Saturday, June 6, 2015

1876. On Michael Löwy’s Ecosocialism

By Kamran Nayeri, June 6, 2015

Introduction
In its most general sense ecological socialism (ecosocialism) is a political movement for the solution to the present day crisis of society and nature.  While there is an increasing number of younger people who begin their political life as ecosocialists, in terms of theory and methodology ecosocialism finds its origins in various shades of socialism, in particular, those that identify themselves as Marxist (The term is more problematic today than it was in Marx’s time, see Michael Heinrich, 2015).  Although Marx and Engels were sensitive to environmental and ecological problems of their time and a number of notable socialists have shown similar sensibilities, ecosocialism as a self-conscious movement has emerged since the 1970s in response to the rise of environmentalism. As such ecosocialism is a movement in its infancy in philosophical, methodological, theoretical, and practical senses.  A welcome addition to the ecosocialist literature, Michael Löwy’s Ecosocialism: A Radical Alternative to Capitalist Catastrophe reflects this fact about ecosocialism. 

However, the book is neither an introduction to ecosocialism in the sense of surveying the field nor a systematic discussion of it from Löwy’s own point of view. Rather it is a small book (120 pages, including 22 pages of appendices, four pages of notes and nine pages of index)  that in Löwy's own words  are “a more modest attempt to explore some of its theoretical aspects and proposals as well as some concrete experiences of struggle.” (p. xv)  

Although Löwy does not explain the logical structure of the book himself, it appears to me that it is centered on his decade-old “What Is Ecosocialism?” (Chapter One).  Chapter Two (“Ecosocialism and Democratic Planning”) and Chapter Three (“Ecology and Advertisement”) are a more detailed discussion of ideas raised in Chapter One.  These are followed by two chapters on Latin American indigenous struggles bearing on ecological and socialist concerns. The book includes four appendices that are ecosocialist statements Löwy coauthored.  Most of what follows pertain to the first and key chapter and their extensions in the next two chapters.  It is an essay in the critical understanding of Löwy ’s conception of ecosocialism and its logical development.  Also, I question Löwy silences when I feel they are important to ecosocialism.  Of course, my reading of Löwy’s book is colored by my own understanding of ecosocialism (Nayeri 2013a and 2013b). 

Ecosocialism and Marx’s theory
A key question in ecosocialism is continuity and change with respect to socialism. The history of socialism is largely one of neglect of the environmental and ecological issues and horrific destruction of the environment under “Really Existing Socialisms.” Given this, environmentalists and ecologists have criticized Marx’s theory as the root-cause. 

Some ecosocialists, notably John Bellamy Foster (2000 and 2010) and Paul Burkett (1999), have argued that not only Marx and Engels were sensitive to and provided insight into ecological and environmental problems of their time, their dialectical methodology and materialist philosophy provide the necessary and sufficient basis for overcoming the crises of society and nature; that is, for ecosocialism.  

Some other ecosocialists have broken with Marx’s and Engels’ teachings in favor of other perspectives. For example, Saral Sarkar (1999) has adopted the technocentric perspective of Limits to Growth of the Club of Rome as a new paradigm to develop his own view of ecosocialism.  

Still, others like James O’Connor (1998) and Joel Kovel  (2007) admit deficiencies and problems in Marx’s theory and have tried to develop synthesis incorporating insights from other sources to meet the intellectual and practical requirements for overcoming the ecosocial crisis. Löwy's theorizing is similar to these writers as he concedes that Marx’s writings include some support for “productivism.” (pp. 2-3)  And he challenges Marxists “to undertake a deep critical revision of their traditional conception of ‘productive forces’ and that they break radically with the ideology of linear progress and with the technological and economic paradigm of modern industrial civilization.” (p. 3)

Löwy approvingly notes Walter Benjamin’s denunciation of the idea of domination of nature and proposal for a new idea of technology as “mastery of relations between nature and humanity” (“One-Way Street”, 1928; quoted in Löwy, p. 3) and his embrace of Fourier’s vision of “labor, which, far from exploiting nature, would be capable of awakening the creations that slept in its womb.” (“On the Concept of History”, 1940; ibid)  I agree that Benjamin had a useful hunch but these formulations remain too general to be useful and as Löwy observes “Marxism is still far from having made up for its backwardness in this regard.” Moreover, regrettably, Löwy reduces Benjamin’s hunch to overcoming “productivism” or in Marxian parlance the explicit preference for continued “development of forces of production” even under socialism.  As we will see below, the quest for domination of nature has been a pillar of the human civilization and root-cause of the anthropogenic crisis of nature. 

To address the problem of “productivism,” in Marx’s theorizing Löwy’ cites two promising lines of development.  One is a recent suggestion by Italian “eco-Marxist” Tiziano Bagarollo to replace the notion of contradiction between forces of production and relations of production with “transformation of potentially productive forces into effectively destructive ones.” (p. 4)  This is a rather substantial revision of Marx’s and Engels’ historical materialism.  It is also an observation made by other Marxists, including Ernest Mandel, who long ago noted that many forms of production are at the same time acts of destruction and so are the forces of production also forces of destruction.  Also, let’s take note that non-Marxists scholars have contributed towards a better understanding of this problem. For example, Ronald Wright (2007) draws attention to “progress traps” in human history and in prehistory when technological progress turns into its opposite. An example he cites is the development of explosive material beginning with the Chinese invention of gunpowder.  Wright argues that when the nuclear bomb was developed a progress trap was reached because if employed it could annihilate the world.  As in the case of Wright, non-Marxist scholars are also more open-minded in terms of searching for such problems in “prehistory” as well as history.  Marxists, on the other hand, are limited by the requirements of historical materialism to look for this problem and solutions to it in class societies. This difference in scope has relevance for the development of ecosocialist theory and policy.  By focusing on class societies, Marxists leave out  95% of the history of Homo sapiens when organized as hunter-gatherers that have to bear on understanding of our relationship with the rest of nature.

Löwy seems to favor another line of thinking, one advanced by James O’Connor’s “Marxist-Polanyist” approach in his “Second Contradiction of Capitalism” thesis. As O’Connor writes: “In 1944, Karl Polanyi published his masterpiece, The Great Transformation, which discussed the ways in which the growth of the capitalist market and economic relations generally impaired or destroyed their own social and environmental conditions.” (O’Connor, 1998, p. 159).  

O’Connor contends this line of analysis is absent from Marx’s work. Such an absence is not surprising as Marx’s focus was on the social relations of production and how they could be revolutionized through the development of class struggle prompted by the laws of motion of capitalist mode of production that he and Engels hoped would lead to socialism in not too distant future.  They could not foresee that the capitalist civilization will survive into the twenty-first century creating the planetary crisis we face today.  But now that it has we need to develop philosophical, theoretical and practical basis adequate to comprehending and overcoming this crisis.  Marx’s and Engels’ brilliant nineteen-century contributions are still necessary.  But in the spirit of Marx himself, we need to find our own way out of this crisis basing ourselves on all necessary knowledge critically appropriated.    

But here is where Löwy’s exploration face difficulties.  He defines ecosocialism as “a current of ecological thought and action that appropriates the fundamental gains of Marxism while shaking off its productivist dross.” (p. 6)  With a slight of his pen, he drops Benjamin’s concern with the problem of the drive to dominate and control nature, which I will return to below.  At the same time, Löwy accepts the need to revise the very method of “Marxism,” historical materialism, with its emphasis on forces of production. How can one “appropriate the fundamental gains of Marxism” if the methodology of reaching them is in some fundamental sense is inadequate to our present day purpose?  The advantage of O’Connor’s approach that Löwy seems to favor is precisely in its attempt to revise historical materialism in ways that allow for a synthesis with Polanyi’s thesis in consideration of the impact of capitalism on nature.  But if we revise Marx’s method would it not be necessary to rethink his theory, including his critique of political economy? Also, Löwy’s definition of ecosocialism as “a current of ecological thought and action” is itself a fundamental revision of Marx’s and Engels’ theory of socialism (Communism, as they called it to differentiate their vision from the Utopian Socialists) as a form of consciousness reached by a current within the working class movement.  Of course, in principle, there is nothing wrong per se in revising Marx’s theory and method if such revision allows us to more effectively overcome the crises of society and nature and emancipate humanity.  However, it is untrue, confusing and sectarian to insist that this is still “Marxist.”  

