Wednesday, September 3, 2014

1537. Indigenous Anarchist Critique of Bolivia's 'Indigenous State': Interview with Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui

By Will Weinberg, Upside Down World, September 3, 2014
Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui 
Originally published on June 7, 2014 at World War 4 Report, with a shorter version on May 26, 2014 at Indian Country Today Media Network.
Bolivian historian and social theorist Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui is author of the classic work Oppressed But Not Defeated: Peasant Struggles Among the Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia, and has recently emerged as one of the country's foremost critics of President Evo Morales from an indigenous perspective. Indian Country Today Media Network spoke with her in New York City, where she recently served as guest chair of Latin American studies at New York University's King Juan Carlos Center. The complete text of the interview appears for the first time on World War 4 Report.
What are you doing here in New York City?
I have been invited as chair of Latin American studies by the King Juan Carlos Center, which is sort of funny, it sounds like a horrible place for me. But Spain should give us back a little bit of what they took! And my salary is like a millionth part of what they owe us.
And what are you doing now in Bolivia?
I used to teach at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, which is the biggest public university in Bolivia. And I was very much involved in university politics, because I was trying to fight corruption in the university. In 2005, I had a 15-day-long hunger strike, and we managed to kick the dean out. But he left a lot of corruptos were still there, and I was forced to retire.
Since then, I have been doing community things, trying to network and create micro-politics... Since I wrote my study on anarchism, I discovered the importance of community to politics, as opposed to the individualist liberal conception...
What was the title?
Los Artesanos Libertarios y la Ética de Trabajo (Libertarian Artisans and the Work Ethic), based on oral history.
What kind of artisans?
Shoe-makers, carpenters, masons. In La Paz. They founded the Local Workers Federation. The foundation date is uncertain. We more or less think it was 1926 or '27. ..
An anarcho-syndicalist federation?
Yes. It actually started with discussion circles as early as 1908—purely workers, without any intellectuals. Only intellectuals that were workers at the same time. I discovered that my great-uncle, from an estranged part of the family—because he was a worker, a mechanic, so my mother wanted nothing to do with him—was an ideologue of this movement.
This federation still exists?
No, no, no. It was destroyed by the MNR [National Revolutionary Movement, which took power in 1952]. Because under the Marxist view of the labor movement at the time, the artisans are not workers, and therefore they deserve to be erased from history! Only "proletarians" count, only the slaves of the machine count.
The final blow was in 1964, with the dictatorship. Only one union remained from the Federation, it was all-female union of flower vendors, in the Mercado de Floristas. We managed to find them still alive and conduct these interviews in 1985, '86. And that archive, which is 100 cassettes, I have been working full-time digitizing here in New York...
And this relates to your current community work?
Yes, I am still working with artisans, with urban self-reliance groups in La Paz, ecological and feminist groups, working in the qhatu, or traditional peasant fair or market. This is a very ancient tradition form colonial times, in which indigenous communities used the market to prevent being used by the market. There is always a barter section, negotiation of prices, at the local level. It is a market that is not depersonalized; it is a conscious market, where people are there, not just prices and commodities. It is against the supermarket, against the mall. It is against the corporations and brands and selling things that are pre-packaged. You harvest lentils from your own garden, and you never put it in a plastic package. So the qhatu is a form of resistance to the world market. It is resisting the market with market—it is almost like a vaccination
I am part of a collective that produced hand-made books and hand-woven bags frmo recycled plastic, as well as lettuce and potatoes and fava beans and sweet peas and medicinal herbs. Grown in community gardens in La Paz. And we sell them at the traditional markets in La Paz.
And we have made campaigns—a campaign against plastic bags, a campaign to promote walking instead of taking trucks or buses or cars. Walking is very difficult in La Paz if it's uphill, because of the altitude. So we have a slogan, Camina La Paz, aun que sea la bajada—Walk through La Paz, even if it's only downhill! At least just get a bus ticket one way!
So we try to link every public issue where human rights, indigenous rights, and the rights of the Pachamama are involved. So we joined with TIPNIS, we joined CONAMAQ, we joined the support network for the human rights office that was almost taken over by the government. We are defending the CONAMAQ people who were kicked out of their office... We are just there for them, if they need shelter for the night or a good breakfast, we go and do that. We are not many, but we do whatever we can.
We call ourselves Colectivo Ch'ixi—from the Aymara word meaning "stain." We are mestizos, but we have a strong Indian stain in our souls. We are "impure." We are not "pure" people. And we have to recognize also that there is a European stain in our bodies and in our subjectivities. And the good part of that stain is the idea of freedom and individual rights. From the Indian part we get the idea of community and of cycle, intimacy with the cycles of nature. But we do recognize the value of individual freedoms and rights—sexual rights, the right to have a sexual identity that is different from the rest, or of abortion. All this comes from the best contributions of European civilization and the Enlightenment.
