Monday, February 4, 2019

3178. Bertrand Russell on the Materialist Conception of History

By Bertrand Russel, The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, 1934/1961
Bertrand Russell in 1935. Photo: Creative Commons

The contributions of Marx and Engels to theory were twofold: there was Marx’s theory of surplus value, and there was their joint theory of historical development, called ‘dialectical materialism’. We will consider first the latter, which seems to me both more true and more important than the former. 

Let us, in the first place, endeavour to be clear as to what the theory of dialectical materialism is. It is a theory which has various elements. Metaphysically it is materialistic: in method it adopts a form of dialectic suggested by Hegel, but differing from his in many important respects. It takes over from Hegel an outlook which is evolutionary, and in which the stages in evolution can be characterized in clear logical terms. These changes are of the nature of development, not so much in an ethical as in a logical sense—that is to say, they proceed according to a plan which a man of sufficient intellect could, thoeretically, foretell, and which Marx himself professes to have foretold, in its main outlines, up to the moment of the universal establishment of Communism. The materialism of its metaphysics is translated, where human affairs are concerned, into the doctrine that the prime cause of all social phenomena is the method of production and exchange prevailing at any given period. The clearest statements of the theory are to be found in Engels, in his Anti-Dühring, of which the relevant parts have appeared in England under the title: Socialism, Utopian and Scientific. A few extracts will help to provide us with our text: 

‘It was seen that all past history, with the exception of its primitive stages, was the history of class struggles: that these warring classes of society are always the products of the modes of production and of exchange—in a word, of the economic conditions of their time; that the economic structure of society always furnishes the real basis, starting from which we can alone work out the ultimate explanation of the whole superstructure of juridicial and political institutions as well as of the religious, philosophical, and other ideas of a given historical period.’ 

The discovery of this principle, according to Marx and Engels, showed that the coming of Socialism was inevitable. 

‘From that time forward Socialism was no longer an accidental discovery of this or that ingenious brain, but the necessary outcome of the struggle between two historically developed classes—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Its task was no longer to manufacture a system of society as perfect as possible, but to examine the historico-economic succession of events from which these classes and their antagonism had of necessity sprung, and to discover in the economic conditions thus created the means of ending the conflict. But the Socialism of earlier days was as incompatible with this materialistic conception as the conception of Nature of the French materialists was with dialectics and modern natural science. The Socialism of earlier days certainly criticized the existing capitalistic mode of production and its consequences. But it could not explain them, and, therefore, could not get the mastery of them. It could only simply reject them as bad. The more strongly this earlier Socialism denounced the exploitation of the working class, inevitable under Capitalism, the less able was it clearly to show in what this exploitation consisted and how it arose.’ 

The same theory which is called Dialectical Materialism is also called the Materialist Conception of History. Engels says: ‘The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders, is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men’s brains, not in man’s better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are to be sought, not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular epoch. The growing perception that existing social institutions are unreasonable and unjust, that reason has become unreason, and right wrong, is only proof that in the modes of production and exchange changes have silently taken place, with which the social order, adapted to earlier economic conditions, is no longer in keeping. From this it also follows that the means of getting rid of the incongruities that have been brought to light, must also be present, in a more or less developed condition, within the changed modes of production themselves. These means are not to be invented by deduction from fundamental principles, but are to be discovered in the stubborn facts of the existing system of production.’ dialectical materialism 

The conflicts which lead to political upheavals are not primarily mental conflicts in the opinions and passions of human beings. ‘This conflict between productive forces and modes of production is not a conflict engendered in the mind of man, like that between original sin and divine justice. It exists, in fact, objectively outside us, independently of the will and actions even of the men that have brought it on. Modern Socialism is nothing but the reflex, in thought, of this conflict in fact; its ideal reflection in the minds, first, of the class directly suffering under it, the working class.’ 

There is a good statement of the materialist theory of history in an early joint work of Marx and Engels (1845–6), called German Ideology. It is there said that the materialist theory starts with the actual process of production of an epoch, and regards as the basis of history the form of economic life connected with this form of production and generated by it. This, they say, shows civil society in its various stages and in its action as the State. Moreover, from the economic basis the materialist theory explains such matters as religion, philosophy, and morals, and the reasons for the course of their development. 

These quotations perhaps suffice to show what the theory is. A number of questions arise as soon as it is examined critically. Before going on to economics one is inclined to ask, first, whether materialism is true in philosophy, and second, whether the elements of Hegelian dialectic which are embedded in the Marxist theory of development can be justified apart from a full-fledged Hegelianism. Then comes the further question whether these metaphysical doctrines have any relevance to the historical thesis as regards economic development, and last of all comes the examination of this historical thesis itself. To state in advance what I shall be trying to prove, I hold (1) that materialism, in some sense, may be true, though it cannot be known to be so; (2) that the elements of dialectic which Marx took over from Hegel made him regard history as a more rational process than it has in fact been, convincing him that all changes must be in some sense progressive, and giving him a feeling of certainty in regard to the future, for which there is no scientific warrant; (3) that the whole of his theory of economic development may perfectly well be true if his metaphysic is false, and false if his metaphysic is true, and that but for the influence of Hegel it would never have occurred to him that a matter so purely empirical could depend upon abstract metaphysics; 

(4) with regard to the economic interpretation of history, it seems to me very largely true, and a most important contribution to sociology; I cannot, however, regard it as wholly true, or feel any confidence that all great historical changes can be viewed as developments. Let us take these points one by one. 

