 |
| Alan Gross being escorted in Havana |
Piece
by piece, in backpacks and carry-on bags, American aid contractor Alan Gross
made sure laptops, smartphones, hard drives and networking equipment were
secreted into Cuba. The most sensitive item, according to official trip
reports, was the last one: a specialized mobile phone chip that experts say is
often used by the Pentagon and the CIA to make satellite signals virtually
impossible to track.
The
purpose, according to an Associated Press review of Gross' reports, was to set
up uncensored satellite Internet service for Cuba's small Jewish community.
The
operation was funded as democracy promotion for the U.S. Agency for
International Development, established in 1961 to provide economic, development
and humanitarian assistance around the world in support of U.S. foreign policy
goals. Gross, however, identified himself as a member of a Jewish humanitarian
group, not a representative of the U.S. government.
Cuban
President Raul Castro called him a spy, and Gross was sentenced last March to
15 years in prison for seeking to "undermine the integrity and
independence" of Cuba. U.S. officials say he did nothing wrong and was
just carrying out the normal mission of USAID.
Gross
said at his trial in Cuba that he was a "trusting fool" who was
duped. But his trip reports indicate that he knew his activities were illegal
in Cuba and that he worried about the danger, including possible expulsion.
One
report says a community leader "made it abundantly clear that we are all
'playing with fire.'"
Another
time Gross said: "This is very risky business in no uncertain terms."
And
finally: "Detection of satellite signals will be catastrophic."
The
case has heightened frictions in the decades-long political struggle between
the United States and its communist neighbor to the south, and raises questions
about how far democracy-building programs have gone -- and whether
cloak-and-dagger work is better left to intelligence operatives.
Gross'
company, JBDC Inc., which specializes in setting up Internet access in remote
locations like Iraq and Afghanistan, had been hired by Development Alternatives
Inc., or DAI, of Bethesda, Maryland, which had a multimillion-dollar contract
with USAID to break Cuba's information blockade by "technological outreach
through phone banks, satellite Internet and cell phones."
USAID
officials reviewed Gross' trip reports and received regular briefings on his
progress, according to DAI spokesman Steven O'Connor. The reports were made
available to the AP by a person familiar with the case who insisted on
anonymity because of the documents' sensitivity.
The
reports cover four visits over a five-month period in 2009. Another report,
written by a representative of Gross' company, covered his fifth and final
trip, the one that ended with his arrest on Dec. 3, 2009.
Together,
the reports detail the lengths to which Gross went to escape Cuban authorities'
detection.
To
avoid airport scrutiny, Gross enlisted the help of other American Jews to bring
in electronic equipment a piece at a time. He instructed his helpers to pack
items, some of them banned in Cuba, in carry-on luggage, not checked bags.
He
once drove seven hours after clearing security and customs rather than risk
airport searches.
On
his final trip, he brought in a "discreet" SIM card -- or subscriber
identity module card -- intended to keep satellite phone transmissions from
being pinpointed within 250 miles (400 kilometers), if they were detected at
all.
The
type of SIM card used by Gross is not available on the open market and is
distributed only to governments, according to an official at a satellite
telephone company familiar with the technology and a former U.S. intelligence
official who has used such a chip. The officials, who spoke on condition of
anonymity because of the sensitivity of the technology, said the chips are
provided most frequently to the Defense Department and the CIA, but also can be
obtained by the State Department, which oversees USAID.
Asked
how Gross obtained the card, USAID spokesman Drew Bailey said only that the
agency played no role in helping Gross acquire equipment. "We are a
development agency, not an intelligence agency," he said.
Cuba's
communist government considers all USAID democracy promotion activities to be
illegal and a national security threat. USAID denies that any of its work is
covert.
Gross'
American lawyer, Peter J. Kahn, declined comment but has said in the past that
Gross' actions were not aimed at subverting the Cuban government.
Cuban
authorities consider Internet access to be a matter of national security and
block some sites that are critical of the government, as well as pages with
content that they deem as counterrevolutionary. Most Cubans have access only to
a severely restricted island-wide Intranet service.
Proponents
of providing Internet access say it can undermine authoritarian governments
that control the flow of information to their people. Critics say the practice
not only endangers contractors like Gross, but all American aid workers, even
those not involved in secret activities.
"All
too often, the outside perception is that these USAID people are intelligence
officers," said Philip Giraldi, an ex-CIA officer. "That makes it bad
for USAID, it makes it bad for the CIA and for any other intelligence agency
who like to fly underneath the radar."
