Showing posts with label SARS-CoV-2. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SARS-CoV-2. Show all posts

Monday, March 21, 2022

3577. ‘He Goes Where the Fire Is’: A Virus Hunter in the Wuhan Market

By Carl Zimmer, The New York Times, March 21, 2022

Edward Holmes

As soon as Edward Holmes saw the dark-ringed eyes of the raccoon dogs staring at him through the bars of the iron cage, he knew he had to capture the moment.

It was October 2014. Dr. Holmes, a biologist at the University of Sydney, had come to China to survey hundreds of species of animals, looking for new types of viruses.


On a visit to Wuhan, a commercial center of 11 million people, scientists from the city’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention brought him to Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. In stall after stall of the poorly ventilated space, he saw live wild animals — snakes, badgers, muskrats, birds — being sold for food. But it was the raccoon dogs that made him pull out his iPhone.


As one of the world’s experts on virus evolution, Dr. Holmes had an intimate understanding of how viruses can jump from one species to another — sometimes with deadly consequences. The SARS outbreak of 2002 was caused by a bat coronavirus in China that infected some kind of wild mammal before infecting humans. Among the top suspects for that intermediate animal: the fluffy raccoon dog.


“You could not get a better textbook example of disease emergence waiting to happen,” Dr. Holmes, 57, said in an interview.


The tall, bald Englishman did his best not to draw attention to himself as he snapped a picture of the raccoon dogs, which look like long-legged raccoons but are more closely related to foxes. He then took a few more pictures of other animals in cages of their own. As a vendor began clubbing one of the creatures, Dr. Holmes pocketed his phone and slipped away.


The photos faded from his mind until the last day of 2019. As Dr. Holmes was browsing Twitter from his Sydney home, he learned of an alarming outbreak in Wuhan — a SARS-like pneumonia with early cases linked to the Huanan market. The raccoon dogs, he thought.


“It was a pandemic waiting to happen, and then it bloody well happened,” he said.


From that day on, Dr. Holmes was swept into a vortex of discoveries and controversies related to the origins of the virus — making him feel like “the Forrest Gump of Covid,” he joked. He and a Chinese colleague were the first to share the genome of the new coronavirus with the world. He then discovered crucial clues about how the pathogen most likely evolved from bat coronaviruses.


And in the contentious geopolitical debate over whether the virus may have leaked from a Wuhan laboratory, Dr. Holmes has become one of the strongest proponents of an opposing theory: that the virus spilled over from a wild animal. With colleagues in the United States, he recently published tantalizing clues that raccoon dogs kept in the very iron cage he photographed in 2014 could have set off the pandemic.


Dr. Holmes’s Covid research has won him international acclaim, including Australia’s top science prize. But it has also garnered claims that his research had been overseen by the Chinese military, along with a flood of attacks on social media and even death threats.


Through it all, Dr. Holmes has continued to publish a torrent of studies on Covid. Longtime colleagues attribute his steady output through unsteady times to an exceptional knack for building big scientific teams, and a willingness to dive into controversial debates if he thinks they are important.


“He’s the right kind of person with the right kind of mind-set, because of the fact that he can be open-minded and engaged and thoughtful, and not become defensive,” said Pardis Sabeti, a geneticist at the Broad Institute of M.I.T. and Harvard who worked with Dr. Holmes on Ebola.



Hunting for Viruses


Growing up in western England, a young Edward Holmes had a biology teacher who put a poster of an orangutan on the wall that read, “I’m not your cousin.”


The teacher told the class not to read the garbage in their textbook about evolution. That made the 14-year-old eager to dive in.


He went on to study the evolution of apes and humans, and then turned to viruses. Over three decades — working in Edinburgh, Oxford, Pennsylvania and finally Sydney — Dr. Holmes has published more than 600 papers on the evolution of viruses including H.I.V., influenza and Ebola.


When he was invited to come to the University of Sydney, in 2012, he seized the chance to move closer to Asia, where he feared that the wildlife trade could set off a new pandemic.