For a humanist ecology? 
Löwy's conception of ecosocialism includes other notable tensions. A key tension is what I think is fair to call his “humanist ecology.”  In his allusion to O’Connor’s definition of ecosocialism, Löwy argues that O’Connor’s notion of “environmental protection” is a “humanist imperative because “the very survival of the human species” is threatened by the capitalist civilization. (p. 8)  Of course, this not a mere propaganda ploy or agitational tool but part of Löwy attempt at theoretical development of ecosocialism.  Add to this Löwy's  criticism of Deep Ecology for opposing anthropocentrism: a “rejection of humanism, which leads to relativist positions that place all living species on the same plane.” (p. 6)  He rhetorically asks: “Should one really maintain that Koch’s bacillus or the Anopheles mosquito have the same right to life as a child suffering from tuberculosis or malaria?”  (ibid.)

I will get back to Löwy’s criticism of Deep Ecology and his rhetorical question in a moment.  Let’s focus on the theoretical and methodological question that Löwy raises: anthropocentrism (or its humanism variety) or ecocentrism (which Deep Ecology embraces), which is the proper worldview for understanding and addressing the ecological crisis?  By definition, ecology as a branch of biology deals with the web of relationships among organisms and with their physical environment. We call this complex set of relationships an ecosystem. Thus, by definition ecological concerns are with ecosystems and are ecocentric by definition.  By contract, anthropocentrism or its humanist variety view humans as the apex of creation. They are a human-centered approach to reality, social or ecological. 

As a philosophical and literary movement, Humanism originated in Italy in the second half of the fourteen century and has come to be a pillar of modernity, including socialism.  Humanism has been a revolutionary movement where it has dethroned supernatural beings, gods, to liberate humanity from religious dogma and tyranny.  Yet, humanism has maintained a modified version of the anthropocentrism of the Church’s doctrine which in the Book of Genesis that claims God created Man in his own image and other species for Him.

Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution challenges anthropocentric views of humans as the apex of creation with its contribution to our understanding of life on Earth and our place in it.  Of course, Darwin did not deny that human mental capacities are greater than other animals. He acknowledged that humans far outdistance all other animals in linguistic ability, thought, and reason.  He only insisted that the difference, impressive as they are, are matters of degree, not of kind. At the same time, despite the prevalent practice of comparing other species’ capabilities to humans, the Darwinian evolutionary theory makes it clear that every species has capabilities adequate to the ecosystem niche it inhabits. Thus, a chimpanzee has arms much stronger than humans and a tiny gopher can dig a complex maze of tunnels with its tiny hands and sharp claws and an ant can carry 100 times its own weight.  It is anthropocentric and anti-Darwinian to expect other species to excel in capacities acquired by our species. In the Darwinian theory, there are simpler and more complex species. There are no superior or inferior species. 

The Darwinian heritage is an intellectual and spiritual pillar for the ecological movement and a guiding light for humanity to emerge out of its thousands-year-old crisis of society and nature.  Thus, it is essential to any ecosocialist theorizing that hopes to provide a solid ethical basis for any post-capitalist naturalist social formation.  

There is a growing literature on bioethics. Let me cite one example that directly uses Darwin’s theory.  Philosopher James Rachels (1990) has used Darwin’s theory to argue for moral consideration for all animals.  Before Darwin, he recalls, the doctrine of “dignity of man” which is the central tenant of humanism, was defended by the claim that “man is made in the image of God” or by the notion that “man is a uniquely rational being.” Rachels painstakingly debunks both of these arguments in light of Darwin’s theory. To replace the “dignity of man” doctrine, he proposes “moral individualism.”  
How an individual should be treated depends on his or her own particular characteristics, rather than on whether he or she is a members of some preferred group--even the ‘group’ of human beings...This means that human life will, in a sense, be devalued, while the value granted to non-human life will be increased. (Rachels 1990, p. 5) 
By “devaluation” of human life, Rachels means the process of dethroning human beings as the apex of creation in our anthropocentric culture. It should be understood in the sense of leveling of hierarchical value systems as in the case of the fall of Apartheid in South Africa.  It was not so much “devaluing” the lives of white South African as it was for equality of rights for all regardless of their race.   

It is also notable that for 95% of our existence when humans were hunter-gatherers some of whom still survive, they held animist beliefs and ecocentric cosmologies.  Archeological evidence suggests that transition to farming by some hunter-gatherer bands that occurred at the end of the last ice age about 10,000 ago was possibly facilitated by emerging anthropocentric worldview and certainly reinforced and institutionalized it with the emergence of class societies and civilization (Barker, 2006).  I have argued (Nayeri, 2013b) that this historical transition marks the onset of our alienation from nature.  Given its foundational necessity for class societies—without domination and control of other species the Agricultural Revolution would have never happened and economic surplus was not possible. Thus, anthropocentrism also served as the basis for social stratification and subordination, oppression and exploitation of all kinds. Therefore, human emancipation, postulated in Marx as a process of de-alienation (and not simply of having more free time as Löwy contends), requires not only a revolution to transcend the fossil fuel-based industrial capitalist civilization in the direction of an Associated Producers mode of production but also a cultural revolution to overcome anthropocentrism (also known as speciesism or doctrine of human superiority). 

Now we can return to  Löwy's rhetorical question and his criticism of Deep Ecology: “Should one really maintain that Koch’s bacillus or the Anopheles mosquito have the same right to life as a child suffering from tuberculosis or malaria?”  Löwy does not ascribe this perverse position to anyone or any source in Deep Ecology.  But holding an ecocentric worldview, Darwinian or Deep Ecology, does not entail disregard for human life or opposition to saving a child from tuberculosis or malaria. Point Three of the Eight Point Platform of Deep Ecology, drafted by two of its most influential thinkers Arnes Naess and George Sessions, clearly states: “Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity [of life] except to satisfy vital needs.” (my emphasis) This statement focuses on species in ecosystems and exempts humans to reduce its “richness and diversity” for the satisfaction of their “vital needs.” Would anyone fantom Naess or Sessions object to saving a child’s life from a life threatening infections?  Löwy rhetorical question posed as an attack on Deep Ecology is bogus.  The “relativism” of Deep Ecology is really its ecocentrism that dovetails Darwin’s and that of ecology.  Neither leads humanity into neglecting our vital needs. Both require us to give up our self-appointed position as the apex of creation and to embrace nature with love and empathy as we do for humanity. Thus, from the point of view of ecosocialism, the problem is not ecocentrism but humanism that is a variety of anthropocentrism. 

In his two chapters on Latin American indigenous peoples’ fight for the environment, Löwy discusses recent development in Bolivia in support of the rights of Mother Earth. Is this not a reflection of the native cultures in the Americas that held and in some cases continue to hold today ecocentric world views similar to those Deep Ecology promotes?

Questions of policy
Of course, the anthropocentric basis of Löwy’s theorizing frames his understanding of the root cause of the ecological crisis and his approach to ecosocialist policy.  In his discussion of democratic planning which he expands on in Chapter Two Löwy appeals to E. P. Thomson’s notion a “moral economy” founded on non-monetary, extra-economic criteria. The question is: does Löwy “moral economy” include an integral ethical approach to other species and the well-being of the planet?  

The answer is that it doesn’t.  I will cite three examples. 

The problem of human overpopulation 
Take Löwy’s silence on the population question.  It is estimated that during Jesus’s time the world population was about 300 million.  It took eighteen centuries for it to reach one billion by 1804.   But in the next 123 years, it doubled to two billion in 1927.  Just 33 years later, in 1960, it reached 3 billion.  Only 14 years later in 1974, it was already 4 billion.  It took 13 years for the world population to reach 5 billion in 1987. By 1999, 12 years later, it had reached 6 billion.  Just 13 years later in 2012, it had reached 7 billion.  It is projected that the world will have around 9 to 10 billions by 2050.  

How can anyone concerned with the ecological health of the planet ignore the size and fast rate of growth of human population especially when it is combined with a rapid rise in its consumption per head as suggested by the increase in the real per capita GDP since the Industrial Revolution in England (1)?  The ratio of real GDP in 1995 to 1950 was 3.1 in the “more developed areas” with 20% of the world population and 2.9 in the “less developed areas” with 80% of the world population. (Easterlin, 2000, Table 3)  Some 20% of the world population, mostly in the industrial capitalist countries, consume 80% of the world GDP.  