(1) Materialism. Marx’s materialism was of a peculiar kind, by no means identical with that of the eighteenth century. When he speaks of the  ‘materialist conception of history’, he never emphasizes philosophical materialism, but only the economic causation of social phenomena. His philosophical position is best set forth (though very briefly) in his Eleven Theses on Feuerbach (1845). In these he says: 

‘The chief defect of all previous materialism—including that of Feuerbach—is that the object (Gegenstand), the reality, sensibility, is only apprehended under the form of the object (Objekt) or of contemplation (Anschauung), but not as human sensible activity or practice, not subjectively. Hence it came about that the active side was developed by idealism in opposition to materialism.... 

‘The question whether objective truth belongs to human thinking is not a question of theory, but a practical question. The truth, i.e. the reality and power, of thought must be demonstrated in practice. The contest as to the reality or non-reality of a thought which is isolated from practice, is a purely scholastic question.... 

‘The highest point that can be reached by contemplative materialism, i.e. by materialism which does not regard sensibility as a practical activity, is the contemplation of isolated individuals in “bourgeois society”. 

‘The standpoint of the old materialism is “bourgeois” society; the standpoint of the new is human society or socialized (vergesellschaftete) humanity. 

‘Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, but the real task is to alter it.’ 

The philosophy advocated in the earlier part of these theses is that which has since become familiar to the philosophical world through the writings of Dr Dewey, under the name of pragmatism or instrumentalism. Whether Dr Dewey is aware of having been anticipated by Marx, I do not know, but undoubtedly their opinions as to the metaphysical status of matter are virtually identical. In view of the importance attached by Marx to his theory of matter, it may be worth while to set forth his view rather more fully. 

The conception of ‘matter’, in old-fashioned materialism, was bound up with the conception of ‘sensation’. Matter was regarded as the cause of sensation, and originally also as its object, at least in the case of sight and touch. Sensation was regarded as something in which a man is passive, and merely receives impressions from the outer world. This conception of sensation as passive is, however—so the instrumentalists contend—an unreal abstraction, to which nothing actual corresponds. Watch an animal receiving impressions connected with another animal: its nostrils dilate, its ears twitch, its eyes are directed to the right point, its muscles become taut in preparation for appropriate movements. All this is action, mainly of a sort to improve the informative quality of impressions, partly such as to lead to fresh action in relation to the object. A cat seeing a mouse is by no means a passive recipient of purely contemplative impressions. And as a cat with a mouse, so is a textile dialectical materialism manufacturer with a bale of cotton. The bale of cotton is an opportunity for action, it is something to be transformed. The machinery by which it is to be transformed is explicitly and obviously a product of human activity. Roughly speaking, all matter, according to Marx, is to be thought of as we naturally think of machinery: it has a raw material giving opportunity for action, but in its completed form it is a human product. 

Philosophy has taken over from the Greeks a conception of passive contemplation, and has supposed that knowledge is obtained by means of contemplation. Marx maintains that we are always active, even when we come nearest to pure ‘sensation’: we are never merely apprehending our environment, but always at the same time altering it. This necessarily makes the older conception of knowledge inapplicable to our actual relations with the outer world. In place of knowing an object in the sense of passively receiving an impression of it, we can only know it in the sense of being able to act upon it successfully. That is why the test of all truth is practical. And since we change the object when we act upon it, truth ceases to be static, and becomes something which is continually changing and developing. That is why Marx calls his materialism ‘dialectical’, because it contains within itself, like Hegel’s dialectic, an essential principle of progressive change. 

I think it may be doubted whether Engels quite understood Marx’s views on the nature of matter and on the pragmatic character of truth; no doubt he thought he agreed with Marx, but in fact he came nearer to orthodox materialism.1 Engels explains ‘historical materialism’, as he understands it, in an Introduction, written in 1892, to his Socialism, Utopian and Scientific. Here, the part assigned to action seems to be reduced to the conventional task of scientific verification. He says: ‘The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. . . . Not in one single instance, so far, have we been led to the conclusion that our sense-perceptions, scientifically controlled, induce in our minds ideas respecting the outer world that are, by their very nature, at variance with reality, or that there is an inherent incompatibility between the outer world and our sense-perceptions of it.’ 

