Friday, September 1, 2023

3622. A Climate Warning from the Cradle of Civilization

By Allissa J. Rubin, The New York TimesJuly 29, 2023



The word itself, Mesopotamia, means the land between rivers. It is where the wheel was invented, irrigation flourished and the earliest known system of writing emerged. The rivers here, some scholars say, fed the fabled Hanging Gardens of Babylon and converged at the place described in the Bible as the Garden of Eden.

Now, so little water remains in some villages near the Euphrates River that families are dismantling their homes, brick by brick, piling them into pickup trucks — window frames, doors and all — and driving away.

“You would not believe it if I say it now, but this was a watery place,” said Sheikh Adnan al Sahlani, a science teacher here in southern Iraq near Naseriyah, a few miles from the Old Testament city of Ur, which the Bible describes as the hometown of the Prophet Abraham.

These days, “nowhere has water,” he said. Everyone who is left is “suffering a slow death.”

You don’t have to go back to biblical times to find a more verdant Iraq. Well into the 20th century, the southern city of Basra was known as the “Venice of the East” for its canals, plied by gondola-like boats that threaded through residential neighborhoods.

Indeed, for much of its history, the Fertile Crescent — often defined as including areas of modern-day Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Iran, the West Bank and Gaza — did not lack for water, inspiring centuries of artists and writers who depicted the region as a lush ancient land. Spring floods were common, and rice, one of the most water-intensive crops in the world, was grown for more than 2,000 years.

But now nearly 40 percent of Iraq, an area roughly the size of Florida, has been overtaken by blowing desert sands that claim tens of thousands of acres of arable land every year.

Climate change and desertification are to blame, scientists say. So are weak governance and the continued reliance on wasteful irrigation techniques that date back millenniums to Sumerian times.

A tug of war over water — similar to the struggles over the Colorado River in the United States, the Mekong in Southeast Asia and the Nile in northern Africa — has also intensified water shortages for tens of millions of people across the regio

Another culprit is common to large regions of the world: a growing population whose water demands continue to rise, both because of sheer numbers and, in many places, higher living standards, increasing individual consumption.

Here in Iraq, the fallout is everywhere, fraying society, spurring deadly clashes between villages, displacing thousands of people every year, emboldening extremists and leaving ever more land looking like a barren moonscape.


In many areas, water pumped from below the surface is too salty to drink, the result of dwindling water, agricultural runoff and untreated waste. “Even my cows won’t drink it,” one farmer said.

Even in the north, where fresh water has historically been available, well diggers in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, bore down 580 feet last summer — and still found only salty water.

Iraq is now the fifth most vulnerable country to extreme temperatures, water scarcity and food shortages, the United Nations says. Next door in Iran, a province of two million people could run out of water by mid-September, Iranian lawmakers said, leaving few options beyond mass exodus.

And for the rest of the Middle East and some other areas of the world — including parts of Mexico, Pakistan, India and the Mediterranean — Iraq and its neighbors offer an unmistakable warning.

“Because of this region’s vulnerabilities, one of the most vulnerable on the planet, it is one of the first places that is going to show some kind of extreme succumbing, literally, to climate change,” said Charles Iceland, the director of water security for the World Resource Institute, a research organization.


PART 2

HOTTER, DRIER, FASTER

But, he added, “no countries, even the rich countries, are adapting to climate change to the degree they need to.”

Many people in the villages near the Euphrates River remember how, 20 years ago, the date palm trees grew so thick and close together that their leaves blocked the sunlight. The splashing of children in the irrigation canals and the sloshing of water jugs being carted home provided the backbeat of summer life.


Now, the irrigation canals are so dry in summer that the small bridges spanning them are barely necessary and the sounds of daily life signal water’s scarcity: the crackle of brown grasses and the rustle of dried out palm leaves. Some palms have no leaves at all, their bare trunks standing like the columns of ancient ruins.

Water comes from the government in red plastic barrels, in rations of about 160 gallons a month per family. Even when used sparingly, it barely lasts a week in the heat, said Mr. Sahlani, the sheikh and science teacher, who lives in the village of Albu Jumaa. Graffiti scrawled in Arabic on a half-destroyed concrete wall expressed the frustration: “Where is the state?” it read.