Just focusing on energy used Vitousek et al (1986) note that we “are now consuming about 12,000 times more as much energy per day as was the case when farming started; 90 per cent of this is a result of industrialization, 10 per cent to our huge growth in numbers…" (cited in Washington, 2013, p. 12).  According to their calculations, humans co-opt organic material equivalent to about 40% of the present net primary product in terrestrial ecosystems each year.  The vast majority of other species must subsist on the reminder.   “‘An equivalent concentration of resources into one species and its satellites has probably not occurred since land plants first diversified.’” (ibid.) Vitousek et al. add that “humans also affect much of the other 60% of terrestrial NPP, often heavily.” (ibid) But Vitousek et al. study is over quarter of century old and uses conservative methodologies.   

Washington who quotes extensively from Vitousek et al. remarks: 
Whichever figure one uses, this remains a huge percentage of the net primary productivity of the planet that humans are appropriating.  Of course this appropriation is also increasing as population, and possibly more importantly per capita consumption, continues to increase. The high and increasing appropriation of NPP by humanity is clearly a fundamental stress on ecosystem health. NPP is the foundation of all ecosystems, so if we pull out too many blocks from the foundation to put on the ‘human pile’ eventually other structures (natural ecosystems) collapse.  And indeed they are... (Washington 2013, p. 12-13).
Unfortunately, most ecosocialists are either silent on the problem of rapidly rising and sheer size of human population and our ever-increasing consumption per capita, or worse, attack ecologists and environmentalists and the few ecosocialists who raise it as “Malthusian.” But to cast the ecological implications of human population growth as a replay of the nineteenth-century argument involving Malthus and Marx is to show a lack of understanding of both.  The Malthus-Marx “debate” (Malthus died in 1834 before Marx learned of him) was really about class conflict and income distribution (Foster, 1999). While Marx was right against Malthus in the nineteenth century "population debate" that was not a discussion of the role of human population in today’s ecological crisis and the ongoing anthropogenic Sixth Great Extinction (Nayeri, 2014a). 

Thus, Löwy’s “humanist ecology” deprives him of the ability to register much less engage the real concern with a human population that environmentalists and ecologists he says he wants to reach correctly cite as cause for concern.  While a critic of economic growth ideology, Löwy vision is not ecological despite his own insistence that ecosocialism is (or ought to be?) a contributing current in the ecological movement. 

The problem of “preservation of ecological equilibrium”
Once Löwy sets out the framework for his vision of ecosocialism he focuses on the problem of planning in forging the future ecosocialist society, mostly in Chapter Two (“Ecosocialism and Democratic Planning”).  The literature on socialist planning is extensive which Löwy does not engage (except briefly in the case of Michael Albert’s “Participatory Economy”).  Rather he stresses a number of his preferred features of planning. First, “the plan concerns the main economic options” not small businesses while he expresses support for workers management of small businesses. (p. 26)  Second, he suggests that instead of “centralized” or “decentralized” dichotomy the “real issue is democratic control of the plan at all levels: local, regional, national, continental, and, hopefully international” levels.” (p. 27) Third, he argues that democratic planning should include consumers as well as producers.   To make these effective and functional Löwy argues for libertarian ecosocialism with a multi-party system and full democratic rights to ensure meaningful choices for the population.

Also, Löwy argues democratic planning of the economy should take into account “the preservation of the ecological equilibrium.” (p. 23)  As examples, he suggests elimination of “nuclear plants, certain methods of mass/industrial fishing…, the destructive logging of tropical forests, etc.” (ibid).  

However, he leaves out a key question: How would planners on each level from local to international approach the problem of “preservation of the ecological equilibrium?” 

Löwy’s humanist approach to ecology would leave him no choice but to rely on scientism and technocentrism to achieve and maintain “ecological equilibrium” from local to the planetary level. Of course, Löwy advocates for democratic planning based on grassroots. But ordinary people are no better in judging what is the proper “ecological equilibrium” than today’s environmentalist establishment which relies on scientists and technicians to figure it out.  Any anthropocentric (or humanist) ecology ends up being ecology by human design, of humans acting as managers of nature(2). As ecosystems are extremely complex and human ingenuity invariably prone to errors the law of unintended consequences will set in and odds of failure increase. And if history is any guide failure is guaranteed!  

Another approach based on ecocentrism is more in line with ecosocialism as it would be motivated by the culture of love and respect for Mother Nature/Mother Earth; take for example,  indigenous cultures, Deep Ecology’s philosophy and simple rules (The Eight Point Platform) or ethical stance of the theory of evolution and Big History (Christian, 2004) that view humanity as part of a vast and intertwined web of life pointing to a “do no harm” environmental ethics.  The ecosocialist society can supplement this ethical approach to nature with knowledge and know-how gleaned from science and technology, remembering that these are not value free enterprises. Science has been motivated by human curiosity and the anthropocentric desire to dominate and control nature and technology is in large measure ways of human domination and control of nature.

To illustrate, while as ecosocialists we appeal to the scientific consensus that there virtually certainty (95% confidence) that global warming is chiefly caused by human-generated emissions that knowledge merely gives urgency to our call for an immediate transition to sustainable sources of energy.  However a transition to sustainable sources of energy is an environmentally ethical choice that follows from our knowledge of possible dangers from fossil fuels to nature.  As ecosocialists we would not need to wait for scientific consensus to act on this question if we had the means to do so. 

How to decide which economic/human activities to eliminate? 
From this perspective, Löwy’s suggestions for elimination of certain economic activities and industries seem timid, insufficient and arbitrary. He is silent on a host of industries and economic activities that thrive on exploitation, misery and death of untold number of species and untold billions of individuals directly or through destruction of their habitat.  For instance would the future ecosocialist society maintain “recreational” and commercial hunting and fishing, zoos and animal circuses, international trade in wildlife and the “pet” industry, uses of animals in laboratory research and “entertainments” such as horse and dog racing, bullfighting, cockfighting, dog fighting to name just a few?  Would the meat industry meet Löwy standard of the ecosocialist “moral economy?” Some statistics can help: In 2011, more than 58 billion chicken (more precisely, 58,110,000,000), nearly 3 billion ducks (2,917,000,000), more than a billion pigs (1,383,000,000) were slaughtered worldwide. Other farm animals slaughtered for food numbered in hundreds of millions each: 654,000,000 turkeys, 649,000,000 geese and guinea fowl, 517,000,000 sheep, 430,000,000 goats and 296,000,000 cattle. (Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2014, p. 15) The extreme suffering of farm animals is well documented (see for example the following links from the Farm Sanctuary for chickens, pigs, cows, and sheep). 

 Of course, consumption of non-human animals as food is not limited to farm animals. In 2011, over 156 million tons of seafood (capture and aquaculture) was consumed worldwide (FAO, “World Fisheries Production,” accessed June 2, 2014). There is also “exotic food” that in the United States includes alligator, alpaca, armadillo, bear, beaver, bobcat, caiman, crocodile, camel, coyote, capon, dove, frog, iguana, kudu, lion, llama, monkey, muskrat, opossum, otter, ostrich, pale, quail, turtle, venison and zebra meat. (see, for example, this marketplace mail order for exotic food)  Other countries and cultures have their own choice of meat. In China, Korea and the Philippines cats and dogs are eaten.  Japanese prize whales as food.  The French eat horse meat. In Africa, bushmeat is treasured.  

In “How Veganism Can Help Save the World” (Nayeri, June 2014) I have argued ecosocialists would do well to fight for a radical transformation of our carnivores diet and the food system that supports it not only because the meat industry it is an essential part of modern day capitalism, not just because a carnivores diet is bad for our health and bad for the environment, but most of all because they are among the most horrendous manifestation of anthropocentrism that stands in the way of ecosocialism. 