Is there necessarily a contradiction?
They are contradictory. But we live the contradiction with joy. It is not a schizophrenic contradiction. We live the contradiction as if the contradiction gives us energy. And contradiction without a synthesis is totally against the grain of Marxism.
This has to do with the Aymara trivalent logic, as opposed to Aristotelian binary logic. Aymara philosophy is based on the "included third." A is not B, and B is not A. But there are things that are A and B at the same time. In binary logic, one excludes the other. But when you have the logic of inclusion, you have enormous possibilities of intercultural action.
This is inscribed in the Aymara language. In Ayrmara grammar, you can say "it is," and you can say "it is not," and you can say "it is and it is not" at the same time. Jisa is yes, jani is no, and inasa can be yes and can be no.
Is this related to the Quechua concepts of hanan and hurin?
That is the same idea projected into space. There is an upper space, there is a lower space, and there is a middle space. The middle space is at the same time upper and lower. In Aymara that space is the taypi. In Quechua it is chawpi.
How does this relate to the concept of synthesis in Marxist and Hegelian dialectics?
It is dialectics without synthesis. The synthesis arises from the desire for unity. And when you have unity, you are without possibilities. It is closed. The possibility of change is because there is contradiction. If you leave it open, there are possibilities—that the margins become the center, that the one side turns to the other side. There is fluidity, there is movement. If you reach the "synthesis," you reach the Communist state—another fucking state!
Some would argue that was a vulgarization of dialectics...
No! If you maintain the idea that the contradiction is there, you will never be looking for a synthesis, you will not be craving for the unity of a state, of a central power. I think that we have to discover the way of freedom and self-organization beyond central powers.
The current Bolivian situation seems to be one of many contradictions...
I had so much hope at the moment when Evo Morales came into the government. But he has come to crave centralized power, which has become a part of the Bolivia’s dominant culture since the 1952 revolution. The idea that Bolivia is a weak state and needs to be a strong state—this is such a recurrent idea, and it is becoming the self-suicide of revolution. Because the revolution is what the people do—and what the people do is decentralized. It is a megalomaniacal kind of thing to have a "strong nation." It is an inferiority complex. I think we should have many reasons to be very happy with what we are. Instead of always craving to be more modern, more developed, more fucking big—more highways, more technology...
Yes, let's have technology. But let's relearn the technologies of old and combine them wind energy or solar. The technology of more and bigger machines and highways—to me that is megalomania and an inferiority complex.
One can anticipate the response that in the real world, Bolivia is trying to assert control over its own territory and resources against the hegemon of the North, the United States, and other imperialist powers. And it is therefore necessary to form a strong state.
I would say that the strength of Bolivia is not the state but the people. And the people have been strong and stubborn enough to be what they are, and to put their own desires as the terms and conditions of what is going to be the change. And that is what saves this process of Evo. What saves him is that there are people behind him who have not been bought completely, and they rely upon themselves.
There is a peculiarity of the Bolivian people in general, with a lot of diversity, a lot of community, a lot of locality, a lot of ability to network and to make friendships. There is also a huge diasporic Bolivianess. I would say half the population of Bolivians live outside Bolivia. There are probably 9 million Bolivians in the diaspora—in Argentina, in Spain, in Italy, Chile, the United States. All over the place—even China now!
But you cannot say that we Bolivians are being well-treated by whatever strength our state has. It is not the weakness of the state that has thrown people away—it is the strength of the state that has thrown people away! Because they are starting to normalize, homogenize, totalize, control and make difficult the lives of the people.
How?
In so many ways. For instance, there is no support for self-employment strategies. There is only support for big state-owned companies and enterprises. And to get a job there, you need to be a militant of the party in power. So what happens to the rest of the people?
We have all the forces we need to create a small-scale industrial culture through processing and adding value to the raw materials that we ourselves produce. The most important asset that the Bolivian people has is knowledge of the environment. The environment of Bolivia is very rare. Only two peoples in the world live at such high altitudes—the Tibetan people, and we. For this land, you don't need tractors. You don't need huge harvesters or huge machines. For that, you need to know what the weather is going to be next month. And for that, you need the people who know how to look to the stars. That is the big asset. The stars and other predictive knowledge tell you when to sow, and when an early rain is coming. The ability to understand nature and its cycles and its messages.
And that is completely outside the ideas of Marxists. But it is part of the Indian epistemic that we, the mestizos, have within our bodes.
We still have the culto de los muertos—the cult of the dead. You should come to my house in Bolivia and meet the skull of my ancestor. I am one of many, many, many paceños, many people from La Paz, who has this Cult of the Dead, very, very strong. Now a skull is a thing, you can just see it as inert material. But it’s not... There is a spirit there; there is a spirit everywhere. You have to be attuned to that. And Marxists don’t believe in that shit. [Laughs.]
