2172. USAID Announces $6 Million Grant Program to Subvert the Cuban Revolution

By Tracey Eaton, Havana Times, January 22, 2016

The U.S. Agency for International Development on Thursday announced that it is offering $6 million in grants over a three-year period to organizations that will “provide humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families, and politically marginalized individuals and groups in Cuba.”

Grant amounts will range from $500,000 to $2 million. The application deadline is Feb. 25.

In the grant notice, USAID warns against sending American citizens to Cuba.

Special thought and consideration should be given to the selection of consultants and other personnel who may be required to travel to the island. To the extent possible, travel by American citizens should be avoided. It is preferable for these personnel to speak Spanish fluently, possess solid understanding of the cultural context, and have prior experience on the island, in order to maximize their effectiveness in this unique operating environment.

The agency also says that grant recipients will be going to Cuba at their own risk and may not hold USAID responsible for what might happen to them. The notice states:

The U.S. government cannot ensure the safety and security of Recipient assets and personnel, particularly as relates to individuals traveling to Cuba under USAID funding, or project staff based in Cuba. Implementation of USAID programs in Cuba requires Recipient awareness of political sensitivities and assumption of risks associated with hostile actions of the Cuban government.

The Recipient will not serve as an agent or act under the direction of USAID and will be responsible for the efficient and effective administration of its own programs with sound business judgment, including any precautions inherent therein. …the Recipient shall not hold USAID liable for injury, death, detainment, incarceration, kidnapping, property loss, damages, or expenses incidental to those liabilities, suffered by, or attributable to the acts, omissions or negligence of, the Recipient, its agents, or its employees implementing programs in Cuba under this NFO.

The grant program is called “Humanitarian Assistance to Cuba.” The program description says:

By supporting civil society and promoting the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people, the President and the U.S. aim to empower the Cuban people to decide their own destiny.

USAID says the program is justified because “the Cuban government currently is detaining dozens of political prisoners for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression.”

The grant notice says that by the end of 2015, there had been at least 8,616 political arrests in Cuba. Without getting into the merits or potential pitfalls of USAID’s program, I think it’s worth pointing out that many of those arrested for political reasons are taking part in programs funded by the U.S. government or U.S. government-financed organizations. I am not arguing for or against such programs or saying there are no human rights violations in Cuba, but I find it interesting that existing U.S. government programs are used to help justify and fuel the need for new programs.

Additional details about the program are below:

SECTION A: PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

1. BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2015, the United States and Cuba formally re-established diplomatic relations and re-opened embassies in each other’s respective countries. The establishment of diplomatic relations allows the U.S. to discuss matters of mutual concern that would advance U.S. national interests, such as migration, counternarcotics, disaster response, environmental protection, and support for human rights. By supporting civil society and promoting the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people, the President and the U.S. aim to empower the Cuban people to decide their own destiny.

However, Cuba is an authoritarian state that limits civil and political rights. Current Cuban law prevents the right to assemble, restricts freedom of expression and labor rights, and enforces a state monopoly over mass media. The day-to-day life of Cubans is hampered by the dual currency system, housing and food shortages, and a lack of sufficient transportation.

In Cuba, repression against human rights leaders continues to intensify despite renewed diplomatic relations with the U.S. It is estimated that the Cuban government currently is detaining dozens of political prisoners for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression. Those arrested are subjected to lengthy prison terms and to prison conditions that are harsh and sometimes life threatening. Prisoners are placed in overcrowded prisons that are at great distances from family members, and are beaten or placed in solitary confinement for voicing their concerns. Imprisonment is only one of the many tactics the Cuban government uses to restrict fundamental freedoms, such as expression, association, peaceful assembly, and movement. Former political prisoners who remain in Cuba are heavily scrutinized and intimidated by the Cuban government for their current political activism and are experiencing material difficulties.

In addition to the current and former political prisoners, thousands of other Cuban citizens are arbitrarily detained, threatened, harassed, beaten and arrested for peacefully exercising their fundamental rights. During the month of November 2015 alone, there were 1,447 political arrests, which represents one of the highest number of monthly arrests in recent history. By the end of 2015, there were a total of 8,616 political arrests. These numbers represent only those cases that have been reported and documented. Many others remain unreported. The effect of such practices creates a climate of fear in Cuban society and suppresses freedom of expression.

These repression tactics are applied to family members of human rights actors as well. They are denied the right to earn a livelihood, access to basic social services, entry into universities, and experience emotional hardship and alienation, as well as other forms of discrimination and abuse due to family members’ association with political dissent.

U.S. assistance programs focus on providing humanitarian assistance to victims of repression, strengthening civil society, facilitating the free flow of information to, from, and within the island, and helping Cubans to create space for dialogue about democratic practices. To encourage civic participation in Cuba, U.S. assistance focuses on strengthening independent Cuban civil society groups, including professional associations and labor groups. Efforts are aimed at increasing the capacity for community involvement in, and networks among, civil society groups. In the interest of advancing human rights, the United States provides humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families, and other victims of repression. In the human rights area, the assistance programs also raise awareness of human rights and supports Cubans to document and report human rights violations.

2. PROGRAM OVERVIEW

Under this award and subject to the availability of funds, USAID intends to provide $6 million in total USAID funding over a three year period. USAID anticipates multiple awards ranging from $500,000 to $2 million each for up to a three-year period of performance. Organizations may submit only one application, and each organization is eligible for only one cooperative agreement.