There is no trace, here, of Marx’s pragmatism, or of the doctrine that sensible objects are largely the products of our own activity. But there is also no sign of any consciousness of disagreement with Marx. It may be that Marx modified his views in later life, but it seems more probable that, on this subject as on some others, he held two different views simultaneously, and applied the one or the other as suited the purpose of his argument. He certainly held that some propositions were ‘true’ in a more than pragmatic sense. When, in Capital, he sets forth the cruelties of the industrial system as reported by Royal Commissions, he certainly holds that these cruelties really took place, and not only that successful action will result from supposing that they took place. Similarly, when he prophesies the Communist revolution, he believes that there will be such an event, not merely that it is convenient to think so. His pragmatism must, therefore, have been only occasional—in fact when, on pragmatic grounds, it was justified by being convenient. 

It is worth nothing that Lenin, who does not admit any divergence between Marx and Engels, adopts in his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism a view which is more nearly that of Engels than that of Marx. 

For my part, while I do not think that materialism can be proved, I think Lenin is right in saying that it is not disproved by modern physics. Since his time, and largely as a reaction against his success, respectable physicists have moved further and further from materialism, and it is naturally supposed, by themselves and by the general public, that it is physics which has caused this movement. I agree with Lenin that no substantially new argument has emerged since the time of Berkeley, with one exception. This one exception, oddly enough, is the argument set forth by Marx in his theses on Feuerbach, and completely ignored by Lenin. If there is no such thing as sensation, if matter as something which we passively apprehend is a delusion, and if ‘truth’ is a practical rather than a theoretical conception, then old-fashioned materialism, such as Lenin’s, becomes untenable. And Berkeley’s view becomes equally untenable, since it removes the object in relation to which we are active. Marx’s instrumentalist theory, though he calls it materialistic, is really not so. As against materialism, its arguments have indubitably much force. Whether it is ultimately valid is a difficult question, as to which I have deliberately refrained from expressing an opinion, since I could not do so without writing a complete philosophical treatise. 

(2) Dialectic in history. The Hegelian dialectic was a full-blooded affair. If you started with any partial concept and meditated on it, it would presently turn into its opposite; it and its opposite would combine into a synthesis, which would, in turn, become the starting point of a similar movement, and so on until you reached the Absolute Idea, on which you could reflect as long as you liked without discovering any new contradictions. The historical development of the world in time was merely an objectification of this process of thought. This view appeared possible to Hegel, because for him mind was the ultimate reality; for Marx, on the contrary, matter is the ultimate reality. Nevertheless he continues to think that the world develops according to a logical formula. To Hegel, the development of history is as logical as a game of chess. Marx and Engels keep the rules of chess, while supposing that the chessmen move themselves in accordance with the laws of physics, without the intervention of a player. In one of the quotations from Engels which I gave earlier, he says: ‘The means of getting rid of the incongruities that have been brought to light, must also be present, in a more or less developed dialectical materialism condition, within the changed modes of production themselves.’ This ‘must’ betrays a relic of the Hegelian belief that logic rules the world. Why should the outcome of a conflict in politics always be the establishment of some more developed system? This has not, in fact, been the case in innumerable instances. The barbarian invasion of Rome did not give rise to more developed economic forms, nor did the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, or the destruction of the Albigenses in the South of France. Before the time of Homer the Mycenaean civilization had been destroyed, and it was many centuries before a developed civilization again emerged in Greece. The examples of decay and retrogression are at least as numerous and as important in history as the examples of development. The opposite view, which appears in the works of Marx and Engels, is nothing but nineteenth-century optimism. 

This is a matter of practical as well as theoretical importance. Communists always assume that conflicts between Communism and capitalism, while they may for a time result in partial victories for capitalism, must in the end lead to the establishment of Communism. They do not envisage another possible result, quite as probable, namely, a return to barbarism. We all know that modern war is a somewhat serious matter, and that in the next world war it is likely that large populations will be virtually exterminated by poison gases and bacteria. Can it be seriously supposed that after a war in which the great centres of population and most important industrial plant had been wiped out, the remaining population would be in a mood to establish scientific Communism? Is it not practically certain that the survivors would be in a mood of gibbering and superstitious brutality, fighting all against all for the last turnip or the last mangel-wurzel? Marx used to do his work in the British Museum, but after the Great War the British Government placed a tank just outside the museum, presumably to teach the intellectuals their place. Communism is a highly intellectual, highly civilized doctrine, which can, it is true, be established, as it was in Russia, after a slight preliminary skirmish, such as that of 1914–18, but hardly after a really serious war. I am afraid the dogmatic optimism of the Communist doctrine must be regarded as a relic of Victorianism. 

There is another curious point about the Communist interpretation of the dialectic. Hegel, as everyone knows, concluded his dialectical account of history with the Prussian State, which, according to him, was the perfect embodiment of the Absolute Idea. Marx, who had no affection for the Prussian State, regarded this as a lame and impotent conclusion. He said that the dialectic should be essentially revolutionary, and seemed to suggest that it could not reach any final static resting-place. Nevertheless we hear nothing about the further revolutions that are to happen after the establishment of Communism. In the last paragraph of La Misère de la Philosophie he says: 

‘It is only in an order of things in which there will no longer be classes or class-antagonism that social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions.’ 