This raises some interesting questions about identity...
Sure. My identity has a lot of Indian-ess, because since I was a small child, I used to hear songs in Aymara and rituals to the dead.
From whom?
From my mother, from my father, and from the servants of the house. My father and mother were middle-class, pretty well-off, because my father was doctor. And they hired to Aymara persons, and one of them to take care of me. And I thought she was my mother.
My real mother wanted me to be an upper-class woman, and I decided not to. Because I was for my substitute mother's way.
Your mother spoke Aymara?
No, only the imperative! [Laughs] My father did speak Quechua, though. He spoke it at home in his house when he was growing up.
So your antepasados [ancestors] were indigenous?
Of course!
And yet you say that you're a mestizo. Just because you grew up speaking Spanish as your first language?
Not only. I have Jewish blood. On my father's side. It was the colonial Jewish people who came to the Andes in the 16th century, escaping the Inquisition in Spain. So on both sides, I am against the Inquisition, and against the king of Spain!
Your indigenous side and your Jewish side. The Jews were Marranos [crypto-Jews]?
Yes, Marranos. I discovered it in the library in Austin, Texas. In the rare book section there was a fichero [file folder] called "Judios en América." And the first name I saw was Rivera! That was a commonly Jewish name. It was then I decided I was a Jew. And a Jew and an Aymara make a very interesting mixture...
And Quechua as well, no?
Yes, Quechua as well. And probably some Basque and some other things. But I don’t care about "blood." I hate "blood" talk. Because I think identity is constructed by living in the present. I have taken my love of the Aymara to such an extreme because I discovered the healthier aspect of my European side through the Aymara recognition of otherness. It is the Aymara side that helped me to discover the good parts of my European heritage.
In Bolivia, the indigenous are a majority and the mestizos a minority, no?
Mestizo is a construction. From one point of view, you can say mestizos are a majority because most Indians are mestizos anyway, because they speak Spanish, they pray to a Christian god, they use money in transactions, they are individualist, and they want their children to speak English. But from the other point of view, those weird things that we do are indigenous, they are a part of the indigenous heritage that we all share. And form that point of view, we are a majority Indians. Therefore you can say yes and no to your question. This is again the Aymara trivalent logic.
You've said that the current Bolivian government is not truly an indigenous government.
No. It has an indigenous face. But, unfortunately, you do not want a "face" to be happening. You want an episteme to be happening. You want the world view, the syntax of the culture to be happening. To really change things, you have to change the episteme, the matrix of the culture. And what Evo is doing is putting an Indian face to corporate capitalism. And that is even worse than putting a hard face to corporate capitalism, which is its real face. It's a disguise.
If you think that "development" means to have malls and to bring WalMart and to bring Starbucks—got to hell! I don’t want development!
But is Evo doing that?
Evo is doing precisely that!
He kicked McDonald's out of the country, no?
McDonald's was going anyway! McDonald’s left on its own, before Evo, because McDonald's was not making money. That's why McDonald’s left.
You have a Starbucks in La Paz?
It's coming. It's coming, and it's not Evo's fault. But he’s not putting any obstacles to corporations. And what’s even worse—because with Starbucks you can either go or not go—but if a mining company is contaminating the water you drink, you have to drink it. And his new Mining Law is resulting in exactly that.
Evo's whole program is based on the idea of centralization of the state and making the state stronger. And what I think makes Bolivia such a special case in terms of indigeneity is the fact that we’re very decentralized. There is a lot of locality, community, networking—and, at the same time, the ability of crossing borders between localities. What they call the "Gas War" happened because many, many local constituencies and groupings came to the same conclusion. That’s why one little spark set the whole thing ablaze. Because the readiness was there at the local level.
Radio was very important in coordinating a decentralized movement. A network of small transmitters, basically under the control of the left-wing clergy. But there is a big struggle underway now for the independence of this network from the government. There has been a lot prevendalismo [patronage]. They have been trying to buy them, more or less. Giving concessions in expectation of loyalty. And there is a lot more surveillance in Aymara—previously, there wasn't.
Evo recently gave the COB a gift of several SUVs and a hotel. Does he want the COB to become an entrepreneur? Or is he so machista that he expects them to use the hotels for their affairs? Oh, shit!
But the COB has not always been a part of Evo's machine...
Not always, no. But he has realized that he has to neutralize the COB. Because when he raised the gasoline prices, the COB was part of the uprising. Since then, they have learned to sobornar, to bribe the COB leadership, so that they keep quiet.
So, we have to prepare a people's revolution...
What does that mean?
I am very familiar with the history of my country. So I know that it will happen again. The leadership will distance itself from the grassroots, and the gap will get bigger and bigger and bigger, and a moment will arrive when the grassroots sees another converging of agendas and networking begins, and... wham! We will throw Evo to the garbage!