As recently as the 1970s and 1980s, Iraq’s water ministry built artificial lakes and dams to hold the immense annual overflow from winter rains and gushing snow melt from the Taurus Mountains, the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates.


Even today, traces of Iraq’s greener past can be seen every spring. In the Anbar desert, a brief winter rain can turn the shallow valleys green and speckle them with flowers. Along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, the water still nourishes trees beside the narrow banks, with bands of green fields on either side.


But even those bands have shrunk in recent decades.


The region is getting hotter — faster — than many parts of the world. By some estimates, the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean could warm by 5 degrees Celsius (9 degrees Fahrenheit) or even more during this century. In the worst months of summer, some places are already nearly unlivable.


Precipitation, already low, is expected to wane across the Middle East. The drought gripping Iraq is now in its fourth year, and the country is particularly vulnerable because most of its water comes from rivers that originate outside the country, holding it hostage to the decisions of its neighbors Turkey and Iran.


PART 3

WATER WARS

The chokehold on Iraq’s rivers has been tightening for decades.

Since 1974, Turkey has built 22 dams, hydroelectric plants and irrigation projects on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, modeled in part on the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States.

Then, in the early 2000s, Iran started building more than a dozen smaller dams and tunnels on tributaries to the Tigris, devastating Iraqi provinces like Diyala, which was known just 10 years ago for its peaches, apricots, oranges and dates. The tributaries from Iran are the only source of water in the province, other than the dwindling rainfall.

The impact has been drastic: The water flowing into Iraq has dropped almost 50 percent on the Euphrates and by about a third on the Tigris since major dam building began in the 1970s, according to statistics from Iraq’s water ministry.


Hashem al-Kinani and his family have felt the changes firsthand. For generations, they farmed 20 acres east of Baghdad, on the Diyala border, facing one trial after another.

First, the American invasion and the ouster of Saddam Hussein bit into the state’s support of farmers. Then in 2006, Al Qaeda moved in and killed many local men, leaving their headless bodies in ditches. Hashem lost an uncle, and the family house was bombed by Al Qaeda. Making matters worse, rainfall has become more erratic and gradually diminished. As the Iranian dams came on line, river water became too scarce to grow fruit.

The fig and pomegranate trees have died. His family sold off their 1,500 head of cattle and their sheep, because it was impossible to feed them. He’s not sure how much longer he can hang on.

“Farming is over here,” he said. “I cannot stay, but what can I do?”

History is replete with water wars, and one of the earliest recorded conflicts took place here in the Fertile Crescent, where scribes documented a fight over water between Sumerian city states more than 4,000 years ago in what is now Iraq.


Many modern nations have gone on the offensive to ensure that their people have enough water. Ethiopia has spent years building a colossal dam on the Nile, inciting fear and anger from Egypt downstream. China has done the same with the Mekong. Central Asian nations have had a long-running feud over the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers, which have been drained to such an extent that by the time they reach the inland Aral Sea, there is little water left.


Worldwide, countries share nearly 900 rivers, lakes and aquifers, according to the United Nations, and though a treaty exists to govern their use, fewer than half of all countries have ratified it. Notably absent from the list are upstream nations like Turkey, Iran and China.


In 2021, Iraq’s water ministry threatened to drag Iran to the International Court of Justice for taking its water. But Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government, which is close to Tehran’s leaders, dropped the issHistory is replete with water wars, and one of the earliest recorded conflicts took place here in the Fertile Crescent, where

scribes documented a fight over water between Sumerian city states more than 4,000 years ago in what is now IraqMany modern nations have gone on the offensive to ensure that their people have enough water. Ethiopia has spent years building a colossal dam on the Nile, inciting fear and anger from Egypt downstream. China has done the same with the Mekong. Central Asian nations have had a long-running feud over the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers, which have been drained to such an extent that by the time they reach the inland Aral Sea, there is little water left.

Worldwide, countries share nearly 900 rivers, lakes and aquifers, according to the United Nations, and though a treaty exists to govern their use, fewer than half of all countries have ratified it. Notably absent from the list are upstream nations like Turkey, Iran and China.