Even
before he delivered the special SIM card, Gross noted in a trip report that use
of Internet satellite phones would be "problematic if exposed." He
was aware that authorities were using sophisticated detection equipment and
said he saw workers for the government-owned telecommunications service
provider conduct a radio frequency "sniff" the day before he was to
set up a community's Wi-Fi operation.
------
U.S.
diplomats say they believe Gross was arrested to pressure the Obama
administration to roll back its democracy-promotion programs. The Cuban
government has alleged without citing any evidence that the programs, funded
under a 1996 law calling for regime change in Cuba, are run by the CIA as part
of an intelligence plan to topple the government in Havana.
While
the U.S. government broadly outlines the goals of its aid programs in publicly
available documents, the work in Cuba could not exist without secrecy because
it is illegal there. Citing security concerns, U.S. agencies have refused to
provide operational details even to congressional committees overseeing the
programs.
"The
reason there is less disclosure on these programs in totalitarian countries is
because the people are already risking their lives to exercise their
fundamental rights," said Mauricio Claver-Carone, who runs the
Washington-based Cuba Democracy Advocates.
USAID
rejected the notion that its contractors perform covert work.
"Nothing
about USAID's Cuba programs is covert or classified in any way," says Mark
Lopes, a deputy assistant administrator. "We simply carry out activities
in a discreet manner to ensure the greatest possible safety of all those
involved."
The
U.S. National Security Act defines "covert" as government activities
aimed at influencing conditions abroad "where it is intended that the role
of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged
publicly."
USAID's
democracy promotion work in Cuba was spurred by a large boost in funding under
the Bush administration and a new focus on providing communications technology
to Cubans. U.S. funding for Cuban aid multiplied from $3.5 million in 2000 to
$45 million in 2008. It's now $20 million.
Gross
was paid a half-million dollars as a USAID subcontractor, according to U.S.
officials familiar with the contract. They spoke only on condition of anonymity
because they are not authorized to discuss the case.
USAID
head Raj Shah said democracy promotion is "absolutely central" to his
agency's work. The Obama administration says its Cuba programs aim to help
politically repressed citizens enjoy fundamental rights by providing
humanitarian support, encouraging democratic development and aiding the free
flow of information.
U.S.
officials say Gross' work was not subversion because he was setting up connections
for Cuba's Jewish community, not for dissidents. Jewish leaders have said that
they were unaware of Gross' connections to the U.S. government and that they
already were provided limited Internet access. USAID has not said why it
thought the community needed such sensitive technology.
Asked
if such programs are meant to challenge existing leaders, Lopes said, "For
USAID, our democracy programs in Cuba are not about changing a particular
regime. That's for the Cuban people to decide, and we believe they should be
afforded that choice."
Others
disagree.
"Of
course, this is covert work," said Robert Pastor, President Jimmy Carter's
national security adviser for Latin America and now director of the Center for
Democracy and Election Management at American University in Washington.
"It's about regime change."
------
Gross,
of Potomac, Maryland, was a gregarious man, about 6 feet (1.8 meters) and 250
pounds (113 kilograms). He was hard to miss. He had bought a Rosetta Stone
language course to improve his rudimentary Spanish and had scant knowledge of
Cuba. But he knew technology. His company specialized in installing
communications gear in remote parts of the world.
Gross'
first trip for DAI, which ended in early April 2009, focused on getting
equipment in and setting up the first of three facilities with Wi-Fi hotspots
that would give unrestricted Internet access to hundreds of Cubans, especially
the island's small Jewish community of 1,500.
To
get the materials in, Gross relied on American Jewish humanitarian groups doing
missions on the island. He traveled with the groups, relying on individuals to
help bring in the equipment, according to the trip reports.
Three
people briefed on Gross' work say he told contacts in Cuba he represented a
Jewish organization, not the U.S. government. USAID says it now expects people
carrying out its programs to disclose their U.S. government funding to the
people they are helping -- if asked.
One
of Gross' reports suggests he represented himself as a member of one of the
groups and that he traveled with them so he could intercede with Cuban
authorities if questions arose.
The
helpers were supposed to pack single pieces of equipment in their carry-on
luggage. That way, Gross wrote, any questions could best be handled during the
X-ray process at security, rather than at a customs check. The material was
delivered to Gross later at a Havana hotel, according to the trip reports.