In favor of what?
Well, that’s the risk of every revolution. Probably we will have civil strife and a lot of fragmentation, and rising and falling of caudillos... Or, we will have right-wing electoral politics capitalizing from the disgust of the people. Now, both these scenarios are very bad. I'm not telling you that I support that. I'm telling you that it is likely to happen. I am recognizing, sadly, what a huge, historic opportunity has been squandered. With so much pain, I say this.
In 1998, I marched with Evo Morales. He led a march od cocaleros from Chapare to La Paz. I joined them near Oruro. In Qalamarka, which has historical significance. Because in the March for Life in 1986, against the privatization of the mines, the march was stopped at Qalamarka. And the local communities welcomed us with food and shelter.
So at first, I held out hope that Evo was Indian enough to counteract the influence of the people around him...
But you still hold out hope that there can be some kind of transformative process?
Under Evo? No. But in Bolivia? Always. In Latin America? Always. I will always have hope of that. Because hope makes things happen!
Do you believe that an indigenous government is possible? Or do you think that it's a contradiction in terms?
You caught me there. That, I have to think a lot. Because there are different scales of government. At certain levels of the scale, you can have self-government, like the Zapatistas' caracoles. But beyond that, it is much more difficult—ever more difficult. If you are talking about a nation-state—even a small one like Bolivia, with 10 million people—you are talking about a centralization of force that is beyond the will of the people. It is even beyond the will of the individual. It is like a machine, a whirlpool, a black hole, that concentrates so much... That is the historical construction of the colonial state. And that historical construction, I don't know how to dismantle. I think that dismantling it is a daily process.
A daily process?
Yes. We will never give up trying to do that—even though you know it's impossible. Because you know if you don't do that, you will be swallowed. So at least you have you and certain friends around you resisting the swallowing force of the state. And then you become an anarchist, more and more.
Anarchism is the link between community and revolution. Because Marxism and community didn't get along, when I was 30 years old and the discussion was totally different than today. The Berlin Wall hadn't fallen, the left was totally sure the proletarians were the vanguard of the revolution. It was in the early '70s that I left the city and went to work in the country that I realized the left had no idea what a worker-peasant alliance meant.
Where did you go?
I went to Apollo, a Quechua region in the far north of La Paz [department].
In addition to the urban-rural divide, there has been a divide between the indigenous movements of the Altiplano and those of the lowland rainforest...
I think the lowland movement is very important, politically, epistemologically, culturally, and I will support them. But I have my criticisms. No indigenous movement up to now has fully acknowledged the difference that women make. Until that happens, we will keep repeating the male-centered idea that leadership is words. Leadership is not example, it is not doing, it is political specialization. Political specialists. And what do they do? They sit and talk.
How do you respond to the criticism that the indigenous opposition, like CONAMAQ, have allowed themselves to become tools of the right and of imperialism?
No, no, no. I have a much deeper criticism of CONAMAQ! Their leaders receive money from solidarity networks in the North. And solidarity networks in the North act out of guilt. And that makes for a vertical relationship. But Evo and his supporters received funds from those same organizations for years and years! All the money they received to build their party and take power came from the same people that now fund CONAMAQ! The Danes, the Swedish, some gringos... They all funded Evo. But now that he has power, he gets money from gas and oil. He now has another funding agency, called the Bolivian state! So it is hypocritical to accuse CONAMAQ of something that have done themselves.
In the indigenous movements that have gained ground in Bolivia over the past 10 or 15 years, do you see a link back to the old anarchist movements?
¡Totalmente! There is a rebirth of anarchism that we are seeing, and not only in Bolivia. My generation knew very little of anarchism, we just had a few hints. But I was very rebellious, even within the left, because I just hated to be commanded by these stupid males. It was an intuitive anarchism. I didn't realize it back then. But the new generation, the generation of my children—they realize it.
Are they consciously anarchist?
Of course! They paint the "A," they do punk...
Yes, but that's urban youth. I mean in the indigenous movements...
They are more autonomist than anarchist. And I am an autonomist. I am not a doctrinaire anarchist. I am not indoctrinated, I am not a missionary. I don't want to convince anybody of what I think.
Oh? You have a point of view, and you express it very strongly...
Of course, but I am not recruiting anybody. It is auto-convocado... I call myself to action. I do not accept to receive a call from without. Throughout Bolivia, there are asambleas auto-convocadas—self-called assemblies, against mining and so on.
But I think anarchism is a very valid option. The anarchists I studied did not believe in a separation of intellectual and manual labor. And all my work in Bolivia today is based on that idea. And today we are adding a reconnection with the rituals and the indigenous way of life. Because the anarchists were totally atheistic, and I don't like that. That’s why we call ourselves anarcho-ch'ixi—stained anarchists. Our anarchism is not pure. It is stained with indigeneity. It is stained with feminism. It is stained with ecology. It is even stained with religiosity, with spirituality.