In 2021, Iraq’s water ministry threatened to drag Iran to the International Court of Justice for taking its water. But Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government, which is close to Tehran’s leaders, dropped the issue.

History is replete with water wars, and one of the earliest recorded conflicts took place here in the Fertile Crescent, where scribes documented a fight over water between Sumerian city states more than 4,000 years ago in what is now Iraq.

Many modern nations have gone on the offensive to ensure that their people have enough water. Ethiopia has spent years building a colossal dam on the Nile, inciting fear and anger from Egypt downstream. China has done the same with the Mekong. Central Asian nations have had a long-running feud over the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers, which have been drained to such an extent that by the time they reach the inland Aral Sea, there is little water left.

Worldwide, countries share nearly 900 rivers, lakes and aquifers, according to the United Nations, and though a treaty exists to govern their use, fewer than half of all countries have ratified it. Notably absent from the list are upstream nations like Turkey, Iran and China.

In 2021, Iraq’s water ministry threatened to drag Iran to the International Court of Justice for taking its water. But Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government, which is close to Tehran’s leaders, dropped the issue.History is replete with water wars, and one of the earliest recorded conflicts took place here in the Fertile Crescent, where scribes documented a fight over water between Sumerian city states more than 4,000 years ago in what is now Iraq.

Many modern nations have gone on the offensive to ensure that their people have enough water. Ethiopia has spent years building a colossal dam on the Nile, inciting fear and anger from Egypt downstream. China has done the same with the Mekong. Central Asian nations have had a long-running feud over the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers, which have been drained to such an extent that by the time they reach the inland Aral Sea, there is little water left.

Worldwide, countries share nearly 900 rivers, lakes and aquifers, according to the United Nations, and though a treaty exists to govern their use, fewer than half of all countries have ratified it. Notably absent from the list are upstream nations like Turkey, Iran and China.

In 2021, Iraq’s water ministry threatened to drag Iran to the International Court of Justice for taking its water. But Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government, which is close to Tehran’s leaders, dropped the issue.

The Kinani family, whose farm withered as Iran built dams, still grows a little wheat, mostly for its own consumption. But the once-clear irrigation canal the farm uses now has nearly stagnant, viscous water with a brownish-green color and a nauseating smell.


“We are irrigating with sewage water,” Mr. Kinani said. 


Drought brings other, less obvious dangers, too. 

In parts of Iraq, rivers and irrigation canals once provided strategic barriers — their waters too wide, fast or deep for extremist fighters to traverse.

Today, if those waters are running at all, they are often low enough to walk across.

Militants who had been pushed back in recent years are taking advantage of the drying landscape to come back and attack with ease, according to Sheikh Muhammed Dhaifan, who has been fighting to keep his tribe northeast of Baghdad from leaving the 44 villages where they have worked the land for generations.

When Al Qaeda seized the tribe’s land in 2005, it used stones to block the irrigation canals fed by the Adaim River and forced many farmers to flee.

After Al Qaeda’s defeat, Sheikh Muhammed persuaded most of his clan to return. But then in 2012, as the Islamic State began to emerge, his tribe was forced to leave again.

Finally, after almost five years, ISIS was vanquished and the villagers began to come back. 


Now the chief enemy is drought, stealing not just their livelihoods, but also their sense of safety. In some places, the water hardly covers the pebbles lining the riverbed. ISIS barely has to slow down to get across.

“We used to be protected by the river,” said Sheikh Muhammed. “Now, sometimes they walk, sometimes they drive their motorbikes, the water is so low.”

Last year, Islamic State fighters crossed on foot at night and killed 11 soldiers, many as they slept, at an Iraqi Army outpost on the river’s banks.

This year, the fighters have moved farther east, attacking villages on the Diyala River, which is also low because of drought and Iran’s dams. More than 50 civilians were killed in the province in the first five months of 2023, most by fighters aligned with ISIS.


In the past, the snowmelt and rains sometimes swelled the region’s rivers, prompting Turkey and Iran to share more water with Iraq. But the future looks unlikely to offer much respite.