3. PURPOSE

The primary goal of this program is to provide humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families, and politically marginalized individuals and groups in Cuba. The program is designed to alleviate the hardships suffered by people who, because of their political beliefs or efforts to exercise their fundamental freedoms, have lost some or all of their ability to support themselves or their families, including being imprisoned or discriminated against.

4. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

USAID seeks creative and innovative new approaches in the design and delivery of humanitarian assistance activities. Applicants should outline how the beneficiaries will be selected and prioritized, with precedence given to political prisoners and their families. Proposals should clearly explain the process and source for supply procurement and delivery throughout the island. Applicants should also describe the types of supplies that are the most appropriate and the rationale for this choice, given the demand and urgent need of the targeted beneficiaries throughout the island. Items and commodities used shall be approved and purchased in accordance with ADS 312, Eligibility of Commodities, and specifically, ADS 312.3.1, USAID Commodity Eligibility Listing. Applicants should outline how they will maximize resources while maintaining high quality materials and efficient distribution of supplies. Assuming appropriate disbursement and monitoring mechanisms are established, the use of cash grants is a possible option for delivering assistance to meet the needs of targeted beneficiaries, subject to USAID review and approval. Applicants should also clearly describe the methods, mechanisms, and systems to be used for the distribution of supplies, as well as a process that will provide confirmation of final receipt to the targeted beneficiaries. Applicants should clearly explain how their local partners and local networks have the expertise, geographic familiarity and experience to carry out assistance activities. Applicants should also demonstrate how relationships will be built with the beneficiaries, and how the proposed program will coordinate to prevent duplication and ensure complementarities with other U.S. Government programs.

Given that the economic conditions are more difficult outside of Havana, Applicants are encouraged to focus on the provision of supplies to outlying provinces and provide details as to how supplies will be distributed among the provinces.

Assistance to Cuba is governed by a complex series of statutory and other restrictions. There are two statutes that are particularly critical in providing authority, notwithstanding other provisions of law, for USAID’s work in Cuba. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (also referred to as “Helms-Burton Act”, P.L. 104-114) provides notwithstanding authority to furnish assistance and provide other support for individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to support democracy-building efforts for Cuba, including (1) published and informational matter to be made available to independent democratic groups in Cuba; (2) humanitarian assistance to victims of political repression and their families; (3) support for democratic and human rights groups in Cuba; and (4) support for deployment of independent international human rights monitors in Cuba.

Also, the Cuban Democracy Act (1992) authorizes the provision of certain assistance notwithstanding any other provision of law. Specifically, this provision authorizes donations of food to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or individuals in Cuba, exports of medicines and medical supplies, and assistance through appropriate NGOs for the support of individuals and organizations to promote nonviolent democratic change in Cuba.

5. PROJECT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The following are goals and objectives expected to be achieved by the end of the program:

• Provide moral, financial, and/or material support to Cubans who, because of their political beliefs or efforts to exercise their fundamental freedoms, have lost some or all of their ability to support themselves or their families, including by being imprisoned or otherwise marginalized or discriminated against.

• Provide food, medicines and medical supplies that are most desired by and beneficial to targeted beneficiaries on a regular basis.

• Strengthen and organize networks and systems to ensure regular deliveries outside Havana in order to minimize costs and maximize the amount of goods delivered to beneficiaries.

• Demonstrate the role that partner networks of civil society members play in identifying political prisoners and marginalized people throughout the island, maximizing the impact of assistance, network strengthening, and providing feedback and information sharing on political conditions and repression on the ground.

6. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER ACTIVITIES

Through various activities implemented by USAID/Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and State Department’s Bureaus of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) and Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), the USG provides ongoing support to targeted beneficiaries throughout the island subjected to human rights abuses as detailed in the 2014 State Department Human Rights Report: 

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper. This activity will support and complement these ongoing initiatives. USAID/LAC coordinates closely with these offices and is in frequent communication with the U.S. Embassy in Havana, both soliciting and sharing information, during its programmatic analysis and subsequent design of this activity.

To maintain appropriate oversight and management and to avoid potential overlap, award recipients will be expected to coordinate and collaborate with other USG program implementers on the delivery of humanitarian assistance to avoid duplication of efforts. USAID shall not fund activities deemed to be duplicative with existing USG Cuba projects and activities.

7. RECIPIENT RESPONSIBILITIES

Award recipients will retain overall management responsibility for all aspects of the program including management of all sub-agreements and sub-contracts. (See also section on Requirements for Prior Approval of Sub-awards and Substantial Involvement.) In addition to adhering to the policies, laws, and regulations governing USAID/LAC/Office of Cuban Affairs assistance awards, recipients are also responsible for the following:

• General program management, including financial management, reporting, and provision of assistance to Cuban counterparts.

• In consultation with USAID, determining appropriate working and coordination relationships with other LAC/Office of Cuban Affairs program grantees and other U.S. and third-country non-governmental organizations working in Cuba.

• In consultation with USAID, finalizing the implementation and annual workplans;1 project- specific results framework;2 cash grants strategy, protocols and reporting requirements; and performance management plan (PMP) covering all program components within 60 days of award.

• Identifying, managing, and supporting other essential programs and communications.

• Carrying out reporting and monitoring and evaluation responsibilities as described below.

