mean to be human. Is consciousness something that a machine can possess? Are we more like intelligent machines or conscious, feeling animals? Who are we? So I think we’re approaching this kind of Copernican moment of redefinition.


What do you think we should do with the increasing awareness that more animals might be conscious than we previously thought? I guess the argument would be that we should have a greater amount of respect for them, but we know human beings are conscious and we exploit the hell out of other humans all the time. That’s a great question. There’s this whole conversation, very active here where I live in Silicon Valley, that if A.I. is conscious, then we’re going to have to give it moral consideration. Well, really? Have we given moral consideration to one another? Have we given moral consideration to the chickens and the cattle that we eat? The answer is no. It doesn’t automatically follow. So we’re going to have to sort out the ethics. Maybe it’s around the ability to suffer. Maybe that’s where you draw the line. I don’t know. I’m not an ethicist, but it’s not as easy as: You’re conscious, therefore you have all these rights. A.I. is really going to complicate this. Who we grant personhood to is a very subjective human decision. We give it to corporations, oddly enough, which are not conscious, but there are all sorts of creatures we don’t give it to. I don’t think we’re entirely rational or consistent in our granting of moral consideration.


You are skeptical that A.I. can achieve consciousness. Why? I’m convinced by some of the researchers, including Antonio Damasio and Mark Solms, who made a really compelling case that the origin of consciousness is with feelings, not thoughts. Feelings are the language in which the body talks to the brain. We forget that brains exist to keep bodies alive, and the way the body gets the brain’s attention is with feelings. So if you think feelings are at the center of consciousness, it’s very hard to imagine how a machine could rise to that level to have feelings. The other reason I think we’re not close to it is that everything that machines know, the data set on which they’re trained, is information on the internet. They don’t have friction with nature. They don’t have friction with us. Some of the most important things we know are about person-to-person contact, about contact with nature — this friction that really makes us human.

Despite how it may seem, the internet is not actually the whole of the world. But to a computer, it’s all you got.

How would we know if an A.I. is conscious or not? How do I know you’re conscious?

I promise I am! Your promise is what’s called reportability in philosophy. You can ask something if it’s conscious, and with humans, we kind of know.


But if an A.I. says: “Michael, I’m conscious. I promise,” how do we know? We don’t, and that is exactly why people are falling deep into these relationships with A.I. We can’t say it’s not conscious when it tells us it is. But we can test it in various ways. It all goes back to this idea of the Turing test — that the test of machine intelligence would be when they can fool us.

If the Turing test is the criteria for machine consciousness, then that test has already been passed. Exactly, it has fooled many, many people. Whether it can fool an expert, too, I don’t know, but probably. So we’re in a very weird place where the machines we’re living with are telling us they’re conscious. We can’t dispute it, but we can look at how they’re made and draw the kind of conclusions I’ve drawn. But is that going to persuade everybody? No. We want them to be conscious in some way. Or some of us do. It’s easier to have a relationship with a chatbot than another human. Going back to that friction point, they offer no friction. They just suck up to us and convince us how brilliant we are, and we fall for it.


What do you think religion has to offer to questions about consciousness? Buddhism has been thinking about consciousness for a very long time. It has been raising these questions about the self and giving people tools to transcend the self, which in itself is a desire that is surprising. We cling to this ego so firmly; at the same time, we do a lot of things to get away from it, whether it’s extreme sports or psychedelics or meditation.

Or watching a movie or having sex or any number of things. Some of the highest experiences of life are these moments where we transcend the self, and that’s curious.


What do you think that’s about? Why, if we cling to the self, are we also so hungry to lose ourselves? The self isolates us, the ego builds walls around it, it’s constantly evaluating, it ruminates. There’s a lot of crappy stuff about the self.


Yeah, it’s constantly yammering away. Yes, there is that voice in our head, and it embodies critical voices, very often inherited from parents or other people. I mean, the ego is very useful. It gets a lot done. It got my book done. It gets your podcast done. So we shouldn’t be too critical of it. On the other hand, when we transcend the self, we connect to things larger than ourselves. And this is one of the beautiful things about psychedelics — when they work, there is this sense of dissolution of self. The walls come down, and you feel part of nature. You feel love. I had an experience I describe in the book of self-dissolution where I merged with this piece of music, this Bach cello suite, and it was such a profound experience because the subject-object split went away and I was identical to this music. The interesting thing, though, is that consciousness doesn’t go away when the ego goes away. We protect our ego because we’re afraid if we lose it, we’re dead. But we’re not. It’s just one voice. There’s a lot else going on, as you learn when you meditate and use psychedelics.