The current trend of a hotter, drier Iraq — and a hotter Middle East — is expected to last for decades, making the once-fertile crescent less and less livable.

Already, Iraq does not have enough water to meet its needs, the World Bank says. But by 2035 its water deficit could widen significantly, cutting into the country’s homegrown food supply and the economy as a whole.

Pleas to Turkey to share more water have largely gone unheeded.

In the summer of 2022, at the height of last year’s drought, Turkey’s ambassador to Iraq responded to Iraq’s requests for more water by complaining that Iraqis were “squandering” it, calling on the Iraqi government to enact “immediate measures to reduce the waste.” This year, when a similar request came, Turkey shared more water for a month before cutting back again.

Turkey’s complaints about Iraq are not unfounded. Iraq’s irrigation efforts lose large quantities to evaporation and runoff. Water soaks into earthen canals, leaks from rusted pipes and runs off after being used in flood irrigation — the 6,000-year-old method of saturating fields.

The fertilizer in the runoff makes the groundwater saltier. Studies in southern Iraq show large areas with salt levels so high that the water cannot be used for drinking, irrigation or even washing clothes.

Iraq’s population makes the forecast even more dire: It is one of the fastest-growing in the region.


Mr. Sahlani, the science teacher near Naseriyah, recalled how much of life in rural southern Iraq life was lived on the water just 20 years ago. Locals started their days in small boats, pushing off at first light to fish before returning after sunrise to tend the fields. While some still do, the river fish are often too small, their flesh too inundated with pollutants, to make it worthwhile these days.

The changes are especially evident in the vast marshes of southern Iraq. Some 60 years ago, they were the largest wetlands in western Eurasia. People have lived there for thousands of years.

Saddam Hussein drained the marshes of about 90 percent of their water to deprive his enemies of a place to hide in their thick reeds and small islands. In doing so, he stifled “the lungs of Iraq,” said Azzam Alwash, the Iraqi-American engineer who helped re-flood the wetlands after the United States invasion.

Surprisingly quickly, marine life rebounded, migratory birds returned and so did the people who had left. Once again, the mashouf — the long, narrow boats used by the Sumerians — glided through the waterways. Herds of water buffalo flourished.

But years of drought, along with the chokehold on river water from Turkey and Iran, have devastated the marshes again.


“The marshes are drying,” Mohammed Raed, 19, said as he left them behind, walking his family’s emaciated buffalo toward a neighboring province, where there was still the hope of feeding them.

Mr. Sahlani, the science teacher, said people now eyed their upstream neighbors with suspicion, accusing them of taking more water from the irrigation canals than they’re due and then shutting the sluice gates, leaving too little for residents downstream to grow crops.

Without realizing it, he was describing — on a much smaller scale — Iraq’s standoff with Turkey and Iran, which control much of the Euphrates and the Tigris.

“I understand the problem,” said Ghazwan Abdul Amir, the Iraqi water ministry’s director in Naseriyah, adding that the government was hoping to bring more water to residents in the area.

But water is scarce and money is tight, he said: “Maybe next year.”

Fixing Iraq’s outdated farming techniques, which waste as much as 70 percent of the water used for irrigation, according to a study done for Iraq’s water ministry, is paramount. But persuading farmers to change has been slow going. There were just 120 drip irrigation systems allotted to farmers in Mr. Sahlani’s province last year to save water — and the farmers had to pay for them.

Past the urban sprawl of northern Naseriyah, with its small auto repair shops and vegetable stands, the land empties out. Storm clouds gather in the late afternoon but then disperse without shedding a drop. Tufts of grasses, yellow and brown by late June, offer signs that crops grew here not so long ago.

The wind starts early each morning, blowing ceaselessly until dusk. It strips the topsoil, drying the land until all that is left is an earthen dust that piles on the quickly mounting dunes.

A short drive off the highway, deeper into the desert, lies Al Najim, a village being blown off the map. Thirty years ago, it had 5,000 people. Today there are just 80 left. The temperature hovered at 122 degrees.