Degrwoth
In his discussion of democratic planning, Löwy is correct to argue that we need a revolution in values against “the prevalent type of consumption, based as it on conspicuous consumption, massive waste, mercantile alienation, obsessive accumulation of goods, and the compulsive acquisition of pseudo-novelties impose by ‘fashion.’” (p. 32).  I have just argued that one would need to radically transform this value matrix from an anthropocentric perspective to an ecocentric perspective.  In Chapter Three (“Ecology and Advertising”), Löwy focuses on the advertising industry, which expands commodity fetishism and economic growth, alas in anthropocentric terms.  First, Löwy limits his field of vision by dividing the literature into “pessimists” and “optimists” about growth.  The optimists are socialists that believe “technical progress and the use of renewable sources of energy will permit unlimited growth and abundance, so that all can receive ‘according to their needs.’” (p. 32)  Although “productivism” is the central theme in Löwy critique of “Marxism” he does not dwell on the “optimists” and their technology fetishism which is shared by a current among neoliberals who claim technology can fix or dispose of ecological problems (inclduing by colonizing other planets!) He is more worried about ecologist pessimists who believe “the only alternative to productivism is to stop growth altogether, or to replace it by negative growth…and dramatically reduce the population’s excessively high level of consumption by cutting energy expenditure by half through renouncing individual family houses, central heating, and washing machines, and so on.” Löwy points to an extremist minority he does not name who call for “ecological dictatorship” to enforce such “draconian austerity.”

In fact, spectrum of views on the problem of capitalism and growth is far more diverse and complicated and in important ways.  Let me illustrate by noting the case of Limits to Growth proponents of ecosocialism.  These include Saral Sarkar (1999) and Ted Trainer (2010; for a brief discussion of Trainer’s view see Alexander, 2012).  While neither is a Marxist, they are not the wild-eyed extremists that Löwy  warns us about.  Both Sarkar and Trainer are motivated by twin concerns of overconsumption, that they believe is largely responsible for the crisis, and with social justice. They both call for democratically decided scaling back of the economy and population to reach a steady state ecosocialist economy compatible with the “carrying capacity” of the planet.  Their idea of democratic planning is similar to Löwy’s.  Sarkar is explicitly anthropocentric and to my knowledge Trainer has not embraced ecocentrism.  While neither of these authors are acknowledged in Löwy’s discussions of ecosocialism, they share similar views with him on many issues. An exception is degrowth (shrinking of the economy and population).  

What I like to argue now is that Löwy’s own view of reorganizing the economy along the value matrix that he defines (see above) will result in negative growth and drastic reduction of the size of the economy (in individual countries where his prescription is adopted as well as the world economy), a form of unplanned degrowth (shrinking of the size and complexity of the economy).  Take for example, his critical view of advertising. If we get rid of advertising in the U.S.  economy we wipe out about 2% of the GDP in one stroke (that is more or less the share of advertising in the GDP in recent years). But if advertising has any real effect on consumption its elimination will reduce demand for goods and services of other industries causing further drop in the GDP.  Then there is the multiplier effect.  Income lost by the lay off of employees in advertising would be lost income for firms and industries that provide goods and services to these individuals. The same multiplier effect will shrink firms and industries that provide goods and services to those laid off from firms and industries affected by the disappearance of advertising capital investment.  Thus, there will be significantly less expenditure in the economy and further shrinking of the GDP.  Of course, some of those laid off in advertising and affiliated industries can be hired in industries producing goods and services to satisfy genuine unmet needs.  But capitalist wastefulness by far exceed unmet human needs and overall the economy is bound to shrink significantly  And, of course, advertising is not the only economic activity that will wither away under ecosocialism(3).

Thus degrowth—of economy—is inherent in ecosocialism in part for the reasons Löwy himself cites—there is much waste and harmful production that must be stopped as soon as possible.  Also, ecosocialist degrowth would not be “draconian” or “dictatorial.”  In fact, it can actually be a fun and liberating experience. (Alexander, 2014)  I would concur with Trainer that ecosocialism will be built on new sets of values consistent with finding joy and fulfillment in simplicity. (Trainer, 2015) 

On indigenous peoples’ struggle
Löwy's two chapters on the indigenous struggles in Latin America are fun to read and educational.  I regret he does not notice the underlaying ecocentrism of these cultures and why that matters in their attitude towards nature and ecological crisis we face.  In the section about the World People’s Conference on Climate Change in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in 2010, he writes:
One can criticize the mystical and confused aspects of the concept of ‘Mother Earth’ (Pachamama in indigenous languages Aymara and Quechua), as some leftist Latin American intellectuals have done, or point out the impossibility of giving an effective legal expression to the ‘rights of Mother earth,’ as jurists have done. Yet this would be to lose sight of the essential point: the powerful, radically anti-systemic social dynamic that has crystalized around these slogans. (p. 71)
But to call indigenous ideas of Mother earth” “mystical and confused” is entirely anthropocentric and colored by the ethos of Western civilization.  Perhaps these “leftists” and the “jurists” should have consulted an anthropologist or an archeologist who could explain to them that these expression are based on cosmologies that view humans as a part of their natural surrounding and as its children not its masters.  Would not this way of thinking about nature be more in line with the Darwinian view of life and our place in the world and perhaps aid Westerners and the rest of us to overcome our delusion of mastery over nature that has been the root-cause of the ecological crisis for thousands of years? 

Löwy’s defense of the indigenous struggle also falls short. Of course, he is correct about “the powerful, radically anti-systemic social dynamic that has crystalized around these slogans.” But as I pointed above he misses the larger point.  It is us the civilized people who can learn from the indigenous cultures their ecocentric outlook and how to incorporate it into the fabric of the ecosocialist society we like to build.

The ecosocialist documents Löwy includes as appendices are historical records. It would have been useful had he also included an assessment of the Ecosocialist International Network which he cofounded and was disbanded without a discussion in 2013 (I belonged to it from 2009 to its demise).

It is a pity that the book is poorly edited.  As I explained earlier there is a certain internal logic to it that is appealing and helpful which Löwy somehow neglects to bring to his readers attention in the Preface. There are repetitious sections, sometimes verbatim, that distract readers from consideration of the author’s reflections on important theoretical problems. The Preface seems to have been written in a rush and includes an unfortunate error.  The opening paragraph reads: “The pursuit of ‘growth’ under the aegis to capital will lead us in short range—the next decades—to catastrophe without precedence in human history: global warming.” (p. vii, my emphasis) 

Global warming is a fact already— Löwy probably meant catastrophic climate change which he refers to repeatedly elsewhere in the book.  Also, both global warming and climate change have happened in human history before—in fact, most experts believe that the Holocene which began with warming of the atmosphere 11,700 years ago that ended the last ice age helped prompt some hunter-gathers to become farmers. As such it was responsible for civilization hence the crisis we face today. 

Notes: 
1. Of course, consumption in the capitalist world economy is highly skewed. While there is overconsumption and a lot of waste in the North and by higher income groups in the South, there is a lot of unmet needs in the South any by low-income groups in the North. Meanwhile, 2.8 billion people struggle to survive on less than $2 a day, and more than one billion people lack reasonable access to safe drinking water. United Nations reports that 825 million people are still undernourished; the average person in the industrial world took in 10 percent more calories daily in 1961 than the average person in the developing world consumes today (World Watch Institute, 2014)
2. The often used term “guardians” of nature is self-serving. Who are we protecting nature from if not some group of humans? 
3. To illustrate, consider the war industry and the health care industry in the U.S. economy.  With  $14.66 trillion economy in 2010, the budget of the Department of Defense budget was $862.2 billions in 2011 (the latest available figure) and the health care system cost $2.49 trillion in 2009 (the latest available figure).  A back of the envelope calculations show that if we get rid of the Department of Defense and reform the U.S. care system to be similar to Canadian system, the second most expensive system in the word but with better outcomes than the U.S. system, there would be roughly a 9.4% drop in the GDP (I am not considering the secondary effects and the multiplier effects of these changes which will make this drop much more pronounced). If those who lose their employment are re-trained and re-employed in ecology friendly and use-value generating economic activities that will guarantee everyone a job by reducing the work week say to 30 hours we will end up with a significantly smaller economy while moving towards a culture of being from the current bourgeois culture of having. 