How often do you do psychedelics? Not very often at all. It’s hard to find time. It’s a big day with a lot of preparation and everything. If I can do it once a year, I’m happy. What I’m talking about is ideally a guided experience. You can let yourself go when someone’s watching your body. So when I can put myself in that situation — which isn’t easy to do, and it’s expensive — I find that very valuable. I’m still learning things.


What are you learning? Oh, every psychedelic experience is different. You never go back to the same place. That’s why I think it’s a great thing to do on or around your birthday, to sort of take stock of your reality and what the issues are. I had an experience not too long ago that kind of rocked me.

What was it? It was a guided trip on — it doesn’t matter what it was on. I had these powerful emotions that had no name. They were like these giant blimps crashing into me, crashing into each other, and I was straining and so frustrated that I didn’t know what they were, and the answer never came clear during the experience. Oddly enough, the answer to what they were came two weeks later when I happened to be at a meditation retreat. The links between psychedelics and meditation are very fruitful and interesting. I was doing a walking meditation after a couple days of complete silence, 12-hour-a-day meditating, and there were the blimps. In sans serif letters, right on the blimp, was the word “fear.” I quickly realized what it was. It was fear of losing something very close to you. So the combination of two experiences ended up being very productive. But on its own, the psychedelic experience raised more questions than gave answers.

Questions of consciousness, which are really questions about what makes us us, are some of the most important questions that can be asked. But at the same time, they can lead into other questions like: Is there some David — some stable “I” — that exists or not? Or what is the relationship between free will and consciousness? Sometimes thinking about those questions can be destabilizing. Is that just me? Do you have similar apprehensions? It can be destabilizing, absolutely. One of the reasons people are happy to be less conscious and fill their attention with distractions and drugs is because the mind can be a scary place to visit. We often want to be less aware of what’s going on. There are reasons people avoid going down these rabbit holes. It takes a willingness to risk something.


I apologize if this seems like a woo-woo question, but do you think the absence of something like a stable “self” also means the absence of something like a soul? Do you believe in a soul? Well, if a soul is something that is indestructible and survives our death, no. But I can’t say anything about the afterlife with confidence. Consciousness has become our secular substitute for the soul; we talk about consciousness the way people in the 16th or 17th century talked about souls. Some people’s interest in it is the fact that it floats free of these mortal bodies and maybe gets folded into a collective consciousness after we’re gone. So I think there is a hidden religiosity or spirituality in the whole conversation around consciousness. Somebody asked me recently, Do you think as people get older, they are more interested in consciousness? And I would say yes, and probably for that reason.


It does seem that many of us have consistencies to ourselves that are a little hard to explain in the absence of something like a stable identity or a soul. In the new book, you mention a period in your teenage years when you were reading Hermann Hesse, writing bad poetry and thinking about the big questions. I don’t know if you still write bad poetry, but the other two things don’t seem that far away from what you’re now doing in your 70s. So what might explain what seem like intrinsic core qualities that are constant for you through time if not a stable self-identity or a soul? Even though I talk a lot about this idea that maybe the self is an illusion, it still has a conventional reality. The fact that I’m using myself to talk to yourself makes this very easy. If neither of us had selves right now, it would be a very loosey-goosey conversation. I can’t even imagine what it would be like. Matthieu Ricard said: It’s like a river has a name, and that conventional name is very useful, but there’s nothing consistent there. It’s just water passing.

I brought something like this up earlier, but I want to ask another version of it. This morning I was reading the news and thinking, Gosh, right now, is talking to Michael Pollan about consciousness a kind of “how many angels can dance on the head of a pin” conversation? I decided the answer is no, but do you ever have those doubts? I did at various points when I was starting on this book and the world was starting to fall apart. Like, is this how I should be using my energy? But I think that consciousness is at stake in a lot of what’s going on. One of the things Trump has done is occupy a significant chunk of our attention every single day. Our consciousness is being polluted, and protecting ourselves against that at the same time we preserve the ability to act politically is a difficult balancing act. Consciousness is a very precious realm. It’s the realm of our privacy and our freedom to think. So I think we need some kind of consciousness hygiene, particularly at this moment, where this one politician has figured out ways to command our attention. Consciousness is more relevant now than it even was 10 or 20 years ago, as something to think about, protect and nurture.