USAID
has long relied on visitors willing to carry in prohibited material, such as
books and shortwave radios, U.S. officials briefed on the programs say. And
USAID officials have acknowledged in congressional briefings that they have
used contractors to bring in software to send encrypted messages over the
Internet, according to participants in the briefings.
An
alarm sounded on one of Gross' trips when one of his associates tried to leave
the airport terminal; the courier had placed his cargo -- a device that can
extend the range of a wireless network -- into his checked bag.
Gross
intervened, saying the device was for personal use and was not a computer hard
drive or a radio.
According
to the trip reports, customs officials wanted to charge a 100 percent tax on
the value of the item, but Gross bargained them down and was allowed to leave
with it.
"On
that day, it was better to be lucky than smart," Gross wrote.
Much
of the equipment Gross helped bring in is legal in Cuba, but the volume of the
goods could have given Cuban authorities a good idea of what he was up to.
"Total
equipment" listed on his fourth trip included 12 iPods, 11 BlackBerry
Curve smartphones, three MacBooks, six 500-gigabyte external drives, three
Internet satellite phones known as BGANs, three routers, three controllers, 18
wireless access points, 13 memory sticks, three phones to make calls over the
Internet, and networking switches. Some pieces, such as the networking and
satellite equipment, are explicitly forbidden in Cuba.
Gross
wrote that he smuggled the BGANs in a backpack. He had hoped to fool
authorities by taping over the identifying words on the equipment:
"Hughes," the manufacturer, and "Inmarsat," the company
providing the satellite Internet service.
The
BGANs were crucial because they provide not only satellite telephone capacity
but an Internet signal that can establish a Wi-Fi hotspot for multiple users.
The appeal of using satellite Internet connections is that data goes straight
up, never passing through government-controlled servers.
------
There
was always the chance of being discovered.
Last
year, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked about clandestine methods
used to hide the programs and reports that some of them had been penetrated.
"Possible
counterintelligence penetration is a known risk in Cuba," the State
Department said in a written response to AP. "Those who carry out our
assistance are aware of such risks."
Gross'
first trip to Cuba ended in early April 2009 with establishment of a
communications site in Havana.
He
went back later that month and stayed about 10 days while a site was set up in
Santiago, Cuba's second-largest city.
On
his third trip, for two weeks in June 2009, Gross traveled to a city in the
middle of the island identified by a U.S. official as Camaguey. He rented a car
in Havana and drove seven hours rather than risk another encounter with airport
authorities.
Gross
wrote that BGANs should not be used outside Havana, where there were enough
radio frequency devices to hide the emissions.
The
report for Gross's fourth trip, which ended early that August, was marked final
and summarized his successes: wireless networks established in three
communities; about 325 users; "communications to and from the U.S. have
improved and used on a regular basis." He again concluded the operation
was "very risky business."
------
Gross
would have been fine if he had stopped there.
In
late November 2009, however, he went back to Cuba for a fifth time. This time
he didn't return. He was arrested 11 days later.
An
additional report was written afterward on the letterhead of Gross' company. It
was prepared with assistance from DAI to fulfill a contract requirement for a
summary of his work, and so everyone could get paid, according to officials
familiar with the document.
The
report said Gross had planned to improve security of the Havana site by
installing an "alternative sim card" on the satellite equipment.
The
card would mask the signal of the BGAN as it transmitted to a satellite, making
it difficult to track where the device was located.
The
document concluded that the site's security had been increased.
It is
unclear how DAI confirmed Gross' work for the report on the final trip, though
a document, also on Gross' company letterhead, states that a representative for
Gross contacted the Jewish community in Cuba five times after his arrest.
In a
statement at his trial, Gross professed his innocence and apologized.
"I
have never, would never and will never purposefully or knowingly do anything
personally or professionally to subvert a government," he said. "I am
deeply sorry for being a trusting fool. I was duped. I was used."
In an
interview with AP, his wife, Judy, blamed DAI, the company that sent him to
Cuba, for misleading him on the risks. DAI spokesman O'Connor said in a
statement that Gross "designed, proposed, and implemented this work"
for the company.
Meanwhile,
the 62-year-old Gross sits in a military prison hospital. His family says he
has lost about 100 pounds (45 kilograms) and they express concern about his
health. All the U.S. diplomatic attempts to win his freedom have come up empty
and there is no sign that Cuba is prepared to act on appeals for a humanitarian
release.