“He goes where the fire is,” said Andrew Read, an evolutionary biologist at Penn State University, who worked with Dr. Holmes at the time.


As he was preparing for the move, Dr. Holmes got an email out of the blue from a Chinese virologist named Yong-Zhen Zhang, asking if he’d like to study viruses with him in China. Their collaboration quickly expanded into a sweeping search for new viruses in hundreds of species of animals. They studied spiders plucked off the walls of huts and fish hauled up from the South China Sea.


They ultimately found more than 2,000 virus species new to science, with many surprises among them. Scientists used to think that influenza viruses infected primarily birds, for example, which could then pass them along to mammals like ourselves. But Dr. Holmes and Dr. Zhang found that fish and frogs get the flu, too.

eye-opening

“That’s been quite an eye-opening,” said Andrew Rambaut, an evolutionary biologist at the University of Edinburgh who was not involved in the surveys. “The diversity of viruses that are out there is just enormous.”


On one of their survey trips in 2014, Dr. Holmes and Dr. Zhang formed a partnership with scientists at the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention to survey animals in the surrounding Hubei Province. The C.D.C. scientists brought them to the Huanan market to see a worrying case of wildlife trade.


After the visit, Dr. Holmes hoped he and his colleagues could use the genetic sequencing techniques they had developed for their animal surveys to look for viruses in the animals at the market. But his colleagues were more interested in searching for viruses in sick people.


Dr. Zhang and Dr. Holmes began working with doctors at Wuhan Central Hospital, fishing for viral RNA in samples of lung fluid from people with pneumonia. Because of this collaboration, he was named a guest professor with the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention from 2014 to 2020.


Last month, Dr. Holmes and his colleagues published their first report on the project, based on samples from 408 patients collected in 2016 and 2017. Many were sick with more than one virus, it turned out, and some were also infected with bacteria or fungi. The researchers even saw evidence of a hidden outbreak: Six patients were infected with genetically identical enteroviruses.


Dr. Holmes and Dr. Zhang also continued surveying the virosphere, examining soil, sediments and animal feces from across China. But in late December 2019, that work ground to a halt.


Covid’s Arrival


When Dr. Zhang got wind of a new pneumonia in Wuhan, he asked colleagues at the Wuhan Central Hospital to ship him lung fluid from a patient. It arrived on Jan. 3, and he used the techniques he and Dr. Holmes had perfected to search for viruses. Two days later, Dr. Zhang’s team had assembled the genome of a new coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2.


Other scientific teams in China had also sequenced the virus. But none made it public, because the Chinese government had barred scientists from publishing information about it.


Dr. Zhang and Dr. Holmes began writing a paper about the genome, which would later appear in the journal Nature. Dr. Zhang flouted the ban and uploaded the virus genome to a public database hosted by the U.S. National Institutes of Health. But the database requires a lengthy review of new genomes, and so days passed without the information going online.


Dr. Holmes urged his collaborator to find another way to share the genome with the world. “It felt like it had to happen,” Dr. Holmes said.


On Jan. 10, they agreed to share it on a forum for virologists, and Dr. Holmes put it online.


That decision was a turning point, according to Jason McLellan, a structural biologist at the University of Texas at Austin who worked on the mRNA technology powering the Moderna vaccine. Only with that genetic sequence could researchers start working on tests, drugs and vaccines. Until then, Dr. McLellan said, scientists like himself were like runners in their starting blocks, waiting for a starter’s pistol.

“It fired the moment Edward and Yong-Zhen posted the genome sequence,” he said. “Immediately, Twitter was abuzz, emails were being exchanged, and the race was on.”

But according to Chinese media reports, Dr. Zhang paid a price for defying his country’s information ban. The day after the genome sequence went live, his laboratory at the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center was reportedly ordered to close for “rectification.”