What these social evolutions are to be, or how they are to be brought about without the motive power of class conflict, Marx does not say. Indeed, it is hard to see how, on his theory, any further evolution would be possible. Except from the point of view of present-day politics, Marx’s dialectic is no more revolutionary than that of Hegel. Moreover, since all human development has, according to Marx, been governed by conflicts of classes, and since under Communism there is to be only one class, it follows that there can be no further development, and that mankind must go on for ever and ever in a state of Byzantine immobility. This does not seem plausible, and it suggests that there must be other possible causes of political events besides those of which Marx has taken account. 

(3) Irrelevance of Metaphysics. The belief that metaphysics has any bearing upon practical affairs is, to my mind, a proof of logical incapacity. One finds physicists with all kinds of opinions: some follow Hume, some Berkeley, some are conventional Christians, some are materialists, some are sensationalists, some even are solipsists. This makes no difference whatever to their physics. They do not take different views as to when eclipses will occur, or what are the conditions of the stability of a bridge. That is because, in physics, there is some genuine knowledge, and whatever metaphysical beliefs a physicist may hold must adapt themselves to this knowledge. In so far as there is any genuine knowledge in the social sciences, the same thing is true. Whenever metaphysics is really useful in reaching a conclusion, that is because the conclusion cannot be reached by scientific means, i.e. because there is no good reason to suppose it true. What can be known can be known without metaphysics, and whatever needs metaphysics for its proof cannot be proved. In actual fact Marx advances in his books much detailed historical argument, in the main perfectly sound, but none of this in any way depends upon materialism. Take, for example, the fact that free competition tends to end in monopoly. This is an empirical fact, the evidence for which is equally patent whatever one’s metaphysic may happen to be. Marx’s metaphysic comes in in two ways: on the one hand, by making things more cut and dried and precise than they are in real life; on the other hand, in giving him a certainty about the future which goes beyond what a scientific attitude would warrant. But in so far as his doctrines of historical development can be shown to be true, his metaphysic is irrelevant. The question whether Communism is going to become universal is quite independent of metaphysics. It may be that a metaphysic is helpful in the fight: early Mohammedan conquests were much facilitated by the belief that the faithful who died in battle went straight to Paradise, and similarly the efforts of Communists may be stimulated by the belief that there is a God called Dialectical Materialism who is fighting on dialectical materialism 485 their side, and will, in His own good time, give them the victory. On the other hand, there are many people to whom it is repugnant to have to profess belief in propositions for which they see no evidence, and the loss of such people must be reckoned as a disadvantage resulting from the Communist metaphysic. 

(4) Economic Causation in History. In the main I agree with Marx that economic causes are at the bottom of most of the great movements in history, not only political movements, but also those in such departments as religion, art, and morals. There are, however, important qualifications to be made. In the first place, Marx does not allow nearly enough for the time-lag. Christianity, for example, arose in the Roman Empire, and in many respects bears the stamp of the social system of that time, but Christianity has survived through many changes. Marx treats it as moribund. ‘When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the eighteenth century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death-battle with the then revolutionary bourgeoisie.’ (Manifesto of the Communist Party by Karl Marx and F. Engels.) Nevertheless, in his own country it remained the most powerful obstacle to the realization of his own ideas,2 and throughout the Western world its political influence is still enormous. I think it may be conceded that new doctrines that have any success must bear some relation to the economic circumstances of their age, but old doctrines can persist for many centuries without any such relation of any vital kind. 

Another point where I think Marx’s theory of history is too definite is that he does not allow for the fact that a small force may tip the balance when two great forces are in approximate equilibrium. Admitting that the great forces are generated by economic causes, it often depends upon quite trivial and fortuitous events which of the great forces gets the victory. In reading Trotsky’s account of the Russian Revolution, it is difficult to believe that Lenin made no difference, but it was touch and go whether the German Government allowed him to get to Russia. If the minister concerned had happened to be suffering from dyspepsia on a certain morning, he might have said ‘No’ when in fact he said ‘Yes’, and I do not think it can be rationally maintained that without Lenin the Russian Revolution would have achieved what it did. To take another instance: if the Prussians had happened to have a good general at the battle of Valmy, they might have wiped out the French Revolution. To take an even more fantastic example, it may be maintained quite plausibly that if Henry VIII had not fallen in love with Anne Boleyn, the United States would not now exist. For it was owing to this event that England broke with the Papacy, and therefore did not acknowledge the Pope’s gift of the Americas to Spain and Portugal. If England had remained Catholic, it is probable that what is now the United States would have been part of Spanish America.  

This brings me to another point in which Marx’s philosophy of history was faulty. He regards economic conflicts as always conflicts between classes, whereas the majority of them have been between races or nations. English industrialism of the early nineteenth century was internationalist, because it expected to retain its monopoly of industry. It seemed to Marx, as it did to Cobden, that the world was going to be increasingly cosmopolitan. Bismarck, however, gave a different turn to events, and industrialism ever since has grown more and more nationalistic. Even the conflict between capitalism and Communism takes increasingly the form of a conflict between nations. It is true, of course, that the conflicts between nations are very largely economic, but the grouping of the world by nations is itself determined by causes which are in the main not economic. 