What do you mean by religiosity and spirituality?
I find everything very spiritual. Everything speaks to me. The Pachamama speaks to me. I would never throw away a potato that is deformed, because the Earth gives you meaning through the potato's shape. Here, the supermarkets throw away the irregular potatoes. Does that mean that Pachamama does not speak to New Yorkers? No, she speaks to New Yorkers! It gives them messages. Lots of cockroaches. [Laughs] They are after your waste. That's a signal from the Mother Earth.
Of what?
Of her as a living being, that knows better than you or me, because she has lived longer. We are the wink of a star in the huge enormity of cosmic time. And she knows those rhythms of cosmic time.
What does that have to do with the roaches in my apartment?
That is a signal that we have to take care of our own waste! One of the most revolutionary things you can do in this time is to recycle, and not misuse the gifts of the Earth. And not to waste so much food.
The entire world economy is predicated on waste.

Yes! It is irrational! That's what makes me suffer so much.

Tuesday, September 2, 2014

1536. Book Review: 2052: A Global Forecast for the Next Forty Years

By Michael Marien, Cadmus, October 6, 2012

2052: A Global Forecast for the Next Forty Years is a report to the CoR commemorating the 40th anniversary of The Limits to Growth, written by one of the four original authors. This broad forecast is “an informed guess tracing the big lines in what I see as the probable global evolution toward 2052…the most likely global roadmap to 2052 so that I would know what I am in for.” Since publication of The Limits to Growth in 1972, “humanity remains in solid overshoot…and we can discern the early signs of the coming gradual destruction of the ecosystem” (p.xv).
1. Five Big Issues toward 2052
“The big question is how fast the transition to sustainability will happen…the sustainability revolution has started, but is still in its infancy” (p13). The transition will require a fundamental change to a number of systems that govern current world developments. The next 40 years will be strongly influenced by how we handle five central issues:
• The End of Uncontrolled Capitalism: “slow and insufficient response to our challenges will dominate”; old-fashioned capitalism will survive in parts of the world, but will be strongly modified elsewhere;
• The End of Economic Growth: continuing technological advance will come to our partial rescue, but lack of space and cheap resources will force solutions with a lower ecological footprint to fit within the carrying capacity of the planet;
• The End of Slow Democracy: the fundamental question is whether democracies will agree on a stronger state and faster decision-making before we run into the brick wall of self-reinforcing climate change;
• Intergenerational Conflict: the era of generational harmony will come to an end, leading to slower economic growth and a smaller pie to share;
• The End of Stable Climate: negative impacts will be significant, but not disastrous before 2052; there will be more droughts and floods, and sea level will be 0.3 meters higher; “self-reinforcing climate change will be worry number one, with methane gas emissions from the melting tundra leading to further temperature increase, which in turn will melt even more tundra” (p47); the world will still be operational, but with higher operating costs and scary prospects for the rest of the 21st century.
2. The Global Forecast
Several Highlights of the forecast:
1. “global population will stagnate earlier than expected because fertility will fall dramatically in an increasingly urbanized population”;
2. “resource and climate problems will not become catastrophic before 2052” due to increased social investment, but there will be much unnecessary suffering;
3. the short-term focus of democracy and capitalism will ensure that “wise decisions needed for long-term well-being will not be made in time”;
4. “global population will be increasingly urban and unwilling to protect nature”;
5. the impact will differ among five regions analyzed here: “the most surprising loser will be the current global economic elite, particularly the US…China will be the winner” (p355).