Dr. Zhang later insisted to a reporter at Nature that the move was not a punishment, and that his lab later reopened. Email requests to Dr. Zhang to comment for this story went unanswered. Dr. Holmes declined to comment about Dr. Zhang’s current situation.




Yong-Zhen Zhang, a Chinese virologist, and his team assembled the genome of SARS-CoV-2 and made it public, defying China’s ban on publishing information about it.

Credit.: Keith Brasher/The New York Times


After the coronavirus genome was sequenced, Dr. Holmes was puzzled to see some bits of genetic material that looked like they might have been put there through genetic engineering.


On a Feb. 1, 2020, telephone conference, Dr. Holmes shared his worries with other virus experts, including Dr. Francis Collins, the director of the N.I.H., and Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, America’s top infectious disease expert. Other scientists explained on the call that those features of the genome could easily have been produced through the natural evolution of viruses.


Soon afterward, Dr. Holmes helped researchers at the University of Hong Kong analyze a coronavirus, found in a pangolin, that was closely related to SARS-CoV-2. The virus looked especially similar in its surface protein, called spike, which the virus uses to enter cells.


Finding such a distinct biological signature in a virus from a wild animal strengthened Dr. Holmes’s confidence that SARS-CoV-2 was not the product of genetic engineering. “Suddenly what looks odd is clearly natural,” Dr. Holmes said.


Dr. Holmes and his colleagues laid out some of these findings in a letter published in March 2020. That same month, he published some of his photos of caged animals at the Huanan market in a commentary he wrote with Dr. Zhang, suggesting that it might have been the site of an animal spillover.


But the idea that the virus had been engineered in a lab continued to gain traction, and Dr. Holmes came under attack for his work with Chinese scientists.


In May 2020, The Daily Telegraph, an Australian newspaper, linked him to the Chinese military with an article titled, “How the Red Army Oversaw Coronavirus Research.”

The newspaper based its claim on the fact that two scientists involved in the pangolin study had secondary affiliations with a Chinese military lab. Dr. Holmes, who said he never met the scientists, noted that they had helped with sequencing RNA from the pangolin tissue.


The University of Sydney responded on Dr. Holmes’s behalf with a statement: “We strongly defend the right of our researchers to collaborate with scientists around the world in line with all relevant Australian laws and government guidelines.” The university noted that Dr. Holmes’s research was entirely supported by Australian grants.


In late 2020, the World Health Organization organized a group of experts to travel to China to investigate the origin of the novel coronavirus. Dr. Holmes sent them his 2014 market photos, but they never made it into the W.H.O.’s report.

“Some of the Chinese delegation suggested that I might have fabricated those pictures,” Dr. Holmes said. (Peter Daszak, the president of EcoHealth Alliance and one of the investigators of the W.H.O. report, corroborated this account: The Chinese investigators said the photos were “not verifiable, and could have been faked,” Dr. Daszak said.)


Preventing Future Spillovers


In reports published last month, Dr. Holmes and over 30 collaborators analyzed early Covid cases, finding that they clustered around the market, and examined the mutations in early coronavirus samples.


Chris Newman, a wildlife biologist at the University of Oxford and a co-author of one of the studies, said that his Chinese colleagues saw a number of wild mammals for sale at the Huanan market in late 2019. Any of them might have been responsible for the pandemic, Dr. Holmes said.

“You can’t prove raccoon dogs yet, but they’re certainly a suspect,” he said.


Some critics have questioned how sure Dr. Holmes and his colleagues can be that a Huanan animal was to blame. Although many of the earliest Covid cases were linked to the market, it’s possible that other cases of pneumonia have not yet been recognized as early Covid cases.


“We still know far too little about the earliest cases — and there are likely additional cases we don’t know about — to draw final conclusions,” said Filippa Lentzos, an expert on biosecurity at King’s College London. “I remain open to both natural spillover and research-related origins.”


Another problem: If infected animals indeed started the pandemic, they’ll never be found. In January 2020, when researchers from the Chinese C.D.C. arrived at the market to investigate, all the animals were gone.