Another set of causes which have had considerable importance in history are those which may be called medical. The Black Death, for example, was an event of whose importance Marx was well aware, but the causes of the Black Death were only in part economic. Undoubtedly it would not have occurred among populations at a higher economic level, but Europe had been quite as poor for many centuries as it was in 1348, so that the proximate cause of the epidemic cannot have been poverty. Take again such a matter as the prevalence of malaria and yellow fever in the tropics, and the fact that these diseases have now become preventable. This is a matter which has very important economic effects, though not itself of an economic nature. 

Much the most necessary correction in Marx’s theory is as to the causes of changes in methods of production. Methods of production appear in Marx as prime causes, and the reasons for which they change from time to time are left completely unexplained. As a matter of fact, methods of production change, in the main, owing to intellectual causes, owing, that is to say, to scientific discoveries and inventions. Marx thinks that discoveries and inventions are made when the economic situation calls for them. This, however, is a quite unhistorical view. Why was there practically no experimental science from the time of Archimedes to the time of Leonardo? For six centuries after Archimedes the economic conditions were such as should have made scientific work easy. It was the growth of science after the Renaissance that led to modern industry. This intellectual causation of economic processes is not adequately recognized by Marx. 

History can be viewed in many ways, and many general formulae can be invented which cover enough of the ground to seem adequate if the facts are carefully selected. I suggest, without undue solemnity, the following alternative theory of the causation of the industrial revolution: industrialism is due to modern science, modern science is due to Galileo, Galileo is due to Copernicus, Copernicus is due to the Renaissance, the Renaissance is due to the fall of Constantinople, the fall of Constantinople is due to the migration of the Turks, the migration of the Turks is due to the desiccation of Central Asia. Therefore the fundamental study in searching for historical causes is hydrography. (Freedom and Organization, London: Allen & Unwin; Freedom Versus Organization, New York: W. W. Norton, 1934.) 

Notes 
1. Cf. Sidney Hook, Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx, p. 32. 2 ‘For Germany’, wrote Marx in 1844, ‘the critique of religion is essentially completed.’ 

Saturday, February 2, 2019

3177. The Political Economy of Half-Earth

By Troy Vettese, The Bullet, January 30, 2019

That the “extermination, enslavement, and entombment of the aboriginal population in mines […and] the transformation of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skin” was essential to capitalism’s emergence has long been recognized. Few, however, realise that capitalism has been changing the climate since its “rosy dawn.”1
An estimated sixty million indigenous people lived in the Americas in 1492, but by the mid-seventeenth century only six million remained due to genocide, epidemics, enslavement, and war. Over four centuries twelve million West Africans were sent along Middle Passage in shark-trailed ships, though only ten million survived the voyage. The ecological implications were equally dramatic. Millions of hectares of cropland were left fallow by New World and West African farmers, allowing forests to invade abandoned fields.
These tragedies were intertwined. Mass death in the New World catalysed the trans-Atlantic slave trade, a profitable business that would undergo three centuries of expansion. As early as 1516, Bartolomé de las Casas advocated the enslavement of Africans so he could liberate indigenous peoples from the Spanish yoke. By the time the English had settled Barbados in 1627, they had already adopted much of Spain’s novel racialized caste-system.2 Within four decades, the majority of Barbados’ population were Black slaves and the tiny island had become England’s most lucrative and most populous colony in the New World. The profitability of the Barbadian system led to its proliferation across the Caribbean Sea, increasing demand for slaves.3