Qahatan Almihana, an agricultural engineer, pointed at the town’s landmarks: buildings half-covered in sand, doors buried too deep to open. Sand piled halfway up the walls, poured in the windows and weighed down the roofs.

“That was the school,” he said. The teachers stopped coming in early 2022.

Sheikh Muhammad Ajil Falghus, the head of the Najim tribe, was born in the village. “The land was good, the soil was good,” he explained. Until the early 2000s, he said, “we grew wheat and barley, corn and clover.”

Now, all that grows are small groups of tamarisk trees planted as a bulwark against the sands.

“We are living now on the verge of life,” the sheikh said. “There is no agriculture, no planting possible anymore. This is the end of the line, the end of life. We wait for a solution from God, or from the good people.”















 

Thursday, July 6, 2023

3621. Learning from the "COVID War"

By Sam Friedman, Bill of Health, July 5, 2023 


Sam Friedman

Amid an emergent international consensus that the COVID pandemic is “over,” writings about the pandemic and its meanings have burst forth like the flowers of June.

This article will focus on one such book, Lessons from the COVID War: An Investigative Report. Produced by an eminently established collection of people, The COVID Crisis Group. The book is intelligently critical of what was done during the pandemic, but at all points it remains within the confines of what is “politically respectable.” This respectability, I argue, means that their recommendations are too narrow to protect Americans, much less the populations of the Global South, from pandemics ahead (barring unexpectedly marvelous advances in vaccine breadth and rapidity of deployment).

Their COVID War

The “COVID Crisis Group” is an establishment group of businesspeople and government officials plus some subject matter experts. Many, like their director, Philip Zelikow, have held high government positions and been lawyers, CEOs, or higher-managers for business. Some have also served as public health officials and/or professors. Only one of the over thirty members of the Crisis Group, Kristin Urquiza, is a community representative due to her role in Marked By Covid. When the Crisis Group organized, it saw itself as the future nucleus for a government commission on the pandemic, much like the 9/11 Commission (that Zelikow had directed). Thus, it formed very much thinking of itself in an establishment role.

Here, I will list a few of their major ideas and assumptions.

  1. The pandemic response in the United States, and its attendant hospitalization and death rates, represents a failure of public health. This failure was primarily rooted in not knowing how to get things done. That is, their critique is on process and competence, not on the underlying assumptions of what was done nor on whether the response was organized for the interest of the wealthy, powerful, and white in ways that hurt workers, the poor, members of oppressed racial/ethnic groups, the disabled and the elderly.
  2. Since the failure came from not knowing how to get things done, they see a major part of the solution as being the re-creation of the “can-do culture” for which the U.S. used to be famous.
  3. They emphasize a “need” for public-private ventures to get things done competently. As they see it, business has the “know-how,” as do certain parts of the military.
  4. They recognize the near-certainty of future pandemic outbreaks. They thus point to the need for early detection and tracking systems, and put forward a number of intelligent suggestions for how this might be done more effectively.
  5. They state as a main goal in responding to pandemics is getting people back to schools and work as soon as possible. That said, they do take seriously the need for layers of protection at schools and workplaces.
  6. They also present good ideas on the “how” side of public health. These include funding increases for public health departments and greater data sharing enabled by digitization of health and public health data.

Their omissions and errors and what else needs to be done

Perhaps their most consequential omission is a serious discussion of why potential pandemics are coming at a rapid rate during this century and how to slow this down. They do mention the issue of slowing the transmission of dangerous viruses and bacteria from other animals to humans, but dismiss this as impractical. Instead of trying to do this, they argue, the United States and other countries should set up effective systems of early detection of new potential pandemics and ways to improve reaction times to such detection. They thus accept the inevitability of zoonotic pandemics, which comes intellectually from their either seeing capitalism as a given or as seeing it as an unavoidable eternal fact.

This is a critical omission. Capitalism fuels potential zoonoses — as cities in the global south expand into forests and savannahs, as hunters seek to flood food markets with “exotic” meats, and as industrial meat producers raise and slaughter animals at massive scale. Once humans get infected with a potential pandemic pathogen, the rapidity of travel across and among continents — much of which is for the business purposes of production, distribution, and, thus, profits — makes it highly possible for disease to spread globally before it is even detected.