But Dr. Holmes argues that there’s more than enough evidence that animal markets could spark another pandemic. Last month, he and Chinese colleagues published a study of 18 animal species often sold at markets, obtaining them either in the wild or on breeding farms.


“They were absolutely full of virus,” Dr. Holmes said.

Over 100 vertebrate-infecting viruses came to light, including a number of potential human pathogens. And some of these viruses had recently jumped the species barrier — bird flu infecting badgers, dog coronaviruses infecting raccoon dogs. Some of the animals were sick with human viruses, too.


The simplest way to reduce the odds of future pandemics, Dr. Holmes has argued, is to carry out studies like this one at the interface between humans and wildlife. His own experience discovering new viruses has convinced him that it doesn’t make sense to try to catalog every potential threat in wildlife.


“You could never possibly sample every virus out there and then work out which one of those can infect humans,” Dr. Holmes said. “I don’t think that’s viable.”





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Tuesday, August 17, 2021

3543. The Animal Origin of SARS-CoV-2

  • By Spyros Lytras
  • Wei Xia
  • Joseph Hughes, 
  • Xiaowei Jiang
  • David L. Robertson, Science Magazine, August 17, 2021


  • Although first detected in December 2019, COVID-19 was inferred to be present in Hubei province, China, for about a month before (1). Where did this new human disease come from? To understand the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is necessary to go back to 2002. At that time a novel respiratory coronavirus appeared in Foshan, Guangdong province, China, and spread to 29 countries (2). Altogether ~8000 people were infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) before public health measures controlled its spread in 2003. The zoonotic origin of SARS-CoV was subsequently linked to live animals available at markets. Further sporadic spillover events of SARS-CoV from animals took place in Guangzhou, Guangdong, and some researchers working with cultured virus were infected in laboratory accidents (3), but ultimately SARS-CoV was removed from the human population. Trading of susceptible host animals is an important common theme in the origins of SARS and COVID-19.

    Three years after the SARS epidemic began, investigations revealed that horseshoe bats (Rhinolophus) in China were harboring related coronaviruses (4). These collectively form the species SARS-related coronavirus (SARSr-CoV), which comprises the Sarbecovirus subgenus of the Betacoronavirus genus. It was inferred that a sarbecovirus circulating in horseshoe bats seeded the progenitor of SARS-CoV in an intermediate animal host, most probably civet cats (3). Although other possible intermediate hosts for SARS-CoV were identified, in particular raccoon dogs and badgers (for sale with civet cats in animal markets), it is a population of civet cats within markets that appear to have acted as the conduits of transmission to humans from the horseshoe bat reservoir of SARS-CoV, rather than civet cats being a long-term reservoir host species. Presumably a captive civet cat initially became infected by direct contact with bats—e.g., as a result of bats foraging in farms or markets—or was infected prior to capture. Following the SARS epidemic, further surveillance revealed the immediate threat posed by sarbecoviruses from horseshoe bats. Despite this clear warning, another member of the SARSr-CoV species, SARS-CoV-2, emerged in 2019 that spread with unprecedented efficiency among humans. There has been speculation that the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in Hubei was the source of the pandemic because no SARS-CoV-2 intermediate host has been identified to date and owing to the WIV’s geographic location.

    SARS-CoV-2 first emerged in Wuhan city, which is >1500 km from the closest known naturally occurring sarbecovirus collected from horseshoe bats in Yunnan province, leading to an apparent puzzle: How did SARS-CoV-2 arrive in Wuhan? Since its emergence, sampling has revealed that coronaviruses genetically close to SARS-CoV-2 are circulating in horseshoe bats, which are dispersed widely from East to West China, and in Southeast Asia and Japan (5). The wide geographic ranges of the potential reservoir hosts—for example, intermediate (R. affinis) or least (R. pusillus) horseshoe bat species, which are known to be infected with sarbecoviruses—indicate that the singular focus on Yunnan is misplaced (5). Confirming this assertion, the evolutionarily closest bat sarbecoviruses are estimated to share a common ancestor with SARS-CoV-2 at least 40 years ago (5), showing that these Yunnan-collected viruses are highly divergent from the SARS-CoV-2 progenitor. The first of these viruses reported by WIV, RaTG13 (6), is certainly too divergent to be the SARS-CoV-2 progenitor, providing key genetic evidence that weakens the “lab-leak” notion. Additionally, three other sarbecoviruses collected in Yunnan independently of WIV are now the closest bat coronaviruses to SARS-CoV-2 that have been identified: RmYN02, RpYN06, and PrC31 (see the figure).