Little Ice Age

Botanical regrowth across the Americas and West Africa sequestered approximately seventeen gigatons of carbon (Gt C), lowering the store of atmospheric carbon dioxide by ten parts per million (ppm). This represented a significant share of the total, which then sat at 276 ppm (compared to today’s 410 ppm), enough to lower temperatures in the northern hemisphere by nearly one degree centigrade. Evidence of these bizarre climatic shifts were noted worldwide; Icelanders starved when the frozen sea choked off their ports, the Swiss dreaded alpine glaciers crashing through their villages, and Manhattanites could walk along the frozen bay to Staten Island. The poor harvests during the cool, wet seventeenth century made peasants desperate and states weak, destabilizing ancient polities, contributing to the Thirty Years’ War and the collapse of the Ming dynasty. Yet, creating a new, bloodless and democratic Little Ice Age may be the Left’s best hope.
The Little Ice Age reminds one that capitalism has been changing the world’s climate since the beginning, but it also inspires a more utopian possibility for the future: natural geo-engineering (NGE). NGE could accelerate carbon sequestration through processes such as afforestation, which would mitigate the effects of global warming. NGE leads one to recognize the centrality of land-use in political economy. The problem of land-scarcity heralds the return of classical economics, as that issue had been fundamental to the works of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Henry George. Fossil fuels allowed capitalism to break free of shackles chaining it to the British countryside so it could conquer the world, but the end of the fossil-fuel era will reinstate those fetters. It is the scarcity of land, not natural resources, that will ultimately prove to be the constraint on economic growth.
In addition to NGE, the problem of land-scarcity is integral to two other issues: implementing renewable energy systems and stopping mass extinctions; both also require a great deal of space. It is nearly universally assumed that if there is any chance of containing the destruction of climate change then fossil fuels will have to be completely replaced with other forms of energy. Yet, what is often overlooked is that fossil fuel substitutes, mainly solar- and wind-based systems, take up a great deal more space. Fossil fuels have a much greater ‘power density’ than renewables, in that they provide more energy in terms of surface area, usually measured in watts per square metre (W/m²). There is simply not enough space for the endless expansion of energy systems.
Aggravating this problem is the third goal of the environmental movement – stopping the death march of the ‘Sixth Extinction’. The main cause of mass animal and plant death is not climate change or poaching, but rather the human appropriation of territory, what experts call in bloodless jargon ‘land-use change’. The close relationship between land-area and extinction means that it will be necessary to set aside half of the world to ensure most species survive. Edward Wilson, the naturalist who devised the concept of a Half-Earth, argues that if his proposal is not realised then half of all flora and fauna will be extinguished by 2100.
The return of land-scarcity demands a new political economy based on furthering the three goals of 1) furthering NGE; 2) preserving biodiversity; 3) and transitioning to a 100% renewable energy system. Such a political economy could be called half-Earth economics. These goals are difficult to achieve – indeed, much more difficult than most environmentalists admit – but they are worth pursuing because the alternative is an ever more brutal fossil-capitalism. The stark demands required by half-Earth economics is useful for clarifying thought; as there are only a few ways to realise all three goals, it becomes possible to adumbrate what an eco-socialist society looks like.

The Alternatives

If there is no swift transition away from fossil fuels, then artificial geo-engineering (AGE) becomes inevitable. There are several forms of AGE, but the most likely candidate is ‘solar radiation management’, which requires the release of millions of tonnes of sulphate aerosols by balloons or cannons into the atmosphere to reflect sunlight back into space. In this way, AGE mimics volcanic eruptions by releasing tiny suspended particles of a sulphur-based compound. Much of the research on AGE focusses on the last large volcanic eruption, Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1992, which cooled the Earth by half a degree.
Given the complexity of climatic systems, it is impossible to have a good idea what effect AGE will have once it is introduced. It could cut off the Gulf Stream, South Asia’s monsoons, increase vitamin D deficiency, and bleach the sky white. Some countries may baulk at being disadvantaged by the new climatic regime. They might initiate wars to defend themselves or undertake their own AGE schemes, resulting in interactions that would be impossible to predict. AGE is also dangerous because carbon pollution would likely continue unabated under the climatic shield, but should it ever fail – say, in case of a war – then the world would quickly roast. Like storing nuclear waste, AGE is a solution that requires millennia of foresight. It was seen as dangerous quackery only a dozen years ago, but has been made respectable through its recent embrace by Nobel Prize winners, elite universities, and even the IPCC.
Many environmentalists abhor AGE and still want to pursue a carbonless energy system, but they are aware of the shortcomings of renewables and thus they grasp for the only other alternative: nuclear energy. This is the path of thought taken by environmentalists of impeccable ideological credentials like George Monbiot, James Lovelock or James Hansen, leading them to recklessly endorse a massive increase in the number of nuclear power plants, while downplaying the substantial risks such a plan of action would have. Hansen, NASA’s famous climate scientist, calls for 2135 new reactors, far exceeding the world’s current sum of 444. And that would only replace fossil fuels used for electrical production and thus not even put a dent in fossil-energy used for transportation or climate-conditioning buildings. Building even more reactors would further increase the risks of both nuclear power mundane dangers in terms of waste and persistent local radioactivity, and the spectacular threat of a meltdown.
There have been enough accidents over the past half-century to discredit nuclear power as a form of energy production, and the latest disaster in Japan is a reminder of this. The clean-up crews at the Fukushima-Daiichi plant don’t even know where the fuel-rods belonging to three destroyed reactors are. Six hundred tonnes of still-fissioning uranium melted through their containment vessels and from there went deep into the earth beneath the plant. Yet, there is no way to retrieve it; the robots that could do so have yet to be invented. Five robots sent to look for them “died” when radiation destroyed their wiring. Just cleaning up the sunken fuel rods might take forty years and cost twenty billion dollars.4 The total cost of the disaster is estimated to be $188-billion.5 According to the ‘largest statistical analysis of nuclear accidents ever undertaken’ another disaster on the scale of Fukushima in 2011 or Chernobyl in 1986 has a fifty percent chance of occurring before 2050. One can imagine that those odds would worsen commensurately should nuclear power be accorded a greater role within a carbonless energy policy.