In other words, pandemics arise through the day-to-day operations of capitalism. For COVID, this involved financial investment by globally-prominent firms in agriculture and food markets in China that probably were the sites of early viral transmission to humans. Relatedly, within the United States, some evidence suggests that capitalist industrial agriculture may have been a driver of the pandemic in the U.S. Midwest.

A second major weakness is their superficial discussion on the misinformation and “anti-science” messages that greatly reduced the effectiveness of many public health interventions around vaccination, masking, and business closures. They discuss some of the commonly mentioned aspects of this, such as the flip-flops of President Trump in his messages about the pandemic, the growth of social media-based misinformation and its spread by “Russian and Chinese cyber mischief-making” (p. 209), and the like.

What they did not discuss is the reasons why capitalism at its current stage breeds attacks on science (such as those volleyed by political leaders against the science of climate change) and a degree of irrationalism among some groups of workers and others in the population, both of which carried over into the politics of COVID. Most importantly, perhaps, they did not discuss the sustained, systematic attacks on science by many large corporations. The tobacco industry attacked the science around smoke and cancer, agribusiness has attacked the critics of both genetically modified organisms and the critics of industrialized meat production, the fossil fuel industry and many firms dependent on it attack the science of climate change. The techniques they used in these attacks, such as sowing doubt and confusion about what science really says and myths about the muzzling and persecution of “dissenting” scientists, were then used to attack the science behind vaccines, masks, school closings, and many other public health responses to the pandemic and to promote many ineffective but supposedly “evidence-based” medications.

The COVID Crisis Group’s superficial discussion of pandemic misinformation does not address the deep-seated roots of this messaging. This is not surprising for such an establishment group, since these root causes are the use of attacks on science to defend the interests of major blocs of capital, the racism that sustains capitalist rule, and the irrationalism that is endemic to capitalism.

Relatedly, although they do report (p. 164-165) that COVID was particularly devastating for American Indians, Blacks, and Hispanics, they do not adequately analyze why this same pattern was true for the HIV/AIDS pandemic, nor why poor health and medical apartheid have been racialized throughout the history of the United States. In discussing the mistrust and disconnection from health systems that greatly weakened a variety of public health efforts during the first two years of the pandemic, they mention that his mistrust “goes deep among communities that have long felt marginalized” (p. 204). They then mention the Tuskegee Syphilis Study that left Black participants with syphilis to suffer the ravages of the disease long after effective treatments were available, but fail to mention similar atrocities such as the involuntary sterilizations that many racially oppressed women had forced on them by the American medical system and the racist eugenic “science” used to justify these actions. Not unexpectedly, with their emphasis on “how to” react to pandemics rather than on what needs to be changed, they do not offer suggestions about ending the socially structured racism that both underlies the extra burdens of pandemics on racialized peoples and contributes substantially to white “anti-science” opposition to public health actions.

They say almost nothing about Long COVID — two short paragraphs and a short footnote. They do recognize that Long COVID is poorly understood and that some people with Long COVID have organized for care and research. One might think that these uncertainties about the extent of Long COVID, its duration, and thus the threat it poses to the population and the workforce would make it worth discussing in depth. After all, if too many people become disabled by it this would show that the COVID Crisis Group was badly mistaken in claiming that getting people back to school and work is a main priority of policy and in supporting the policy of getting back to normalcy in 2023.

In supporting the return to normalcy, they do not discuss one of its large-scale and extremely harmful effects — that of excluding millions of people in the United States (and elsewhere) from social life. Examples include people with asthma or other respiratory infections, or those with impaired immune systems (such as those undergoing chemotherapy for cancer, or those with HIV except when it is totally under control), and elderly people. Thus, the policy of “opening up” and of “normalcy” amounts in practice to excluding tens of millions of people from many jobs and stores. This is not a surprise — by and large, businesses and governments around the country have given lip service to including people with disabilities in society, but actions on this have trailed far behind words

As a final critique, and as a first step in presenting ideas for political actions in future outbreaks of COVID or in the next pandemic (or even a bad epidemic in one country), the COVID Crisis Group discusses the failures and successes of what happened in the United States response to COVID in a thoroughly top-down matter. 