Some Details of the forecast:
• Disparities:The world in 2052 will be one of huge regional and class differences; there will be social friction because of distributional inequity; regional variations in increased temperature will range from 0oC to >4oC;
• World Population: Continuing decline in fertility, only partly offset by a continuing rise in life expectancy, will cause “global population to reach a maximum of some 8.1 billion people in the early 2040s,”thereafter “declining at 1% per year and it will be back to current levels (7 billion people) by 2075”(pp62-64);
• Workforce: Potential workforce will follow the pattern of population: it will first grow, then peak, and then start to decline; “the number of people aged 15 to 65 will peak some five years before the peak in total population”; thus, the support burden will stay more or less constant because the rise in the number of the elderly population will be offset by a decline in the number of children;
• Productivity: Productivity growth will peak in the 2020s and then decline toward the middle of the century; in 2052, GDP per person will grow at only 1%/year; productivity growth will be hampered by erratic weather and growing inequity that will disturb the peace;
• GDP Growth: World GDP will be 2.2 times as big as today, enabling higher average consumption rates but also resulting in higher emissions and more rapid depletion of resources; world GDP will start to decline just after 2052, despite dramatic increases in resource and energy efficiency;
• Investment Growth/Consumption Decline: Emerging problems will mean increased investment, forced or voluntary; this will take up a larger share of GDP, lowering the share available for consumption; investment is currently 25% of GDP and will need to be increased to >30%; “global consumption will grow toward stagnation in 2040 and begin to fall around 2050”;
• Rising Costs: New costs will emerge, e.g.: substitutes for scarce resources, solutions for dangerous emissions, replacements for ecological services such as water that were formerly free, protections against future climate damage like sea-level rise, rebuilding real estate and infrastructure destroyed by extreme weather, and maintaining armed forces to defend resource supplies and fight off immigration; the cost of such developments “could easily exceed 10% (of world GDP) in the long run of a badly handled future”;
• Energy Use: About 87% of today’s global energy use is supplied by coal, oil, and gas; energy intensity will fall by a third by 2052 while the global economy doubles—thus energy use will grow by 50%;
• Changing Energy Mix: Use of conventional oil has probably peaked, and peaks in both coal and gas use are expected before 2040 due to very rapid increase in use of renewable energy, which will grow from 8% of energy use in 2010 to 37% in 2050 (this shift will be slowed by the cheap intermediary solution of replacing coal with gas); the nuclear share of world energy will be one-half of today’s contribution—below 3%;
• Emissions: CO2 emissions from energy will peak in 2030, but overall emissions from energy use will still be 40% above global emissions in 1990; carbon capture and storage (CCS) will have a limited role in reducing CO2 emissions in 2052, dwarfed by increases in energy efficiency and renewables;
• Rising Temperature: “Average temperature will go from plus 0.8oC relative to preindustrial times in 2012 to plus 2.0oC in 2052, and a maximum of plus 2.8oC in 2080” (p241). In 2052, “there will be visible climate damage and growing worry about the future” (p119);
• Urbanization: “More people will seek shelter inside modern city walls, leaving a small rural population to fend for itself against increasingly violent weather and ecosystem change”;
• Adaptation: “By 2052, voters in the well-governed part of the world will have seen enough damage to be genuinely concerned about the possibility of self-reinforcing climate change in the last half of the century”; a tremendous effort will finally be under way to reduce emissions for the benefit of all, in parallel with an extraordinary effort to adapt to the new climate;
• Food: Production will continue to grow in the decades ahead, and Homo affluensiswill have moved down the food chain to less refined foods; but food will be unevenly distributed then as now, and many will starve; as we get closer to 2052, agriculture will be increasingly affected by climate change; use of genetically modified organisms will increase but prove unsustainable in the long run;
• Managed Degrowth: Forward-thinking regions within some nations will increasingly focus on managing their inevitable degrowth by trying to build regional resilience focusing on local food and energy;
• Sustainability Paradigm: Growth in GDP will remain a central ambition in most countries for many decades; “the sustainability crowd is still a tiny minority, and the paradigm shift is probably several decades into the future”; by 2052 global society will increasingly be seeking sustainable well-being based on planet-friendly energy and resources;
• Modified Capitalism: Global society will interfere, to some extent, with operation of the free market to ensure that investments flow toward what is publicly needed rather than what is most profitable; thus, under “modified capitalism,” a stronger role for wise government;
• China as World Leader:“China will be the world leader in 2052…the premier driving force on the planet,”with a population 3.5 times bigger than the US, an economy nearly 2.5 times larger, and consumption >70% of the US equivalent (the US could maintain its hegemony, but its system of governance does not seem capable of quick, bipartisan decision making);
• Jobs: There will be as many jobs in the future as in the past, relative to the workforce; “I see little reason why there should be higher levels of unemployment in the future”;
• Wild Cards: Some wild cards: abundant oil or gas making new renewables less competitive, a financial meltdown, nuclear war, a deadly disease killing two billion people, collapse of ecological services such as bee pollination, counter-revolution in China leading to lower emissions and reduced investment in green technology, a citizen’s rebellion in the US that fundamentally changes the tax laws, a dedicated global effort to stop climate change.