The Return of Land-Scarcity

Despite the many reasons to abandon nuclear power and fossil fuels for solar- and wind-based energy, these latter two are hampered by their extremely low power densities. The most efficient solar energy plants have a power density of about 10 W/m², but a rate of 2–4 W/m² is more common. This figure isn’t likely to improve much and certainly not by an order of magnitude. Renewables’ puny power-densities become blatant when compared to fossil fuels and nuclear power. The disfigured and hellish wastelands created by mining, drilling, and spilling are relatively tiny. Even the most inefficient forms of fossil fuel extraction, such as Alberta’s tar sands, still have a power density of 1,000 W/m². Fukushima-Daiichi boasted a respectable 1,300 W/m². The richest coal and petroleum deposits can have an incredible power density of 10,000 W/m². This is one reason why only half of one per cent of U.S. territory is currently dedicated to energy production. In densely populated countries, like the UK and Germany, all of their national territory would have to be covered in wind turbines, solar panels, and biofuel crops to maintain current levels of production. Even a country as large as the United States would have to sacrifice between a fifth to half of its landmass, depending on whether its cars are powered by electricity or biofuel crops (the latter have an extremely low power density, c. 0.2 W/m²).
Luckily, half-Earth economics’ other goals of preserving bio-diversity and furthering NGE are mutually reinforcing, but they still require huge tracts of land. Upholding an ecosystem’s biodiversity ensures that NGE functions effectively. In this way, Wilson’s goal of preserving species is indispensable for NGE to function. For example, studies have shown that kelp forests need predators to protect them from herbivores. When otter populations in the North Pacific rebounded, they reduced the number of sea urchins, which in turn allowed kelp forests to flourish. They now absorb one-tenth of British Columbia’s annual carbon emissions. Similarly, wolves protect the forest from marauding elk that would otherwise feed on bark and saplings. Wolves were re-introduced into Yellowstone U.S. National Park only in 1995, but their effects on ecology are already tangible.
Like the effects of wolves and otters, there have been recent events demonstrating that NGE could influence the climatic system rather quickly. After the collapse of communism in 1991, agriculture in Russia contracted drastically in the 1990s, a decade that saw forests in its western region increase by a third, absorbing significantly more carbon. China has long had an extremely effective state-directed afforestation program. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the carbon sequestered by its forests increased five-fold as a result of increased tree plantations and the expansion of protected wild forests. Chinese scientists have noted that wild ecosystems sequester more carbon per hectare than their managed equivalents. The relative speed of NGE matters as it will be necessary to counteract the worst effects of climate change that are now occurring, as recent events have already made manifest how destructive the new climatic era is.
It must be from pasture that an eco-austere world will derive the land needed for NGE. The agricultural sector produces almost a third of greenhouse gas emissions – more than the transportation sector – and most of that comes from meat production. Nearly half of the world’s non-mountainous land is already dedicated to agriculture. Of these 5 billion ha, 3.5 billion ha is pasture, and much of the remaining agricultural land grows crops for industrial use or animal-feed, which leaves less than a billion hectares to grow food directly for people.6 Yet, a vegan requires only a tenth as much land as an omnivore to grow her food. If the world were vegan, there would easily be room for a 100% renewable energy system, biodiverse NGE-efficient ecosystems, and vegan agriculture. The potential for such abundant land is immense. One study estimates that if 800 million ha of land is reforested, then billions of new trees will sequester 215 GtC over the next century. NGE at this scale would decrease atmospheric carbon pollution at the scale of 85 ppm, bringing it to a much safer level in the low 300s ppm.7 This feat would be relatively easy to accomplish in a mostly vegan world, even though an afforestation of this scale is five times greater than the last massive rewilding during the Little Ice Age.
A carbonless energy system with enough space to further NGE and provide space for a Half-Earth can only come about if the global bourgeoisie makes drastic cuts to their energy consumption. A useful framework to guide this discussion is the ‘2000-Watt Society’, proposed by the Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich. Two thousand watts as a rate of primary energy use per person equates to 17,500 kWh per year or 48 kWh per day. This goal marries environmental and global economic justice because it would allow the poorest to increase their consumption while demanding a commensurate reduction by the richest. An average U.S. citizen uses 12,000 W, which is twice as much her counterpart in Europe and twelve times more than in India. This is a useful framework that can easily be incorporated within Half-Earth political economy. Indeed, it is a perfect fit for once energy consumption in the rich world is reduced, then suddenly there is enough space for all of those wind turbines and solar panels as well as an expansion of nature preserves. It should be mentioned too that though these demands may seem spartan in the global North, half-Earth economics is hardly austere on a global scale as it champions doubling the consumption of poor people.
Swiss technocrats believe they can reach their goal through greater energy efficiency. But gains in this field are unlikely to suffice. They overlook Jevons’ Paradox, which states that greater efficiency actually increases total consumption because energy becomes relatively cheaper. To reach 2000 W resources must be rationed; asceticism must become more than a ‘lifestyle’ choice. The market cannot fix problems that it creates – only planning can. The 2000-Watt Society’s creators skirt these political implications. Nevertheless, their framework underscores that the good life for all is possible once wasteful practices are shed. Meeting this challenge would require that everyone live in a house that requires little heating or cooling energy, abstain from meat, and rely on trams, bikes, and walking to get around.
There is room for some optimism, as a great experiment in creating a nearly fossil fuel-free society has already taken place. Cubans had to make do with much less in the 1990s during the Período Especial, when Soviet petroleum exports evaporated along with the superpower itself. This was a difficult transition because Cuba during the 1980s, known as the ‘years of the fat cow’, depended on a massive industrial sugar sector oriented toward export, grew few crops for sustenance, and catered to extremely carnivorous tastes. Getting by without petroleum or petroleum-based inputs (e.g. fertilizers and pesticides) forced the largest and most compressed experiment in organic and urban gardening in history. In the 1990s there were twenty-six thousand public gardens in Havana alone, turning the city into a big urban farm that supplies enough produce for about half of its nutritional needs.8 Cuba bought over a million bikes from China to replace their idle fuel-starved buses and cars.
With its effective and low-cost social policy and post-fossil fuel economy, one can see in Havana the outline of eco-socialism in practice. Despite a severe economic recession and the tightening of the U.S. embargo, universal health care and education were maintained and many indices even improved.9 Eating less meat and more vegetables, combined with pedalling or walking to work generally led to improved health within the general population.10 Plantation monocultures could not be managed without massive fossil-fuel inputs, so Cubans cultivated less land more intensively, returning about a third of farmland to wilderness.11 This has helped Cuba maintain its incredible biodiversity – indeed, it is listed amongst Wilson’s global biodiverse hotspots – and led the World Wildlife Fund to recognise it as the world’s only ‘sustainable’ country.12 All of these accomplishments were possible even though the average Cuban used much less than 2,000 W.
Renewable energy, biodiversity, and climate-focussed afforestation should be viewed as interlinked political objectives. Other environmentalists have struggled to unite green goals under a single banner because they lack a distinct theory of political economy. The proposal sketched here can produce red–green responses to a number of issues and open up new ground for utopian political programmes. Half-Earth economics provides a framework for the realisation of fundamental environmentalist goals while simultaneously achieving for all good housing, health, education, and transportation. In short, the good life.
The global bourgeoisie can no longer pretend that their society can solve its own problems: it cannot be both nature’s destroyer and savior. Greens and leftists need new concepts, goals, and tactics. Radically reducing consumption is a price worth paying if it prevents capitalism from enriching a few rentiers while impoverishing billions and irrevocably turning the planet into either a farm or garbage dump. Indeed, if environmentalists are to realise their ambitions it is hard to imagine another way to do so given the constraints of land. The Left must embrace vegan communism to destroy the meat-grinder of capitalism. •