    So, how did SARS-CoV-2 get into humans? Although it is possible that a virus spillover occurred through direct horseshoe bat–to–human contact, a known risk for SARSr-CoVs (7), the first detected SARS-CoV-2 cases in December 2019 are associated with Wuhan wet markets (8). This is consistent with multiple animal-market–associated spillover events in November and December (9). It is currently not possible to be certain of the animal source of SARS-CoV-2, but it is notable that live animals, including civet cats, foxes, minks, and raccoon dogs, all susceptible to sarbecoviruses, were for sale in Wuhan markets, including the Huanan market (identified as an epicenter of the outbreak in Wuhan) throughout 2019 (10). Many of these animals are farmed for their fur at large scale and then sold to animal markets (11). Some of these farmed species (American minks, red foxes, and raccoon dogs) were sold alive for food by Wuhan animal sellers, as was trapped wildlife (including raccoon dogs and badgers), although no bat species were for sale (10). Together, this suggests a central role for SARSr-CoV–susceptible live intermediate host animals as the primary source of the SARS-CoV-2 progenitor that humans were exposed to, as was the case with the origin of SARS.

    If these routes of transmission to humans are in place, why is emergence so rare that only two major outbreaks have occurred in the last two decades? Spillover events are not so unusual in locations where more frequent human-animal contacts take place. This is indicated by serology studies showing evidence for SARSr-CoV–specific antibodies in people living in rural locations (12), and even higher rates recorded in people living near bat caves (7). Spillover risk will increase with human encroachment into rural areas, resulting from new travel networks around and between urban areas. When a novel virus is then exposed to a densely packed human population, such as in Wuhan city, these spillover events have a much higher chance of resulting in substantial onward spread (1).

    One particular ecological event in China that severely disrupted meat trade, and thereby contributed to increased wildlife–human contacts, was the shortage of pork products in 2019. This was a direct consequence of the African swine fever virus (ASFV) pandemic (11), which led to ~150 million pigs being culled in China, resulting in a pork supply reduction of ~11.5 million metric tons in 2019. Although production of other meat, such as poultry, beef, and fish products, moderately increased and China imported more of these products from international markets to mitigate the shortfall, this supply only covered a fraction of the ASFV-associated pork losses. Consequently, pork prices hit a record high in November 2019, with the wholesale price increasing ~2.3 times compared with the previous year. Moreover, pig production has been relocating from Southern to Northern China since 2016. This, coupled with tight restrictions on the movement of live pigs and pork products to mitigate the ASFV pandemic, reduced the availability of pork in the Eastern and Southern provinces, resulting in much steeper price increases in these regions. In response, food consumers and producers may have resorted to alternative meats, including farmed or captured wildlife, especially in Southern China where wildlife is traditionally consumed (11). The resulting increased trade of susceptible farmed animals and wildlife could have brought humans into more frequent contact with meat products and animals infected with zoonotic pathogens, including SARSr-CoVs.