References:
Alexander, Samuel.“Ted Trainer and The Simpler Way,” Simplicity Institute, 2012
Alexander, Samuel. “Life in a ‘Degrowth’ Economy, and Why You Might Actually Enjoy It,” The Conversation, 2014.
Barker, Graeme.  The Agricultural Revolution in Prehistory.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Burkett, Paul.  Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective, 1999 (republished in paperback by Haymarket Books, 2014).
Christian, David. Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.
Easterlin, Richard E. “The Worldwide Standard of Living Since 1800,”, Journal of Economic Perspective, volume 14, Number 1, Winter 2000, pp. 7–26,).
FAO. “World Fisheries Production,” accessed June 2, 2014
Foster, John Bellamy.“Malthus’ Essay on Population at Age 200: A Marxist View”, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999
Foster, John Bellamy.  Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000 
Foster, John Bellamy; Brett Clark and Richard York. The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth.  New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010. 
Heinrich, Michael. “Je ne suis pas Marxiste,” libcome.org
Löwy, Michael. Ecosocialism: A Radical Alternative to Capitalist Catastrophe. Haymarket Books, 2015. 
Nayeri, Kamran. Economics, Socialism, and Ecology: A Critical Outline—Part 1,” Philosophers for Change (republished in Our Place in the World: A Journal of Ecosocialism) 2013a. 
Nayeri, Kamran. Economics, Socialism, and Ecology: A Critical Outline—Part 2,” Philosophers for Change (republished in Our Place in the World: A Journal of Ecosocialism) 2013b.
Nayeri, Kamran. “On the Population Question: Malthus, Marx and Beyond”, Our Place in the World: A Journal of Ecosocialism, 2014a.
Nayeri, Kamran. How Veganism Can Help Save the World,” Our Place in the World: A Journal of Ecosocialism, June 2014.
O’Connor, James. Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Marxism. The Guilford Press, 1998. 
Rachels, James. Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism. Oxford University Press, 1990
Sarkar, Saral. Eco-Socialism or Eco-Capitalism? The Fundamental Choice for Humanity, Zed Books, 1999.
Trainer, Ted. Getting to a Sustainable and Just World, Envirobook, 2010
Trainer, Ted. “The Case for Simplicity ,” Simplicity Institute, 2015
Vitousek, P., A. Ehrlich, and P. Matson.  “Human Appropriation of the Products of Photosynthesis,” BioScience, vol. 277, pp. 494-499, 1986. 
Washington, Haydn. Human Dependence on Nature: How to Help Solve the Environmental Crisis.  Abingdon, Canada and New York: Routledge, 2013. 
World Watch Institute. “The State of World Consumption,” accessed May 13, 2014.  
Wilson. E. O. Creation: An Appeal to Save Life on Earth.  New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006. 
Wright, Ronald.  A Short History of Progress, Da Capo Press, 2004.

1875. The Legend of Marx, or “Engels the Founder”

By Maximilien Rubel, marxmyths.org, 1972
Maximilien Rubel
Introduction
In May 1970, upon the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Friedrich Engels, the town of Wuppertal had organised an international scientific conference. This occasion brought together around 50 specialists from more than 10 European countries, as well as Israel and the United States whose task was to take stock of modern research on the thought of he who is universally taken to be, alongside his friend Karl Marx, one of the founders of “Marxism”. Invited to participate in this conference, I intended to submit as a text for the discussion a series of critical theses centred on the theme of Engels’s responsibility for the genesis of the dominant ideology of the 20th century: ‘Marxism’. It had seemed to me normal and urgent to share my critical reservations, in the context of a more ‘scientific’ than commemorative event, to an audience informed of the problems in the evolution of ideas in relation to the events and upheavals that have marked the 20th Century. I had therefore presented the organisers a document in 8 points, written in German, which I had titled “Gesichtspunkte zum thema ‘Engels als Begründer’”.

To my surprise, upon arrival in Wuppertal, I was received by the conference officials who informed me of a certain predicament: my Soviet and East German colleagues, being personally offended when reading my “Viewpoints”, were threatening to leave the conference if my contribution was not retracted from the debate! After laborious negotiation we came to an agreement on a formula which seemed likely to calm the irritation of these ‘scientific’ representatives from ‘socialist’ countries: the texts would no longer be read from the platform, but merely commented upon and discussed. It would be tempting to recount the details of the debate if the objections had merited the term ‘scientific’, and if the behaviour of certain participants hadn’t translated as a complete refusal to engage in a discussion that risked putting in question the range of ideological positions of ‘marxism-leninism’. At the same time, this obstinate if not insulting refusal, was enough to confirm to the eyes of an impartial observer the fundamental criticism that can be directed at the use of this concept of ‘Marxism’, the erroneous use of which was precisely what my “Viewpoints” denounced[1].

The epilogue to this conference was to further underline the solid grounding of a critique which, in the form of a simple semantic reflection, in fact represented a defence of Marx’s social theory in opposition to Marxist mythology. As it turned out, the organisers were not afraid of avoiding the elementary rules of editorial policy generally respected in ‘bourgeois’ democracies: the text (submitted at the request of the officials) was not included in the volume of collected contributions that were submitted prior to the conference[2]. Habent sua fata libelli…[3]

We here present a translation of the text refused by the conference at Wuppertal, with some supporting commentary.  

Viewpoints on the Theme of “Engels the Founder”

“For the ultimate final triumph of the ideas set forth in the Manifesto, Marx relied solely upon the intellectual development of the working class, as it necessarily has to ensue from united action and discussion.”


I. Marxism did not enter the world as an authentic product of Karl Marx’s way of thinking, but was conceived in Friedrich Engels’ mind. Insofar as the term ‘marxism’ conceals a rational concept, it is not Marx but Engels who carries the responsibility; and if today Marx’s argument retains a priority, it is principally related to problems for which Engels did not find more than a partial solution, or with which he did not concern himself. Therefore, if these problems can be resolved at all, this can only be with the help of Marx himself. By no means does this mean that Engels must be excluded from discussion, but it is legitimate to question the extent to which he should be taken into account in any dealings with the writings of Marx which escaped his attention. In more general terms the question can be thus formulated: what are the limits of Engels’ competence in his role as uncontested executor of Marx’s intellectual legacy, to which we still appeal to elucidate the material and ethical problems of our time?

II. This interrogation must examine a central problem – that of the intellectual relationship between Marx and Engels, ‘founders’ of a collection of ideological and political concepts artificially grouped under the name ‘marxism’. The fact that this question must be posed itself reveals a very characteristic phenomenon of our epoch, which one might now call the ‘myth of the 20th Century’. We should recall that the ‘founders’ sometimes themselves evoked mythological interpretation to underline the peculiar character of their friendship and intellectual collaboration: Marx was not being ironic in invoking the example of antique “Dioscures” or that of Orestes and Pylade, whilst Engels mocked the rumour according to which “Ahriman-Marx” had led “Ormuzd-Engels” astray[4]. There is equally an opposite tendency, with increasingly frequent efforts to oppose Marx to Engels: the first would be the ‘true’ founder, the second reduced to the rank of mere ‘pseudo-dialectician’[5].

III. Any investigation into the relationship between Marx and Engels is in advance destined to fail if it does not clear away the legend of the ‘foundation’ and does not take for a methodological point of departure the aporia of the concept of Marxism. It was the merit of Karl Korsch, when twenty years ago at the threshold of a radical revision of his intellectual positions, to have attempted a critique of Marxism which amounted to a declaration of war. However, Korsch simply did not dare commit the act of sweeping away the concept of Marxism and it’s mythological residues. Instead, he tried to remove this difficulty through the usage of linguistic artifices destined to conserve and to save the “important elements of the Marxist doctrine” with a view to the “reconstruction of a revolutionary theory and practice”. In his “Ten Theses on Marxism Today” Korsch moves indiscriminately between speaking of the “teaching of Marx and of Engels”, “Marxist doctrine”, the “doctrine of Marx”, “Marxism” and so on[6]. In the fifth thesis, concerning the question of the precursors, founders and continuators of the socialist movement, Korsch goes so far as to omit the name of Engels, the alter ego of Marx! Yet he was not far from the truth when he wrote:

“Today, all attempts to re-establish the Marxist doctrine as a whole in its original function as a theory of the working classes social revolution are reactionary utopias.”
Korsch could as well, and more accurately, have spoken of “absurd mythologies” in place of “reactionary utopias.”