• Applicants must closely monitor, track, verify and report to USAID on the end-use of all materials sent to Cuba. LAC/Office of Cuban Affairs is covered by a general license issued by the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The general license of note to USAID is found at 31 CFR 515.562. Successful Applicants will be required to obtain an applicable Department of Commerce license if necessary, consistent with the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Parts 740 and 746). Of particular note is the Department of Commerce license exception “Support for the Cuban People” found at 15 CFR § 740.21. Information regarding U.S./Cuba legal and/or policy requirements may be found on the following websites:

a. U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/cuba.aspx;

b. U.S. Department of Commerce Cuba page for exports: http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-destinations/cuba;

c. USAID and Assistance Awards Policies: https://www.usaid.gov/ads/policy/300/303

d. OFAC Cuba FAQs: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_faqs_new.pdf

e. State Department fact sheet on regulatory changes: http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/index.htm

Applicants should be familiarized with the difficulties of working in closed societies similar to Cuba and with the particular challenges of working in Cuba. Applicants should also understand that, given the nature of the Cuban government, USAID cannot be held responsible for any injury or inconvenience suffered by individuals traveling to the island under USAID grant funding.

8. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

8.1 Monitoring Results and Tracking Indicators

Recipients will be required to comply with all USAID policy and requirements related to performance monitoring, reporting, and evaluation, including the new USAID Evaluation Policy which can be found at www.usaid.gov/evaluation. The recipient will be expected to work and coordinate with USAID monitoring and evaluation experts on a regular basis.

Those applications that include a level of effort and funds to conduct baseline assessments for each performance indicator will be strongly preferred. Such baseline figures will be extremely important when objectively measuring program results. Applicants are expected to submit a comprehensive, implementation workplan and annual workplan. A complete Cuba commodities list should also be included in the proposal.

In conjunction with and corresponding to the stated objectives of the implementation plan, proposals should include a performance management plan (PMP) with annual targets, performance indicators, and definitions in their proposal. Upon award, the implementation plan, an annual workplan, and PMP will be reviewed in consultation with the assigned Agreement Officer’s Representative (AOR)/Program Manager from the LAC/Office of Cuban Affairs, with revised plans submitted to the AOR/Program Manager for final written approval within 60 days of the award date.

Recipients will need to revise their draft PMP upon award and receive USAID approval within 60 days of the award date. The final PMP should include the following elements:

• A list of specific, quantifiable performance indicators that the recipient plans to use in measuring performance.

• Detailed information on the indicators (outputs, outcomes, and impact): unit of measure; data source; justification/management utility; baseline values if available; annual targets for the overall objectives and activities; frequency and schedule for data collection; and detailed plans for data analysis, review, and reporting to measure project progress against overall objectives; and for the use of data collected by the project to improve program planning and performance.
• Indicators shall be disaggregated by gender as appropriate.Performance indicatorsshall include one required indicator: “Number of individuals/groups from low-income or marginalized communities who received legal aid or victim’s assistance with USG support” and 2 to 3 additional custom indicators to be proposed by the Applicant in their application.

Recipients will be responsible for developing and tracking program activity targets, outputs, and outcomes. Recipients’ post-award consultation with the appropriate AOR/Program Manager will also include discussion of USG foreign policy directives. Programs receiving funds under this NFO will contribute to the Office of Cuban Affairs objectives, program areas, and indicators.

These objectives and indicators are in accordance with the performance indicators established by the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources. If an Applicant’s proposed program and activities do not fit within the listed USG indicators, Applicants should include suitable program and activity-level indicators in their proposal and explain why the selected indicators are needed.

Upon award, USAID will consult with selected recipients to ensure that their monitoring, evaluation, results tracking, and reporting of activities and indicators are realistic, feasible, and contribute to the overall Office of Cuban Affairs objectives, as well as comply with USAID policy. Recipients will routinely monitor, track, evaluate, and report on program activities using the agreed-upon indicators. Recipients must differentiate gender when collecting indicator data. As appropriate, USAID encourages Applicants to also differentiate between age, gender, beneficiary, and province when collecting indicator data.

All activities implemented under this NFO may be subject to evaluation by a USAID-funded evaluator, and recipients are expected to work closely with the evaluator(s) to effectively monitor program implementation and performance. Evaluating on-island activity is especially important and recipients, in addition to working with a third-party evaluator, are expected to track and report on all the necessary information as identified in their official PMPs.

Note: Under this award, USAID will not fund any recipient sub-agreements or consultancies for monitoring and evaluation activities. Recipients are still required to closely monitor their program activities and report results.

8.2 Workplans and Performance Management Plan (PMP)

Recipients are responsible for following their approved implementation workplan, annual workplan, project-specific results framework, cash grants strategy, and PMP throughout the life of the award. These plans provide the basis for the recipient’s performance. USAID will utilize these plans (including the approved budget plan) to monitor, assess, and evaluate a recipient’s program and program operations. USAID understands the difficult operating environment in Cuba, and if necessary, will work with a recipient to revise plans if mid-program corrections and adjustments are required. However, it is the recipient’s responsibility to inform the LAC/Office of Cuban Affairs if implementation issues arise which may affect approved plans.

9. CROSS CUTTING ISSUES

Cross cutting issues must be integrated into the technical approach and be considered when designing activities and creating implementation plans.

9.1 Gender Equality and Female Empowerment

The Applicant will be required to demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of gender equality and empowerment and how gender can best be addressed in programming. In addition to demonstrating an understanding of issues of gender in the Cuban context, the Applicant will need to present a methodology for monitoring gender impact in its PMP, including incorporation of gender-sensitive indicators. Please review ADS 205 found at http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/205.pdf for more information on integrating this policy into their approach.