3. Regional Futures
• The US: The economy will grow at an average rate of only 0.6%/year over the next 40 years (reaching zero by 2052), because it is already a mature economy with high productivity, it has not been investing sufficiently (investment is only 16% of GDP-less than two-thirds the 24% global average), and the US must repay the debt run up over the last decades; as a consequence, “per capita consumption levels in 2052 will be some 10% lower than in 2010” (p267); energy use will be more or less constant, with a huge shift from coal and oil to gas, and renewables as the largest source of energy by 2052; emissions from energy use will decline nearly one-half by 2052—35% below 1990 levels;
• China: “Tremendous economic growth” is expected over the next 40 years, averaging 3.5% per year but much higher in the next 20 years. Despite high savings and investment (currently at >35%), consumption per capita will grow fivefold by 2052. But China’s “footprint on the planet will be substantial,” and climate change will create significant problems of sea level rise and desertification; energy use will more than double by the 2030s; agricultural output will increase by 25% before it peaks in the 2030s and starts to decline;
• OECD-less-US: The old industrialized market economies other than the US have more than twice as much population as the US; population will remain constant until 2025 and then start a slow decline so that it will be 10% lower in 2052 than today; aging will lead to an increase in the support burden by some 10% after 2030; total GDP will peak in the early 2030s at some 15% above current level; very fast growth in renewables will reduce gas use after 2035, and the nuclear industry will be in steady decline; overall emissions will be 55% below the current rate and 50% below 1990 emissions;
• BRISE: Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa and ten big emerging economies (Indonesia, Mexico, Vietnam, Turkey, Iran, Thailand, Ukraine, Argentina, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia) had a total of 2.4 billion people in 2010 (half in India) and will peak by 2052 at well below 3 billion; collective GDP in the 14 countries will triple by 2052, with per capita GDP growing from $6K to $16K; emissions from fossil fuels will not plateau until the 2040s despite efficiency increases; the region is subject to potential climate disasters (e.g., inundation of SE Asian countries by melting glaciers in Tibet, drying out of the rain forest in Brazil, insects killing the boreal forest in Russia); in sum, the region will be “in lively development” over the next 40 years, but with widely varying quality in governance;
• Rest of the World: This eclectic blend of 186 countries had a total population of 2.1 billion in 2010, which will peak in the 2050s at 3.1 billion due to education and contraception; GDP will grow three times its current size by 2052, and GDP will grow from $4K to $8K. Food production will outpace population growth, and the energy system will grow gradually. The area of cultivated land will start to decline around 2040, and the ROW region will need food imports by 2052.
4. “Overshoot and Collapse” Updated
The concern about “overshoot and collapse” was first articulated in the 1972 Limits to Growth report. This forecast chooses “Scenario 3” from The Limits to Growth, which describes a shortage of nonrenewable resources and dangerous pollution postponed until the mid-21st century due to application of technology. “The story of the 2052 forecast is one of overshoot caused by delayed societal response to greenhouse gas emissions being allowed to increase beyond sustainable levels for generations. It is a story of lower consumption growth (and in the rich world consumption decline) resulting partly from the costs of trying to mitigate the climate problem” (p305). The world will experience numerous cases of overshoot and decline before 2052, but it will not experience overshoot and collapse before 2052, when average per capita consumption will peak, and global average temperature will surpass the danger threshold of 2oC. This forecast of developments to 2052 is “quite gloomy,” but “not catastrophic” (p323).
The human ecological footprint has expanded continuously since 1972, and will become heavier. The human footprint can expand beyond planetary limits. When the footprint approaches a limit, society normally reacts, but only after some delay. “Currently the human demand on the biosphere exceeds the global bio-capacity by some 40%” (p311). The world of 2012 is in overshoot, but this is a temporary phenomenon. In each instance of overshoot, humanity has to move back into sustainable territory, either through “managed decline” or by “collapse induced by nature.” The world has not yet experienced large-scale environmental collapse. The challenge is solvable in principle, but hard to address in practice.
5. What We Should Do
“It took 30 years from when the current success measure of GDP was invented in the 1930s to regular use for policy guidance in the 1960s; we now need to institute 'monthly measures of national well-being in much less than 30 years'.”
The final chapter discusses what “global society ideally should have done”: increase energy efficiency, shift to renewable energy, stop destroying forests, and invest in carbon capture and storage. All of these actions are technically feasible and not especially expensive. If properly executed, the effort would not reduce employment. With a lower discount rate and more realistic pricing, many climate-friendly solutions are competitive at current prices.
“The saddest aspect of my forecast is probably the fact that there will be no wage rise—and possibly a decline in real disposable income—in the rich world over the next 40 years…for most who are younger and poorer, this will seem like an ominous future” (p327). The answer is to decide on a different success criterion, choosing well-being rather than material gain as the appropriate goal. It took 30 years from when the current success measure of GDP was invented in the 1930s to regular use for policy guidance in the 1960s; we now need to institute “monthly measures of national well-being in much less than 30 years” (p328).