IV. In view of the impossibility of rationally defining the meaning of the concept of Marxism, it seems logical to abandon the word itself, yet it is so commonly and so universally employed. This term, degraded to the point of merely being a mystificatory slogan, carried from its birth the stigma of obscurantism. Marx struggled hard to undo this when, in the last years of his life, his reputation had broken the wall of silence which surrounded his work, and he made this categorical declaration: “ce qu’il y a de certain c’est que moi, je ne suis pas Marxiste”[7]. However revealing, the fact that Engels bequeathed this warning to posterity does not relieve him of the responsibility of having given in to the temptation of lending the stamp of his authority to this unjustifiable term. Charged with being the guardian and the perpetuator of a theory, the elaboration of which he admitted to not having contributed more than a modest part[8], and glorifying Marx’s name in an attempt to repair the damage, Engels inadvertently promoted the genesis of a superstition, the negative consequences of which he could not have known. Today, sixty years after his death, his efforts are perfectly clear. When Engels decided to appropriate the terms ‘marxist’ and ‘marxism’ from his adversaries in order to change a hostile name into a name of honour, he could hardly have expected that, through this gesture of defiance (or was it resignation?), he would become the godfather of a mythology destined to dominate the twentieth century.

V. The genesis of Marxist myth can be traced to the conflicts within the International. The need to hurl abuse at the opponent and their partisans made the ‘anti-authoritarians’, with Bakunin at their head, inventive enough to create such terms as ‘marxites’, ‘marxists’, and ‘marxism’. Gradually Marx’s disciples in France developed the habit of accepting these denominations which they had not created and which destined them to be distinguished from other socialist factions, so that finally these terms became political and ideological labels. From then on only the authority of Engels was necessary to sanction the usage of these terms, the ambiguity of which may not have been evident to those who used them. Engels was from the outset energetically hostile to their usage; he knew better than anyone that it risked corrupting the profound significance of a teaching that should have been considered the theoretical expression of a social movement and by no means as a doctrine invented by an individual for the benefit of an intellectual elite. His resistance did not weaken until when, in 1889, the dissent between, on one hand the ‘possibilists’, ‘blanquistes’ and ‘broussistes’, and on the other hand the ‘collectivists’ and ‘guesdistes’, threatened to cause a rupture in the movement in France, each faction having decided to organize its own international Workers’ Congress. Engels’ predicament is obvious; he attempted to avert danger of confusion and of verbal and ideological corruption by using inverted commas to speak of “Marxists” and of “Marxism”, and by speaking of “so-called Marxists”. When Paul Lafargue expressed his apprehension in seeing his group pass for a “faction” amongst others in the Workers Movement, Engels replied “we have never called you anything other than the ‘so-called Marxists’ and I cannot know what to call you otherwise. If you have another name as short, tell us and we will duly call you that with pleasure.”[9]

VI. If Nietzsche published Ecce Homo for fear of one day being canonized by disciples for which he did not at all wish, the same precaution did not seem necessary in the case of Marx, even though he had not written and published more than a fragment of his projected oeuvre. Nevertheless, the printed and unpublished material which he had bequeathed to posterity amounted to a rigorous formal prohibition against linking his name to the cause for which he had fought, and to a teaching for which he believed himself mandated by the anonymous mass of the modern proletariat. If Engels had respected this prohibition as Marx’s executor, and had applied his veto to the abusive term, the universal scandal of ‘marxism’ would never have seen the light of day; but Engels committed the unpardonable error of supporting this abuse, and thus acquired the dubious honour of being the first ‘Marxist’. It is tempting to see it as the punishment of destiny that, believing himself heir, he was in truth the founder – albeit involuntarily – of ‘Marxism’. The “irony of history” which Engels loved to invoke had played a cruel trick on him. He thus became a prophet in spite of himself when on his 70th birthday he pronounced the regretful words: “my destiny willed that I harvest the honour and the glory sowed by a greater man than I; Karl Marx”[10]. For his 150th anniversary, we must acknowledge in Engels the contestable merit and the more dubious title of ‘founder of Marxism’.

VII. In the history of Marxism and the cult of Marx, Engels is at the forefront. We are familiar enough with the human and quasi-religious aspect of this friendship, which does not require particular analysis. On the other hand, what necessitates a thorough examination is the effect of the friendship as much upon Marx himself as on his epigones and his distant disciples. Always ready to act as pioneer of Marx’s theories, Engels expressed many ideas which Marx could not, of course, accept without critique; the silence of Marx can be explained by his desire to scrupulously respect the solidarity which he held with his friend. We cannot confirm the extent to which he should be identified with everything that Engels had said or written, but this problem is minor, considering his acknowledged admiration for the intellectual gifts of his friend: after all, he considered himself Engels’ disciple[11]. That which Marx did not allow himself has today become a strict duty: we must break the bewitching charm of this legend, and determine the place of Engels’ oeuvre in the development of the intellectual inheritance of socialism, in relation to the destiny of the workers’ movement.

VIII. It is only if one understands that Engels had the makings of a founder that one will grasp the reasons for which he went about the duties of editor and perpetuator of the manuscripts of Marx in a manner which, today more than ever, demands some critique[12]. The writings of Marx neglected by Engels (amongst others the preparatory works for the doctoral thesis, the Kreuznach anti-Hegelian manuscript, the economico-philosophical sketches of Paris and of Brussels, the Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858 (The Grundrisse), the numerous workbooks and the correspondence with third parties) did not only place the researcher and specialist before entirely new interpretive problems; they erected new categories and created new generations of readers who could not and would not content themselves with the stereotyped phraseology of professional Marxists. The real imperative is to understand a world and to live and act in a time when ideology, mechanization and manipulation of consciousness are allied with pure violence, to change the world into a vale of tears.

The theses sketched here above constitute the introduction to a debate whose essential theme must be the problem of Marxism as the mythology of our era. The question of the extent to which Engels can be held responsible for the genesis of this universal superstition is secondary to the extent that we can affirm, if we recognize the teaching of Marx the ‘materialist’, that ideologies- amongst which Marxism in all its variants should be placed – do not fall from the sky; they are essentially bound to the class interests which are at the same time the interests of power. It is enough to recognize in Engels the legitimate inheritor of Marx’s thought to denounce in his name and to his honour, the established ‘Marxism’ as a school of confusion and misguided ways for our age of iron.
M. Rubel, 1972.