9.2 Partnerships

This project should aim at forming partnerships and seek to engage the private sector, other donors, international organizations, and civil society institutions, in order to provide comprehensive approaches to deliver humanitarian assistance and also to leverage additional funds to enhance proposed project results, promote sustainability of these activities, and provoke a broader impact.

While USAID will consider applications that include proposed partners (sub-recipients) for implementation of this award, Applicants are encouraged to partner with organizations that show A complementarity of skills sets and capabilities. Please note that Applicants are not encouraged to partner with organizations that will require organizational capacity building. Rather USAID seeks that the recipient organization has prior commendable performance in Cuba or other closed societies, with a preference for experience in Cuba. Subject matter experience by the prime recipient or sub-recipients in implementing similar programs is also preferred.

If an Applicant includes sub-recipients for implementation of the award, Applicants should demonstrate how these sub-recipients complement the organizational capabilities of the Applicant and how the partnerships strengthen the overall program plan.

While each member of the partnership should have a defined role under the agreement, the Prime Recipient will be named in the agreement and will be responsible to USAID for all administrative, management, and reporting requirements. Applicants should describe their proposed partnership(s), each partner organization, its strengths and experiences, its proposed role and responsibilities, and associated costs. The application should also explain how the Applicant will assure the effective implementation of all program activities set forth in its proposal (including those carried out through sub-awards) and the delivery of timely and accurate reports among partner organizations. References for the past performance of each partner organization should also be provided. (For more information, please refer to the section on Requirements for Prior Approval of Sub-awards.

10. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

10.1 Consultants and Travelers

Special thought and consideration should be given to the selection of consultants and other personnel who may be required to travel to the island. To the extent possible, travel by American citizens should be avoided. It is preferable for these personnel to speak Spanish fluently, possess solid understanding of the cultural context, and have prior experience on the island, in order to maximize their effectiveness in this unique operating environment.

10.2 Cash Grants

If USAID is able to confirm that appropriate disbursement and monitoring mechanisms exist among all partners (prime and sub-recipients) affiliated with an award, the use of cash grants is an implementation option. Applicants should clearly articulate a cash grants strategy and the role of cash grants in their proposal. The application should include: a concrete plan that presents the goals and objectives of a cash grants program; which activities will be undertaken using the grants; how those activities will be implemented; how the activities will expand the impact of the overall Cuba program; and why cash grants are the better choice over other approaches.

Disbursement and monitoring protocols should also be provided and programmatic need and mitigation measures for identified risks are among the criteria for approval. The partner must also demonstrate that it has the management capability to administer a cash grants program. Implementing partner monitoring protocols should include financial and administrative systems that require, to the maximum extent possible, supporting documentation on the use of cash grants and end-use verification. Disbursement and monitoring mechanisms will be reviewed in consultation with the assigned AOR/Program Manager from the LAC/Office of Cuban Affairs and approved by USAID in a written communication separate from the cooperative agreement. Cash grants reports will be submitted to USAID on a quarterly basis.

11. AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION AND APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND POLICIES

The authority for the NFO and any resulting award is from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Additionally, as explained above, there are two statutes that are particularly critical in providing authority, notwithstanding other provisions of law, for USAID’s work in Cuba: (1) Section 109(a) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (also referred to as “Helms-Burton Act”, P.L. 104-114) and (2) Section 6004 of the Cuban Democracy Act. 22 U.S.C. 6001 et. seq. (“CDA”). Activities authorized and financed under this program are governed and limited by the terms of the CDA and the Libertad Act.

The following link contains the full text of the LIBERTAD Act: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/libertad.pdf.

The following link contains the full text of the CDA Act:

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/cda.pdf.

1 The “implementation workplan” provides the three-year project timeline of activities, milestones, and deliverables, while the “annual workplan” provides a breakdown of activities to be achieved by quarter over a one-year period. Note: for workplan (and reporting) purposes, recipients and sub-recipients should mirror the USAID fiscal year, which begins on October 1.

2 The “project-specific results framework” is specific to the recipient’s project and is used for quarterly reporting purposes and to create the project’s PMP.

1373. U.S. Secretly Created ‘Cuban Twitter’ to Stir Unrest

By Alberto Arce, Desmond Butler and Jack Gillum, Associated Press, April 2, 2014

WASHINGTON — In July 2010, Joe McSpedon, a U.S. government official, flew to Barcelona to put the final touches on a secret plan to build a social media project aimed at undermining Cuba’s communist government.

McSpedon and his team of high-tech contractors had come in from Costa Rica and Nicaragua, Washington and Denver. Their mission: to launch a messaging network that could reach hundreds of thousands of Cubans. To hide the network from the Cuban government, they would set up a byzantine system of front companies using a Cayman Islands bank account, and recruit unsuspecting executives who would not be told of the company’s ties to the U.S. government.

McSpedon didn’t work for the CIA. This was a program paid for and run by the U.S. Agency for International Development, best known for overseeing billions of dollars in U.S. humanitarian aid.

According to documents obtained by The Associated Press and multiple interviews with people involved in the project, the plan was to develop a bare-bones “Cuban Twitter,” using cellphone text messaging to evade Cuba’s strict control of information and its stranglehold restrictions over the Internet. In a play on Twitter, it was called ZunZuneo — slang for a Cuban hummingbird’s tweet.

