Saturday, November 14, 2026

3737. Reflections on the Recent Protests in Europe

By Kamran Nayeri, November 14, 2026


French protests against a new retirement age are deeply rooted in history. Photo credit: Washington Post. 


Europe has been experiencing a wave of protests. In Serbia, students began an anti-corruption uprising in November 2024 that continues, triggered by the collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad, killing 16 people. From September to November 2026 in France, the youth have protested against education and economic insecurity, initially led by high school students, demanding more education funding, more teachers, smaller classes, and improved school facilities. Trade unions joined these protests. In Turkey, students have protested political repression with repercussions lasting from March to July 2025. In Spain, housing affordability and economic exclusion have led to protests since 2025, which overlapped with overtourism and speculative real estate investments. In Portugal, housing costs and the cost of living have led to marches by young people and the occupation of public spaces since 2025. Students protested inadequate university funding and education cuts. Students demanded education reforms and protested austerity measures. In Italy, during October-November 2026, students protested university budget cuts and demanded affordable living and better employment.  In Greece, from 2025 to November 2026, students protested, demanding better school facilities, education funding, student housing, and opposing rising costs of living.

During these protests, economic grievances have become political grievances.  The protests are increasingly interconnected internationally. There is no single ideological orientation to these protests. Students and youth with environmentalist, progressive, anti-establishment currents have joined forces.

What characterizes the current situation is that Europe has enormous productive assets and technological capabilities, yet the promise of social progress through education and economic development is losing credibility.

In what follows, I will outline the factors contributing to this crisis.

Demographic transition as the background

Europe has undergone a remarkable demographic transformation. The proportion of older people has increased substantially over the past 40 years. Using the European Union (EU-27) as the consistent geographical definition, the percentage of people aged 65 and older rose from about 12.5% in 1985 (estimated) to 17.0% in 2005, and to 22.0% in 2025 (Source: Eurostat).  

  • In 40 years, the proportion of people aged 65+ has increased by approximately 76%.
  • Today, more than one in five Europeans is 65 or older; in 1985, it was approximately one in eight.
  • The EU now has approximately 99 million people aged 65 and older.

The change is particularly significant when considering the relationship between older people and the working-age population. In 2025, the EU had approximately 34.5 people aged 65+ for every 100 people aged 15–64 (working age). This is called the old-age dependency ratio. Source: Eurostat, Demography of Europe 2026

This raises important questions about:

·       The long-term financing of public pension systems.

·       The availability and cost of health and elder-care services

·       The distribution of income between working and retired generations.

·       Whether increased productivity can offset the declining proportion of working-age people.[1]

Let’s look at a few countries that have recently experienced protests.

Percent of population 65 years and older by year

Country

1995

2005

2015

2025

Italy

~16.5

19.5

21.9

24.7

Greece

~15.0

18.0

20.9

23.7

Portugal

~14.5

17.0

20.3

24.3

Germany

~16.0

19.0

21.0

22.7

France

~15.0

16.5

18.4

21.8

Spain

~15.0

16.5

18.4

20.7%

Belgium

~16.0

17.0

18.1

20.2%

EU

15.0

17.0

19.1

22.0

Source: Eurostat, population age structure, January 1, 2025. European Commission

The most striking feature is the aging of Italy, Greece, and Portugal, where approximately one in four people is now 65 or older.

Low fertility rates in the EU

The key reason is the low fertility rates in the EU. The latest Eurostat comparable official fertility data is for 2024. The replacement fertility rate is 2.1 children per woman. The 2024 figures for our sample are: France 1.60, Belgium 1.44, Portugal 1.41, Greece 1.24, Italy 1.18, and Spain 1.10.  For the EU, the fertility rate is 1.34. All are well below the replacement fertility rate of 2.1. (Source: Eurostat, European Commission)

Immigration policy

Thus, EU countries require immigration policies to increase the working-age population.

The percentage of immigrants in the population in 2025 was as follows: Belgium 20.2%, Spain 19.3%, France 14.0%, Portugal 14.0%, Italy 11.8%, and Greece 11.0%. For the EU, 14.35% of the population was born abroad as of January 1, 2025. This represents 64.7 million people out of 450.6 million in the EU. These figures include immigrants who have become citizens.

Italy and Portugal are Europe's oldest societies among these six countries, with nearly one-quarter of their populations aged 65 or older. Spain has undergone an extraordinary demographic transformation. Nearly one-fifth of its population was born abroad in 2025. Immigration has not eliminated population aging. All six countries experienced an increase in the proportion aged 65 and older between 2024 and 2025.

Cultural change

Europe has a Judeo-Christian cultural history. The migration of Muslims has affected a cultural change in Europe. In August 2024, the PEW Research Center published The Religious Composition of the World’s Immigrants using data through 2020. It shows that Muslims make up about 18% of Europe’s population; this includes the EU, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland.

In comparison, 14.7% of the US population were foreign-born immigrants in 2025.  In the PEW study noted above, only 7% of them were Muslim.

These findings are important for two reasons. They show a generational divide between seniors in European countries who want to protect the old-age benefits they earned during their working life and the younger generation, who aspire to live at least as well as their parents who are losing hope for a better future.

European stagnation

Europe has been in a prolonged period of stagnation, although the term must be qualified. Europe is growing slowly, experiencing weak productivity gains, losing relative economic weight internationally, and struggling to generate a new period of social development as the following table shows.   

Annual real GDP growth (%)

Country

1995

2005

2015

2025

Italy

2.9

0.8

0.9

0.5

Greece

2.1

1.2

-0.2

2.1

Portugal

4.3

0.8

1.6

1.9

France

2.4

1.9

1.1

0.8

Belgium

2.4

2.3

1.5

1.0

Spain

2.8

3.6

4.1

2.8

Germany

1.9

0.9

1.7

0.2

EU

2.5

1.9

2.3

1.4

Source: Eurostat historical national accounts and its 2025 editions of National Accounts and GDP. Note: The 1995 EU figure represents EU-15, the membership at that time. The later EU figures represent the EU-27. Historical figures are subject to statistical revisions, so small differences from other editions are possible.

The rise of European fascism

Unlike in the 1920s and 1930s in Italy, Germany, and Spain, Europe had no large trade unions or Socialist and Communist parties that could threaten capitalism. Yet authoritarian and fascist currents rose sharply across Europe (Traverso, 2019; Carnegie Europe, 2026). First, there is the electoral resurgence of the radical right, as seen in rising party membership and voting patterns. Second, authoritarian politics is growing, as seen in attacks on democratic institutions and political pluralism. Third, fascism is emerging or re-emerging as an ideology and political organization. Immigrants, especially Muslims, have become the scapegoats for authoritarianism and fascism in Europe.

A similar situation has been in play with Donald Trump’s authoritarian anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and America First/Make America Great Again movement in the United States. The November 2026 mid-term elections showed how many US voters, including some Republicans, rebelled against Trump and his politics.  

The crisis in Europe and in the United States reflects the relative weakening of Western imperialism as it is being challenged by newly rising regional powers.

References:

Carnegie Europe. Two Years On: Why Europe’s Far Right Keeps Growing. 2026.

Traverso, Enzo. The New Faces of Fascism. 2026.



[1] It is important to note: These are EU figures, not the entire geographical continent of Europe. Including the UK, Switzerland, Norway, and other European countries would produce a somewhat different aggregate.

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