Footnotes
1. For a general survey of the debates at Wuppertal, cf. Henryk Skrypczak, “International wissenschaftliche Engels-Konferenz in Wupperta” in International Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der Deutschten Arbeitebewegung (I.W.K.), no. 10, Berlin, June 1970, p. 62 ff. A summary of my viewpoints can be found ibid. p. 81 ff.
2. Friedrich Engels 1820-1970. Referate-Diskussionen-Dokumente. Internationale wissenschaftliche Konferenz in Wuppertal vom 25-29 Mai 1970, Hannover, Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1970.
My “position” is commented upon in the following terms:
“In order to fulfill the program of the final day, the council of the conference had decided to give up the discussion after the 6th session, and to begin after the 7th with the general debate. Firstly, Maximilien Rubel was supposed to have continued (?) to expound his conception. He submitted a text to the conference which was a polemical formulation against Engels, but did not then present this text before the assembly (with good reason!). These 8 theses which were, in accordance with the author’s intention, to provoke a debate on the actual significance of Marxism, may be summarised as follows: after Marx’s death, Engels made great efforts to elevate the term ‘Marxism’ formed by Marx’s adversaries, to the rank of an intelligible and definable concept. In doing this, Engels became the founder of a hybrid system of thought which was alien to the intentions of Marx himself. After the death of Engels, the ideological germs of this system were transformed into a conceptual methodology necessarily dependent upon certain class conditions.” [p. 255 ff.]
The report then mentions a polemic in opposition to mine, from a preceding session, from an East-German Marxist, about the concept of a “historic mission”, a controversy, “in which Engels did not play more than an indirect role” [ibid.]
Much could be said about the “abridged report” which summarises my theses and the “polemic” which they had provoked. I would simply affirm, however, that my text “against Engels” was simply the critique of a historically negative act by the closest and most active collaborator of Marx, and against a certain school of Marxist thought, the existence of which constitutes the negation of all that Marx and Engels themselves did for socialist thought and the workers movement. I continue to believe that my contribution responded, more than any other, to the true ‘scientific’ spirit of that conference, in the memory of he who invented the notion of ‘scientific socialism’, and who equally identified this notion with ‘critical socialism’. The conference could not offer a real homage to the man whom it intended to celebrate if it did not take as a guiding thread in its debates these words of Engels’:
“The workers movement rests on the most rigorous critique of existing society. The critique is the vital element. How could it absent itself from critique, or prohibit debate?” (Engels to Gerson Trier, 18th December, 1889).
3. [editorial note:“books have their fate”]
4. Cf. Marx to Engels, 20th January, 1864; 24th April, 1867. Engels to E. Bernstein, 23rd April, 1883. There are even instances in which the two friends are spoken of as if they acted as a single person: for example “Marx and Engels says” (see Marx to Engels August 1st, 1856.)
5. See, for example, the opposition that Iring Fetscher established between Marx’s “philosophy of the proletariat”, and that of Engels. Fetscher explores their different ways of envisaging the “negation of philosophy” and the relation of human history to nature in the conception – which was unacceptable for Marx – of an objective dialectics of nature, and of thought as a reflection of reality. See I. Fetscher, Karl Marx und der Marxismus. Von der Philosophie des Proletariats zur proletarischen Weltanschauung, Munchen, 1987, p. 182 ff. See also Donald C. Hodges, “Engels’s Contribution to Marxism”, The Socialist Register, 1965, p. 297-810, and Vladimir Hosky, “Der neue Mensch in theologischer und marxisticher Anthropologie” Marxismusstudien, VII, 1972, p. 58-86.
6. See Karl Korsch, “Dix thèses sur le marxisme aujourd’hui”, Arguments III, no. 16, 1959, p. 26 ff. The mimeograph of this text supports the date Zurich, 4th September, 1950. [editorial note – a translation of this text is available: Ten Theses on Marxism Today]
7. Engels specifies that this declaration was made by Marx with regards to the “Marxism” which was rampant between 1879-1880 “amongst certain of the French”, but the blame also applies to a group of intellectuals and students within the German party; they, together with the opposition press, exhibited a distorted and disfigured “Marxism” (see Engels’s letter to the editors of Socialdemokrat, 7th September 1890, published in the journal, 18th September 1890). This quip of Marx’s, so full of foreboding, was reported by Engels every time the occasion arose; see his letters to Bernstein, 3rd November, 1882, to Carl Schmidt, 5th August, 1890, and to Paul Lafargue, 27th August, 1890. G. A. Lopatine, the Russian revolutionary, met Engels to discuss the perspectives for Russian revolution in September 1883. He recounted some details of their talks in a letter to a member of the Norodnaiia Voliia containing the passage: “You should remember what I told you once – that Marx himself was never a Marxist. Engels reported that at the time of the struggle of Brousse, Malon, and Cie against the others, Marx said with laughter one day that ‘I can say just one thing; that I am not a Marxist!’” See the extract from Lopatine’s letter to M. N. Oshanina of 20th September, 1888, translated from Russian, in Marx-Engels-Werke 21, p. 489. However, there is no humorous tone to Marx’s letters to his friend when, on a trip to France, he communicated his impressions of the arguments of the socialists in the competing congresses of the Possibilists in Saint-Etienne, and the Guesdists in Roanne in Autumn 1882. “The Marxists and the anti-Marxists”, he wrote, “both types have done their best to ruin my trip to France” (Marx to Engels, September 30th, 1882). On his disagreement with the Russian ‘Marxists’, see Marx to Vera Zasulich, 1881, on the possibilities of the Russian peasant commune. On the relations between Marx and Engels and their Russian disciples, see Die russische Kommune. Kritik eines Mythos, Herausgegeben von M. Rubel, Carl Hanser Verlag, Munich, 1972.
8. The formal declarations of Engels in this respect are too numerous to be recounted here. Let us say simply that there is not the slightest doubt regarding the paternity of the great scientific discoveries, which are all, without exception, attributable only to Marx. Of all his declarations, the most significant is perhaps the note inserted by Engels in a writing which was to demonstrate the continuity of German philosophy in elevating its most dignified inheritor, Karl Marx, to the rank of founder of a system. See Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, 1888. It is in this work that Engels made the official gesture of baptising the theory with Marx’s name: “Out of the dissolution of the Hegelian school, however, there developed still another tendency, the only one which has borne real fruit. And this tendency is essentially connected with the name of Marx.” Engels repeated this act in the note where he remarks that “What Marx accomplished I would not have achieved. [...] Marx was a genius; we others were at best talented. Without him the theory would not be by far what it is today. It therefore rightly bears his name.” We should not then be surprised at the conclusion to this critique, which consecrates Marx as both inheritor and founder of a philosophical school: “The German working-class movement is the inheritor of German classical philosophy.” Engels had thus cast the die.
9. Engels to Lafargue, 11th May, 1889. Once engaged in this verbal concession, Engels could no longer back out, and he had to go all the way. His mind was made up the moment he felt assured of the triumph of the collectivists led by Guesde and Lafargue: “But the advantage gained over the anarchists after 1873 was put into question by their successors, and I did not therefore have a choice. Now that we are victorious, we have proved to the world that almost all of the socialists in Europe are ‘Marxists’. It will drive them crazy that they gave us that name and they will be left with Hyndman to console them” (Engels to Laura Lafargue. 11 June, 1889). Ironically it is precisely the same Hyndman whom Marx had advised against referring to his name in the program of the new English party. “In the party programs we should avoid everything which leads to the appearance of a direct dependence on a particular author or a particular book” (Marx to Henry Mayers Hyndman, 2 July, 1881).
10. Letter to the editors of the Berliner Volksblat, 5th December, 1890.
11. “You know, primo, that I am always slower in getting onto things and, secundo, that I follow in your footsteps.” (Marx to Engels, 4th July, 1864).
12. See M. Rubel, Introduction to Karl Marx, Oeuvres: Economie II, Gallimard, Paris, 1968. See ibid. p. CXXVII ff., for the list of the discoveries which Marx regarded as being his own. Marx attributed to himself neither the founding of historical materialism, nor the discovery of surplus value. However, this attribution – an act of Engels’s – was tacitly approved by Marx. See, for example, the account given by Engels in Das Volk, 1859, and the biographical article on Marx in Volkskalendar 1877.

Friday, June 5, 2015

1874. Ursula K. Le Guin Calls on Fantasy and Sci Fi Writers to Envision Alternatives to Capitalism

By Araz Hachadourian, Yes Magazine, June 4, 2015
In November 2014 science fiction and fantasy writer Ursala K. Le Guin was awarded the National Book Foundation’s medal for Distinguished Contribution to American Letters.
In her acceptance speech she called out publishers for turning literature into a commodity and charging libraries ridiculously high rates for books and e-books. Le Guin also explained how authors, especially fantasy writers, have a special opportunity to stand up to the corporate system because they can portray a world very different from the one we currently live in.
“We live in capitalism,” said Le Guin, “Its power seems inescapable. So did the divine right of kings.” It’s up to authors, she explains in the video below, to spark the imagination of their readers and to help them envision alternatives to how we live.

1873. We Were Wrong on Peak Oil. There's Enough to Fry Us All

By George Monbiot, The Guardian, June 3, 2015


The facts have changed, now we must change too. For the past 10 years an unlikely coalition of geologists, oil drillers, bankers, military strategists and environmentalists has been warning that peak oil – the decline of global supplies – is just around the corner. We had some strong reasons for doing so: production had slowed, the price had risen sharply, depletion was widespread and appeared to be escalating. The first of the great resource crunches seemed about to strike.

Among environmentalists it was never clear, even to ourselves, whether or not we wanted it to happen. It had the potential both to shock the world into economic transformation, averting future catastrophes, and to generate catastrophes of its own, including a shift into even more damaging technologies, such as biofuels and petrol made from coal. Even so, peak oil was a powerful lever. Governments, businesses and voters who seemed impervious to the moral case for cutting the use of fossil fuels might, we hoped, respond to the economic case.

Some of us made vague predictions, others were more specific. In all cases we were wrong. In 1975 MK Hubbert, a geoscientist working for Shell who had correctly predicted the decline in US oil production, suggested that global supplies could peak in 1995. In 1997 the petroleum geologist Colin Campbell estimated that it would happen before 2010. In 2003 the geophysicist Kenneth Deffeyes said he was "99% confident" that peak oil would occur in 2004. In 2004, the Texas tycoon T Boone Pickens predicted that "never again will we pump more than 82m barrels" per day of liquid fuels. (Average daily supply in May 2012 was 91m.) In 2005 the investment banker Matthew Simmons maintained that "Saudi Arabia … cannot materially grow its oil production". (Since then its output has risen from 9m barrels a day to 10m, and it has another 1.5m in spare capacity.)