Documents show the U.S. government planned to build a subscriber base through “non-controversial content”: news messages on soccer, music, and hurricane updates. Later when the network reached a critical mass of subscribers, perhaps hundreds of thousands, operators would introduce political content aimed at inspiring Cubans to organize “smart mobs” — mass gatherings called at a moment’s notice that might trigger a Cuban Spring, or, as one USAID document put it, “renegotiate the balance of power between the state and society.”

At its peak, the project drew in more than 40,000 Cubans to share news and exchange opinions. But its subscribers were never aware it was created by the U.S. government, or that American contractors were gathering their private data in the hope that it might be used for political purposes.

“There will be absolutely no mention of United States government involvement,” according to a 2010 memo from Mobile Accord, one of the project’s contractors. “This is absolutely crucial for the long-term success of the service and to ensure the success of the Mission.”

The program’s legality is unclear: U.S. law requires that any covert action by a federal agency must have a presidential authorization. Officials at USAID would not say who had approved the program or whether the White House was aware of it. McSpedon, the most senior official named in the documents obtained by the AP, is a mid-level manager who declined to comment.

USAID spokesman Matt Herrick said the agency is proud of its Cuba programs and noted that congressional investigators reviewed them last year and found them to be consistent with U.S. law.

“USAID is a development agency, not an intelligence agency, and we work all over the world to help people exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms, and give them access to tools to improve their lives and connect with the outside world,” he said.

“In the implementation,” he added, “has the government taken steps to be discreet in non-permissive environments? Of course. That’s how you protect the practitioners and the public. In hostile environments, we often take steps to protect the partners we’re working with on the ground. This is not unique to Cuba.”

But the ZunZuneo program muddies those claims, a sensitive issue for its mission to promote democracy and deliver aid to the world’s poor and vulnerable — which requires the trust of foreign governments.

“On the face of it there are several aspects about this that are troubling,” said Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt. and chairman of the Appropriations Committee’s State Department and foreign operations subcommittee.

“There is the risk to young, unsuspecting Cuban cellphone users who had no idea this was a U.S. government-funded activity. There is the clandestine nature of the program that was not disclosed to the appropriations subcommittee with oversight responsibility. And there is the disturbing fact that it apparently activated shortly after Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor who was sent to Cuba to help provide citizens access to the Internet, was arrested.”

The Associated Press obtained more than 1,000 pages of documents about the project’s development. The AP independently verified the project’s scope and details in the documents — such as federal contract numbers and names of job candidates — through publicly available databases, government sources and interviews with those directly involved in ZunZuneo.

Taken together, they tell the story of how agents of the U.S. government, working in deep secrecy, became tech entrepreneurs — in Cuba. And it all began with a half a million cellphone numbers obtained from a communist government.

ZunZuneo would seem to be a throwback from the Cold War, and the decades-long struggle between the United States and Cuba. It came at a time when the historically sour relationship between the countries had improved, at least marginally, and Cuba had made tentative steps toward a more market-based economy.

It is unclear whether the plan got its start with USAID or Creative Associates International, a Washington, D.C., for-profit company that has earned hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. contracts. But a “key contact” at Cubacel, the state-owned cellphone provider, slipped the phone numbers to a Cuban engineer living in Spain. The engineer provided the numbers to USAID and Creative Associates “free of charge,” documents show.

In mid-2009, Noy Villalobos, a manager with Creative Associates who had worked with USAID in the 1990s on a program to eradicate drug crops, started an IM chat with her little brother in Nicaragua, according to a Creative Associates email that captured the conversation. Mario Bernheim, in his mid-20s, was an up-and-coming techie who had made a name for himself as a computer whiz.

“This is very confidential of course,” Villalobos cautioned her brother. But what could you do if you had all the cellphone numbers of a particular country? Could you send bulk text messages without the government knowing?

“Can you encrypt it or something?” she texted.

She was looking for a direct line to regular Cubans through text messaging. Most had precious little access to news from the outside world. The government viewed the Internet as an Achilles’ heel and controlled it accordingly. A communications minister had even referred to it as a “wild colt” that “should be tamed.”

Yet in the years since Fidel Castro handed over power to his brother Raul, Cuba had sought to jumpstart the long stagnant economy. Raul Castro began encouraging cellphone use, and hundreds of thousands of people were suddenly using mobile phones for the first time, though smartphones with access to the Internet remained restricted.

Cubans could text message, though at a high cost in a country where the average wage was a mere $20 a month.

Bernheim told his sister that he could figure out a way to send instant texts to hundreds of thousands of Cubans— for cheap. It could not be encrypted though, because that would be too complicated. They wouldn’t be able to hide the messages from the Cuban government, which owned Cubacel. But they could disguise who was sending the texts by constantly switching the countries the messages came from.

“We could rotate it from different countries?” Villalobos asked. “Say one message from Nica, another from Spain, another from Mexico”?

Bernheim could do that. “But I would need mirrors set up around the world, mirrors, meaning the same computer, running with the same platform, with the same phone.”

“No hay problema,” he signed off. No problem.

After the chat, Creative hired Bernheim as a subcontractor, reporting to his sister. (Villalobos and Bernheim would later confirm their involvement with the ZunZuneo project to AP, but decline further comment.) Bernheim, in turn, signed up the Cuban engineer who had gotten the phone list. The team figured out how to message the masses without detection, but their ambitions were bigger.