    There are controversial reports of human SARS-CoV-2 cases in China being traced back to contact with imported frozen foods and SARS-CoV-2 apparently identified from frozen food, packaging, and storage surfaces (13). In an effort to prevent ASFV spread through live pig transportation routes, supply through the cold chain has been encouraged by the Chinese government since October 2018, with stronger support since September 2019 in the form of waiving freeway toll fees for frozen pork. The large demand for pork meat facilitated the use of cold-chain transport for all meat types, in particular from places with lower prices to those with higher prices, legally (or illegally), potentially also including transport of species susceptible to SARSr-CoV infection. The World Health Organization (WHO) Origins Report (8) recorded carcasses of wildlife, particularly badgers, left behind in freezers at the Huanan market, as well as their sale as frozen goods in late December 2019. It is likely that this wildlife had been trapped or farmed elsewhere and sold to Wuhan markets through the cold chain. Exposures could also potentially occur through feeding of coronavirus-infected carcasses to live animals either in transport or at markets.

    The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 has properties that are consistent with a natural spillover (9). Although carriage from a bat cave of a sarbecovirus close enough to SARS-CoV-2 to be the progenitor as a research sample to the WIV is theoretically possible, such a scenario would be extremely unlikely relative to the scale of human-susceptible animal contacts routinely taking place in animal trading. Alternatively, bat guano (feces) is collected for use as fertilizer, again on a much larger scale than irregular research visits to bat caves, consistent with rare but ongoing SARSr-CoV transmissions to humans in rural areas (712).

    Overall, SARSr-CoV animal-to-human transmission associated with infected live animals is the most likely cause of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the massive scale of cold-chain supply, particularly following disruption to the meat industry in China caused by ASFV-associated culling, suggests that frozen susceptible-animal carcasses, either for human or animal consumption, should not be discounted as playing a role in the emergence of SARS-CoV-2. This will especially be the case if the progenitor population of SARS-CoV-2 is found further away from Wuhan, because live-animal trafficking is much more likely to involve more proximal locations to the city, e.g., the prefectures of Hubei province. Serology, sampling and interviewing of the individuals (e.g., trappers, traders, and farmers) connected to the sources of wildlife sold in the Wuhan markets in October and November 2019 would be a sensible next step in future investigations.

    Once in the human population, SARS-CoV-2 has spread surprisingly rapidly for a new human pathogen. Contrary to classical expectations for a host species jump, SARS-CoV-2 is highly capable of human transmission, including frequent asymptomatic transmission and amplification through superspreader events. This initial ”success,” at least prior to the emergence of variants of concern, is unlikely to be due to early adaptation to humans but rather can be attributed to the relatively generalist nature of SARS-CoV-2 (14), evidenced by frequent transmission to mammals: minks, cats, and others. Worryingly, recent experimental evidence has found that the pangolin-derived sarbecoviruses (presumably acquired from exposure to horseshoe bats or other infected animals after illegal trafficking into China) can also infect human cells and have spike proteins that are even better at facilitating entry into human cells than that of SARS-CoV-2 (15). Collectively this points to a further risk of spillover that extends to the more divergent members of the lineage that SARS-CoV-2 emerged from and implies frequent spillovers from bats to other susceptible wildlife.

    Humans are now the dominant SARS-CoV-2 host species. The danger is that SARS-CoV-2 could spread from humans to other animal species, termed reverse zoonosis, as is suspected for white-tailed deer in the United States. The promiscuous infection of various host species by the sarbecoviruses means that future spillovers of SARSr-CoVs from wildlife are very likely, and current vaccines may not be protective against novel variants. The sampling intensity of sarbecoviruses needs to be urgently increased to gain a better understanding of this spillover risk. The recent finding of sarbecoviruses, not dissimilar to SARS-CoV-2, dispersed in Southeast Asia emphasizes the urgency of monitoring coronavirus diversity. Humanity must work together beyond country borders to amplify surveillance for coronaviruses at the human–animal interface to minimize the threat of both established and evolving variants evading vaccines and to stop future spillover events.


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    This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

    References and Notes

    ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: We thank the researchers who have shared genome data openly via GenBank or GISAID. D.L.R. and J.H. are funded by the Medical Research Council (MRC) (MC_UU_1201412) and D.L.R. by the Wellcome Trust (220977/Z/20/Z). S.L. is funded by an MRC studentship.