Peak oil hasn't happened, and it's unlikely to happen for a very long time.

A report by the oil executive Leonardo Maugeri, published by Harvard University, provides compelling evidence that a new oil boom has begun. The constraints on oil supply over the past 10 years appear to have had more to do with money than geology. The low prices before 2003 had discouraged investors from developing difficult fields. The high prices of the past few years have changed that.

Maugeri's analysis of projects in 23 countries suggests that global oil supplies are likely to rise by a net 17m barrels per day (to 110m) by 2020. This, he says, is "the largest potential addition to the world's oil supply capacity since the 1980s". The investments required to make this boom happen depend on a long-term price of $70 a barrel – the current cost of Brent crude is $95. Money is now flooding into new oil: a trillion dollars has been spent in the past two years; a record $600bn is lined up for 2012.

The country in which production is likely to rise most is Iraq, into which multinational companies are now sinking their money, and their claws. But the bigger surprise is that the other great boom is likely to happen in the US. Hubbert's peak, the famous bell-shaped graph depicting the rise and fall of American oil, is set to become Hubbert's Rollercoaster.

Investment there will concentrate on unconventional oil, especially shale oil (which, confusingly, is not the same as oil shale). Shale oil is high-quality crude trapped in rocks through which it doesn't flow naturally.

There are, we now know, monstrous deposits in the United States: one estimate suggests that the Bakken shales in North Dakota contain almost as much oil as Saudi Arabia (though less of it is extractable). And this is one of 20 such formations in the US. Extracting shale oil requires horizontal drilling and fracking: a combination of high prices and technological refinements has made them economically viable. Already production in North Dakota has risen from 100,000 barrels a day in 2005 to 550,000 in January.

So this is where we are. The automatic correction – resource depletion destroying the machine that was driving it – that many environmentalists foresaw is not going to happen. The problem we face is not that there is too little oil, but that there is too much.

We have confused threats to the living planet with threats to industrial civilisation. They are not, in the first instance, the same thing. Industry and consumer capitalism, powered by abundant oil supplies, are more resilient than many of the natural systems they threaten. The great profusion of life in the past – fossilised in the form of flammable carbon – now jeopardises the great profusion of life in the present.

There is enough oil in the ground to deep-fry the lot of us, and no obvious means to prevail upon governments and industry to leave it in the ground. Twenty years of efforts to prevent climate breakdown through moral persuasion have failed, with the collapse of the multilateral process at Rio de Janeiro last month. The world's most powerful nation is again becoming an oil state, and if the political transformation of its northern neighbour is anything to go by, the results will not be pretty.

Humanity seems to be like the girl in Guillermo del Toro's masterpiece Pan's Labyrinth: she knows that if she eats the exquisite feast laid out in front of her, she too will be consumed, but she cannot help herself. I don't like raising problems when I cannot see a solution. But right now I'm not sure how I can look my children in the eyes.

1872. Global Warming ‘Hiatus’ Challenged by NOAA Research

By Justin Gillis, The New York Times, June 4, 2015


Scientists have long labored to explain what appeared to be a slowdown in global warming that began at the start of this century as, at the same time, heat-trapping emissions of carbon dioxide were soaring. The slowdown, sometimes inaccurately described as a halt or hiatus, became a major talking point for people critical of climate science.

Now, new research suggests the whole thing may have been based on incorrect data.
When adjustments are made to compensate for recently discovered problems in the way global temperatures were measured, the slowdown largely disappears, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration declared in a scientific paper published Thursday. And when the particularly warm temperatures of 2013 and 2014 are averaged in, the slowdown goes away entirely, the agency said.

“The notion that there was a slowdown in global warming, or a hiatus, was based on the best information we had available at the time,” said Thomas R. Karl, director of the National Centers for Environmental Information, a NOAA unit in Asheville, N.C. “Science is always working to improve.”

The change prompted accusations on Thursday from some climate-change denialists that the agency was trying to wave a magic wand and make inconvenient data go away. Mainstream climate scientists not involved in the NOAA research rejected that charge, saying it was essential that agencies like NOAA try to deal with known problems in their data records.

At the same time, senior climate scientists at other agencies were in no hurry to embrace NOAA’s specific adjustments. Several of them said it would take months of discussion in the scientific community to understand the data corrections and come to a consensus about whether to adopt them broadly.

“What you have is a reasonable effort to deal with known biases, and obviously there is some uncertainty in how you do that,” said Gavin A. Schmidt, who heads a NASA climate research unit in New York that deals with similar issues.

Some experts also pointed out that, depending on exactly how the calculation is done, a recent slowdown in global warming still appears in the NOAA temperature record, though it may be smaller than before. “These trends are very sensitive to the time periods you use to compute them,” said Gerald A. Meehl, a senior scientist at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colo.

Scientists like Dr. Meehl never accepted the notion, put forward by some climate contrarians, that the slowdown disproved the idea that global warming poses long-term risks. But they said they believe it is real and demands an explanation.

A leading hypothesis to explain the slowdown is that natural fluctuations in the Pacific Ocean may have temporarily pulled some heat out of the atmosphere, producing a brief flattening in the long-term increase of surface temperatures.

NOAA is one of four agencies around the world that attempts to produce a complete record of global temperatures dating to 1880. They all get similar results, showing a long-term warming of the planet that scientists have linked primarily to the burning of fossil fuels and the destruction of forests. A huge body of physical evidence — notably, that practically every large piece of land ice on the planet has started to melt — suggests the temperature finding is correct.

Yet the temperature record is plagued by many problems: thermometers and recording practices changed through time, weather stations were moved, cities grew up around once-rural stations, and so on. Entire scientific careers are devoted to studying these issues and making corrections.

In their paper published online Thursday by the journal Science, and in interviews, scientists at NOAA said that in coming months they would roll out new versions of their temperature record that incorporate numerous improvements.

The previous record showed that temperatures from 2000 to 2014 had warmed at about two-thirds the rate of temperatures from 1950 to 1999. In the new analysis, the rate of warming in those two time periods is basically identical.

NOAA said the improvements in its data set included the addition of a huge number of land measurements from around the world, as a result of improving international cooperation in sharing weather records. But the disappearance of the slowdown comes largely from adjustments in ocean temperatures.

The ocean covers 70 percent of earth and thus the temperature at its surface has a huge influence on the overall record. Yet ocean measurements in particular are rife with difficulties.

For many decades, into the mid-20th century, the main measurements came from sailors hauling up buckets of seawater and plopping thermometers into them.
The buckets varied, the thermometers varied, and some of the sailors were more diligent than others about following instructions. On average, scientists believe, the water tended to cool off a bit before the temperature was recorded.

NOAA had long believed the data glitches from the buckets had largely disappeared after World War II, but new information suggests that bucket measurements continued on some commercial vessels long after the war. The new NOAA data set attempts to correct for this and other problems in the ocean records.

The Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank in Washington that is critical of climate science, issued a statement condemning the changes and questioning the agency’s methodology.

“The main claim by the authors that they have uncovered a significant recent warming trend is dubious,” said the statement, attributed to three contrarian climate scientists: Richard S. Lindzen, Patrick J. Michaels and Paul C. Knappenberger.

However, Russell S. Vose, chief of the climate science division at NOAA’s Asheville center, pointed out in an interview that while the corrections do eliminate the recent warming slowdown, the overall effect of the agency’s adjustments has long been to raise the reported global temperatures in the late 19th and early 20th centuries by a substantial margin. That makes the temperature increase of the past century appear less severe than it does in the raw data.

“If you just wanted to release to the American public our uncorrected data set, it would say that the world has warmed up about 2.071 degrees Fahrenheit since 1880,” Dr. Vose said. “Our corrected data set says things have warmed up about 1.65 degrees Fahrenheit. Our corrections lower the rate of warming on a global scale.”

Even if the warming slowdown in the early 21st century was real, there seems to be little question that it is ending. By a small margin, the global temperature hit a record in 2014, and developing weather patterns suggest that record will likely be broken by a larger margin in 2015.