Creative Associates envisioned using the list to create a social networking system that would be called “Proyecto ZZ,” or “Project ZZ.” The service would start cautiously and be marketed chiefly to young Cubans, who USAID saw as the most open to political change.

“We should gradually increase the risk,” USAID proposed in a document. It advocated using “smart mobs” only in “critical/opportunistic situations and not at the detriment of our core platform-based network.”

USAID’s team of contractors and subcontractors built a companion Web site to its text service so Cubans could subscribe, give feedback and send their own text messages for free. They talked about how to make the Web site look like a real business. “Mock ad banners will give it the appearance of a commercial enterprise,” a proposal suggested.

In multiple documents, USAID staff pointed out that text messaging had mobilized smart mobs and political uprisings in Moldova and the Philippines, among others. In Iran, the USAID noted social media’s role following the disputed election of then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2009 — and saw it as an important foreign policy tool.

USAID documents say their strategic objective in Cuba was to “push it out of a stalemate through tactical and temporary initiatives, and get the transition process going again towards democratic change.” Democratic change in authoritarian Cuba meant breaking the Castros’ grip on power.

USAID divided Cuban society into five segments depending on loyalty to the government. On one side sat the “democratic movement,” called “still (largely) irrelevant,” and at the other end were the “hard-core system supporters,” dubbed “Talibanes” in a derogatory comparison to Afghan and Pakistani extremists.

A key question was how to move more people toward the democratic activist camp without detection. Bernheim assured the team that wouldn’t be a problem.

“The Cuban government, like other regimes committed to information control, currently lacks the capacity to effectively monitor and control such a service,” Bernheim wrote in a proposal for USAID marked “Sensitive Information.”

ZunZuneo would use the list of phone numbers to break Cuba’s Internet embargo and not only deliver information to Cubans but also let them interact with each other in a way the government could not control. Eventually it would build a system that would let Cubans send messages anonymously among themselves.

At a strategy meeting, the company discussed building “user volume as a cover ... for organization,” according to meeting notes. It also suggested that the “Landscape needs to be large enough to hide full opposition members who may sign up for service.”

In a play on the telecommunication minister’s quote, the team dubbed their network the “untamed colt.”

At first, the ZunZuneo team operated out of Central America. Bernheim, the techie brother, worked from Nicaragua’s capital, Managua, while McSpedon supervised Creative’s work on ZunZuneo from an office in San Jose, Costa Rica, though separate from the U.S. embassy. It was an unusual arrangement that raised eyebrows in Washington, according to U.S. officials.

McSpedon worked for USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), a division that was created after the fall of the Soviet Union to promote U.S. interests in quickly changing political environments — without the usual red tape.

In 2009, a report by congressional researchers warned that OTI’s work “often lends itself to political entanglements that may have diplomatic implications.” Staffers on oversight committees complained that USAID was running secret programs and would not provide details.

“We were told we couldn’t even be told in broad terms what was happening because ‘people will die,’” said Fulton Armstrong, who worked for the Senate Foreign Relations committee. Before that, he was the US intelligence community’s most senior analyst on Latin America, advising the Clinton White House.

The money that Creative Associates spent on ZunZuneo was publicly earmarked for an unspecified project in Pakistan, government data show. But there is no indication of where the funds were actually spent.

Tensions with Congress spiked just as the ZunZuneo project was gearing up in December 2009, when another USAID program ended in the arrest of the U.S. contractor, Alan Gross. Gross had traveled repeatedly to Cuba on a secret mission to expand Internet access using sensitive technology typically available only to governments, a mission first revealed in February 2012 by AP.

At some point, Armstrong says, the foreign relations committee became aware of OTI’s secret operations in Costa Rica. U.S. government officials acknowledged them privately to Armstrong, but USAID refused to provide operational details.

At an event in Washington, Armstrong says he confronted McSpedon, asking him if he was aware that by operating secret programs from a third country, it might appear like he worked for an intelligence agency.

McSpedon, through USAID, said the story is not true. He declined to comment otherwise.

On Sept. 20, 2009, thousands of Cubans gathered at Revolution Plaza in Havana for Colombian rocker Juanes’ ”Peace without Borders” concert. It was the largest public gathering in Cuba since the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1998. Under the watchful gaze of a giant sculpture of revolutionary icon Ernesto “Che” Guevara, the Miami-based Juanes promised music aimed at “turning hate into love.”

But for the ZunZuneo team, the concert was a perfect opportunity to test the political power of their budding social network. In the weeks before, Bernheim’s firm, using the phone list, sent out a half a million text messages in what it called “blasts,” to test what the Cuban government would do.

The team hired Alen Lauzan Falcon, a Havana-born satirical artist based in Chile, to write Cuban-style messages. Some were mildly political and comical, others more pointed. One asked respondents whether they thought two popular local music acts out of favor with the government should join the stage with Juanes. Some 100,000 people responded — not realizing the poll was used to gather critical intelligence.

Paula Cambronero, a researcher for Mobile Accord, began building a vast database about the Cuban subscribers, including gender, age, “receptiveness” and “political tendencies.” USAID believed the demographics on dissent could help it target its other Cuba programs and “maximize our possibilities to extend our reach.”

Cambronero concluded that the team had to be careful. “Messages with a humorous connotation should not contain a strong political tendency, so as not to create animosity in the recipients,” she wrote in a report.

Falcon, in an interview, said he was never told that he was composing messages for a U.S. government program, but he had no regrets about his involvement.