Endnotes

  1. Karl Marx, ‘Das Kapital’ in Karl Marx – Friedrich Engels – Werke, Band 23, vol. 1, section 7, East Berlin 1968, p. 779.
  2. Jerome S. Handler, “Custom and Law: The Status of Enslaved Africans in Seventeenth-Century Barbados,” Slavery & Abolition, vol. 37 no. 2, pp. 237–239.
  3. Simon Newman, A New World of Labor: The Development of Plantation Slavery in the British Atlantic, Philadelphia 2013.
  4. Aaron Sheldrick and Minami Funakoshi, “Fukushima’s Ground Zero,” Reuters, 11 March 2016.
  5. Yuka Obayashi and Kentaro Hamada, “Japan Nearly Doubles Fukushima Disaster-Related Cost to $188 Billion,” Reuters, 8 December 2016.
  6. The remaining 300,000,000 ha is used for industrial purposes, like biofuel and bioplastics.
  7. Sebastian Sonntag et al. “Reforestation in a High-CO2 World—Higher Mitigation Potential than Expected, Lower Adaptation Potential than Hoped for,” Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 43, 2016, p. 6548.
  8. Wright, Cuba, 138.
  9. This is the main argument of Emily Morris’ piece, in which she compares Cuba favourably against post-communist ‘transitional’ economies in Eastern Europe: “Unexpected Cuba,” New Left Review 88, July 2014. The major crisis of the period, however, was Cuban Epidemic Neuropathy. In 1992 thirty thousand people lost their eyesight due to nutritional deficiencies, but once the state had diagnosed the cause of the epidemic, it was able to respond quickly by distributing vitamin supplements thanks to its robust primary care system. Christina Mills, “In the Eye of the Cuban Epidemic Neuropathy Storm,” MEDICC Review, vo. 13, no. 1, January 2011, pp. 10–15.
  10. Sarah Boseley, “Hard Times behind Fall in Heart Disease and Diabetes in 1990s Cuba,” Guardian, 9 April 2013.
  11. Elisa Botella-Rodriguez, “Cuba’s Inward-Looking Development Policies: Towards Sustainable Agriculture,” Historia Agraria, no. 55, December 2011, p. 160.
  12. World Wildlife Fund, Living Planet Report 2006, Gland 2006, p. 19.