They focus on what government agencies and politicians did, on what researchers did, and on what pharmaceutical companies did. In doing this, they failed to discuss the remarkable and sometimes successful actions of ordinary people and workers. They fail to see how members of local communities mobilized mutual aid projects to held neighbors unable (or afraid) to get groceries or needed medications. They fail to discuss and analyze the actions of nurses and other health care workers to organize care, to support each other when sick, and to force hospital managements to procure PPE like masks. They fail to discuss the strikes by various groups of front line workers that arose in dangerous conditions. Further, in their emphasis on the need to re-open schools, they fail to discuss the heroic actions of some teachers’ unions in refusing to return until changes in ventilation and case detection procedures were established that would keep kids, their relatives, and school workers as safe as reasonably possible. They fail even to discuss Marked by COVID and its efforts, in spite of the fact that the COVID Crisis Group includes the founder of Marked by COVID as a member, much less discuss groups like People’s CDC, which have been involved in community education and politics opposed to some of what the COVID Crisis Group proposes.

In short, they base their analysis on thoroughly elitist grounds. They treat the public as the objects acted upon by public health institutions and as a potential obstacle to implementing public health. In the next section, I take the exact opposite view. I see the actions of community mutual aid and worker groups as the solution to ending the system that evokes pandemics and, until then, as fundamental to mitigating the pandemics that arise through the everyday search for profit and power by capitalist institutions.

Solutions

In preparation for the next pandemic, and perhaps during it, we need to empower workers at workplaces to defend themselves. I do not see this primarily as a call to change laws, although passing laws to increase workers’ rights to avoid unsafe working conditions and to organize unions, and even to speak freely with each other at work, would clearly be helpful, and I do support their passage. Laws, however, are likely to be abrogated by employers and the state during emergencies like pandemics. What is needed now, and in the future, is for workers to organize their power and their collective willingness and ability to strike effectively regardless of what the law says and even regardless of what union leaders say. During the COVID pandemic, hospital workers did this, as did some teachers and other workers. Much more is needed.

Similarly, people in the most-effected communities developed many skills at how to cope with sickness and how to organize mutual aid for each other. When confronted with police violence and killings in 2020, people demonstrated around the U.S. and, indeed, the world as part of the Black Lives Matter movementWhat is needed now, and in the future, is for neighborhoods and larger communities of poor people, racially or otherwise oppressed people, and working people to develop organizations of mutual solidarity and aid, and a willingness and ability to take direct action to defend themselves and to meet their needs regardless of what employers or governments say.

COVID ravaged prison populations, nursing homes and the homeless with particular ferocity. To prepare for future pandemics, these groups too will have to organize, together with various abolitionist groups. They alone will have limited power, but together with the worker and community groups discussed, more can be done.

Although all of the above will be essential in meeting the threats of a renewed COVID outbreak and of future pandemics, they alone will not be enough. We also will need many of the more intelligent proposals that the COVID Crisis Group put forward, such as improved forms of detecting new pathogens as soon as they arise and rapidly responding to reduce their spread and to develop medicines and vaccines quickly through improved and sustained scientific and public health capabilities.

Preventing pandemic destruction is not just a question of “how to,” as the COVID Crisis Group thinks. It is a question of organizing power from below so people can get rid of capitalism and its pandemic-creating needs and set up a society where people can take care of their needs and of each other without evoking pandemics or climate change. Given the damage that capitalism has already done to the metabolic interchanges between humans and the rest of nature, some of the specific proposals of the COVID Crisis Group will be useful. The economic, political and human structures and ways of thought that we will need to set up, however, will in no way resemble the public-private or military “can-do structures” that are their ideal.

I would like to acknowledge the intellectual input of fellow members of the People’s CDC, and especially Fran Green, Karyn Pomerantz, Howard Waitzkin, and Rob Wallace.

Samuel R. Friedman is a research professor at a leading New York university and previously the Director of the Institute for Infectious Disease Research at National Development and Research Institutes in New York. He can be reached at sam4wp@netscape.net