“They didn’t tell me anything, and if they had, I would have done it anyway,” he said. “In Cuba they don’t have freedom. While a government forces me to pay in order to visit my country, makes me ask permission, and limits my communications, I will be against it, whether it’s Fidel Castro, (Cuban exile leader) Jorge Mas Canosa or Gloria Estefan,” the Cuban American singer.

Carlos Sanchez Almeida, a lawyer specializing in European data protection law, said it appeared that the U.S. program violated Spanish privacy laws because the ZunZuneo team had illegally gathered personal data from the phone list and sent unsolicited emails using a Spanish platform. “The illegal release of information is a crime, and using information to create a list of people by political affiliation is totally prohibited by Spanish law,” Almeida said. It would violate a U.S-European data protection agreement, he said.

USAID saw evidence from server records that Havana had tried to trace the texts, to break into ZunZuneo’s servers, and had occasionally blocked messages. But USAID called the response “timid” and concluded that ZunZuneo would be viable — if its origins stayed secret.

Even though Cuba has one of the most sophisticated counter-intelligence operations in the world, the ZunZuneo team thought that as long as the message service looked benign, Cubacel would leave it alone.

Once the network had critical mass, Creative and USAID documents argued, it would be harder for the Cuban government to shut it down, both because of popular demand and because Cubacel would be addicted to the revenues from the text messages.

In February 2010, the company introduced Cubans to ZunZuneo and began marketing. Within six months, it had almost 25,000 subscribers, growing faster and drawing more attention than the USAID team could control.

Saimi Reyes Carmona was a journalism student at the University of Havana when she stumbled onto ZunZuneo. She was intrigued by the service’s novelty, and the price. The advertisement said “free messages” so she signed up using her nickname, Saimita.

At first, ZunZuneo was a very tiny platform, Reyes said during a recent interview in Havana, but one day she went to its Web site and saw its services had expanded.

“I began sending one message every day,” she said, the maximum allowed at the start. “I didn’t have practically any followers.” She was thrilled every time she got a new one.

And then ZunZuneo exploded in popularity.

“The whole world wanted in, and in a question of months I had 2,000 followers who I have no idea who they are, nor where they came from.”

She let her followers know the day of her birthday, and was surprised when she got some 15 personal messages. “This is the coolest thing I’ve ever seen!” she told her boyfriend, Ernesto Guerra Valdes, also a journalism student.

Before long, Reyes learned she had the second highest number of followers on the island, after a user called UCI, which the students figured was Havana’s University of Computer Sciences. Her boyfriend had 1,000. The two were amazed at the reach it gave them.

“It was such a marvelous thing,” Guerra said. “So noble.” He and Reyes tried to figure out who was behind ZunZuneo, since the technology to run it had to be expensive, but they found nothing. They were grateful though.

“We always found it strange, that generosity and kindness,” he said. ZunZuneo was “the fairy godmother of cellphones.”

By early 2010, Creative decided that ZunZuneo was so popular Bernheim’s company wasn’t sophisticated enough to build, in effect, “a scaled down version of Twitter.”

It turned to another young techie, James Eberhard, CEO of Denver-based Mobile Accord Inc. Eberhard had pioneered the use of text messaging for donations during disasters and had raised tens of millions of dollars after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

Eberhard earned millions in his mid-20s when he sold a company that developed cellphone ring tones and games. His company’s Web site describes him as “a visionary within the global mobile community.”

In July, he flew to Barcelona to join McSpedon, Bernheim, and others to work out what they called a “below the radar strategy.”

“If it is discovered that the platform is, or ever was, backed by the United States government, not only do we risk the channel being shut down by Cubacel, but we risk the credibility of the platform as a source of reliable information, education, and empowerment in the eyes of the Cuban people,” Mobile Accord noted in a memo.

To cover their tracks, they decided to have a company based in the United Kingdom set up a corporation in Spain to run ZunZuneo. A separate company called MovilChat was created in the Cayman Islands, a well-known offshore tax haven, with an account at the island’s Bank of N.T. Butterfield & Son Ltd. to pay the bills.

A memo of the meeting in Barcelona says that the front companies would distance ZunZuneo from any U.S. ownership so that the “money trail will not trace back to America.”

But it wasn’t just the money they were worried about. They had to hide the origins of the texts, according to documents and interviews with team members.

Brad Blanken, the former chief operating officer of Mobile Accord, left the project early on, but noted that there were two main criteria for success.

“The biggest challenge with creating something like this is getting the phone numbers,” Blanken said. “And then the ability to spoof the network.”

The team of contractors set up servers in Spain and Ireland to process texts, contracting an independent Spanish company called Lleida.net to send the text messages back to Cuba, while stripping off identifying data.

Mobile Accord also sought intelligence from engineers at the Spanish telecommunications company Telefonica, which organizers said would “have knowledge of Cubacel’s network.”

“Understanding the security and monitoring protocols of Cubacel will be an invaluable asset to avoid unnecessary detection by the carrier,” one Mobile Accord memo read.

Officials at USAID realized however, that they could not conceal their involvement forever — unless they left the stage. The predicament was summarized bluntly when Eberhard was in Washington for a strategy session in early February 2011, where his company noted the “inherent contradiction” of giving Cubans a platform for communications uninfluenced by their government that was in fact financed by the U.S. government and influenced by its agenda.

They turned to Jack Dorsey, a co-founder of Twitter, to seek funding for the project. Documents show Dorsey met with Suzanne Hall, a State Department officer who worked on social media projects, and others. Dorsey declined to comment.

The State Department under then-Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton thought social media was an important tool in diplomacy. At a 2011 speech at George Washington University, Clinton said the U.S. helped people in “oppressive Internet environments get around filters.” In Tunisia, she said people used technology to “organize and share grievances, which, as we know, helped fuel a movement that led to revolutionary change.”

Ultimately, the solution was new management that could separate ZunZuneo from its U.S. origins and raise enough revenue for it to go “independent,” even as it kept its long-term strategy to bring about “democratic change.”

Eberhard led the recruitment efforts, a sensitive operation because he intended to keep the management of the Spanish company in the dark.

“The ZZ management team will have no knowledge of the true origin of the operation; as far as they know, the platform was established by Mobile Accord,” the memo said. “There should be zero doubt in management’s mind and no insecurities or concerns about United States Government involvement.”

The memo went on to say that the CEO’s clean conscience would be “particularly critical when dealing with Cubacel.” Sensitive to the high cost of text messages for average Cubans, ZunZuneo negotiated a bulk rate for texts at 4 cents a pop through a Spanish intermediary. Documents show there was hope that an earnest, clueless CEO might be able to persuade Cubacel to back the project.

Mobile Accord considered a dozen candidates from five countries to head the Spanish front company. One of them was Francoise de Valera, a CEO who was vacationing in Dubai when she was approached for an interview. She flew to Barcelona. At the luxury Mandarin Oriental Hotel, she met with Nim Patel, who at the time was Mobile Accord’s president. Eberhard had also flown in for the interviews. But she said she couldn’t get a straight answer about what they were looking for.

“They talked to me about instant messaging but nothing about Cuba, or the United States,” she told the AP in an interview from London.

“If I had been offered and accepted the role, I believe that sooner or later it would have become apparent to me that something wasn’t right,” she said.

By early 2011, Creative Associates grew exasperated with Mobile Accord’s failure to make ZunZuneo self-sustaining and independent of the U.S. government. The operation had run into an unsolvable problem. USAID was paying tens of thousands of dollars in text messaging fees to Cuba’s communist telecommunications monopoly routed through a secret bank account and front companies. It was not a situation that it could either afford or justify — and if exposed it would be embarrassing, or worse.

In a searing evaluation, Creative Associates said Mobile Accord had ignored sustainability because “it has felt comfortable receiving USG financing to move the venture forward.”

Out of 60 points awarded for performance, Mobile Accord scored 34 points. Creative Associates complained that Mobile Accord’s understanding of the social mission of the project was weak, and gave it 3 out of 10 points for “commitment to our Program goals.”

Mobile Accord declined to comment on the program.

In increasingly impatient tones, Creative Associates pressed Mobile Accord to find new revenue that would pay the bills. Mobile Accord suggested selling targeted advertisements in Cuba, but even with projections of up to a million ZunZuneo subscribers, advertising in a state-run economy would amount to a pittance.

By March 2011, ZunZuneo had about 40,000 subscribers. To keep a lower profile, it abandoned previous hopes of reaching 200,000 and instead capped the number of subscribers at a lower number. It limited ZunZuneo’s text messages to less than one percent of the total in Cuba, so as to avoid the notice of Cuban authorities. Though one former ZunZuneo worker — who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly about his work — said the Cubans were catching on and had tried to block the site.

Toward the middle of 2012, Cuban users began to complain that the service worked only sporadically. Then not at all.

ZunZuneo vanished as mysteriously as it appeared.

By June 2012, users who had access to Facebook and Twitter were wondering what had happened.

“Where can you pick up messages from ZunZuneo?” one woman asked on Facebook in November 2012. “Why aren’t I receiving them anymore?”

Users who went to ZunZuneo’s Web site were sent to a children’s Web site with a similar name.

Reyner Aguero, a 25-year-old blogger, said he and fellow students at Havana’s University of Computer Sciences tried to track it down. Someone had rerouted the Web site through DNS blocking, a censorship technique initially developed back in the 1990s. Intelligence officers later told the students that ZunZuneo was blacklisted, he said.

“ZunZuneo, like everything else they did not control, was a threat,” Aguero said. “Period.”

In incorrect Spanish, ZunZuneo posted a note on its Facebook page saying it was aware of problems accessing the Web site and that it was trying to resolve them.

“ ¡Que viva el ZunZuneo!” the message said. Long live ZunZuneo!

In February, when Saimi Reyes, and her boyfriend, Ernesto Guerra, learned the origins of ZunZuneo, they were stunned.

“How was I supposed to realize that?” Guerra asked. “It’s not like there was a sign saying ‘Welcome to ZunZuneo, brought to you by USAID.”

“Besides, there was nothing wrong. If I had started getting subversive messages or death threats or ‘Everyone into the streets,’” he laughed, “I would have said, ‘OK,’ there’s something fishy about this. But nothing like that happened.”

USAID says the program ended when the money ran out. The Cuban government declined to comment.

The former web domain is now a placeholder, for sale for $299. The registration for MovilChat, the Cayman Islands front company, was set to expire on March 31.

In Cuba, nothing has come close to replacing it. Internet service still is restricted.

“The moment when ZunZuneo disappeared was like a vacuum,” Guerra said. “People texted my phone, ‘What is happening with ZunZuneo?’

“In the end, we never learned what happened,” he said. “We never learned where it came from.”