This said, 21 provocative “pieces of personal advice” are offered:
1. Focus on satisfaction as a core goal, rather than income (e.g., maximizing life satisfaction as long as income stays above a certain threshold);
2. Don’t acquire a taste for things that will disappear (the future will be urban, dense, and crowded; don’t develop a taste for life in suburbia);
3. Invest in great electronic entertainment and learn to prefer it (virtual worlds will increasingly compete with the real world for our attention; fascination with the real appears to be an acquired taste, and tastes are changing);
4. Don’t teach your children to love the wilderness (humanity is eliminating wild nature from the planet; those who have been taught to love wilderness will have fewer places to go, farther away; however, love of untouched nature is largely an acquired taste);
5. If you like great biodiversity, see it now (despite continued efforts to conserve and restore biodiversity, climate change will take its toll);
6. Visit world attractions before they are ruined by the crowd—or increasing social unrest (cultural diversity is seemingly disappearing even faster than biological diversity);
7. Live in a place that is not overly exposed to climate change (the general picture is well-known: avoid traditional flood zones, sea level locations, areas that are already too hot or too dry, and mountains that are currently frozen—which will “give off landslides when the permafrost lifts 200 vertical meters by 2052);
8. Move to a country that is capable of decision-making (democracy and the free market have solved a number of complex problems in past generations, but society will be facing problems not easily solved by these well-tested means, notably global warming; thus “choose as your new homeland a country that is capable of acting proactively in the decades ahead”);
9. Know the unsustainabilities that threaten your quality of life (map out the problems your location will face in the next decade or two—both physical threats such as erratic weather, brownouts, and migration flows and non-material threats such as higher taxes, new legislation, and cultural decline);
10. Get an education (it guarantees a more interesting life and ensures greater choice; if unemployed, fight for your rights, because “unemployment is a distributional issue” that can always be solved by changing national policy, e.g.: tax the rich and/or print more money so as to create public employment);
11. Encourage your children to learn Mandarin Chinese (more than 1.5 billion people already know this language, and it is important to have “direct access to the future hegemon”);
12. Stop believing that all growth is good (if you want to stay happy in the next 40 years, refine and revise your thinking about growth, because “a number of things are going to decline” for better and worse; “in the future growth won’t be generally good”;
13. Remember that fossil-based assets will lose their value (as global energy use peaks around 2040 and energy efficiency increases);
14. Invest in things that are not sensitive to social unrest (in that tensions will rise in the next several decades because of mounting inequities);
15. Do more than your fair share to promote sane perspective, policy, and practice in your communities, companies, and households;
16. In business, explore the most urgent unsustainabilities on the corporate radar—the first things that will go seriously wrong if the world evolves according to this forecast (the solution is not always unprofitable, e.g. Philips moved from producing cheap but energy-intensive light bulbs to much more intensive low-watt bulbs);
17. In business, don’t confuse growth in volume with growth in profits (e.g. windmills and photovoltaics are fast-growing markets but do not guarantee a profit because of too many investors);
18. In politics, support only initiatives with short-term benefits if you want reelection. The only leaders able to force wise long-term policy onto their people seem to be the EU and China’s Communist Party;
19. In politics, remember that the future will be dominated by physical limits (future politicians will have to use much time on issues of depletion and pollution—issues that won’t go away for a long time, such as land for agriculture and forests, freshwater, oceans; the aim is to reduce energy intensity and climate intensity);
20. In politics, accept that equal access to limited resources will trump free speech (in a resource-constrained world, allowing scarce resources to be in the hands of a minority will lose legitimacy; “over the next 40 years politicians will increasingly be pushed to consider the rights of future generations…hopefully by the end of the century there will be an International Court of Intergenerational Justice” (p350); in an increasingly crowded world, “collective well-being will be more important than individual rights”);
21. As a final word of encouragement, “don’t let the prospect of a suboptimal long-term future kill your hope…even if we do not succeed in our fight for a better world, there will still be a world with a future—just less beautiful and less harmonious than it could have been” (p351).
6. Comment
This 40-year forecast is very useful and highly provocative. It is particularly useful for pointing to the necessary rise of social investment in response to global warming that will displace some consumption. The 21 pieces of advice for individuals and organizations are especially thought-provoking. A close reading is strongly advised for anyone concerned about world futures and the turbulent decades ahead, although everyone will surely find some points of disagreement.
At first glance, this report appears to be unique. However, it is useful to contrast 2052 with2025: Scenarios of US and Global Society Reshaped by Science and Technology by Joseph F. Coates, John B. Mahaffie, and Andy Hines (Oakhill Press, 1996/508p), an equally audacious work that made 107 generally optimistic assumptions about the future, mostly about technological progress (e.g, many natural disasters mitigated or prevented by 2025, and, less probably, 120mpg cars in widespread use). Global warming is mentioned, but is not a central theme as in Randers' forecast. In Chapter 8 on “Managing the Planet,” Coates et al. offer a hopeful scenario where “sustainability has emerged as a core global value” (p227), which is far from the case today. Could Randers also be overly optimistic?
Randers' forecast is assisted (but perhaps complicated) by thirty-four “2052 Glimpses” of 3-4 pages each by writers such as Herman Daly, Jonathan Porritt, Mathis Wackernagel, John Elkington, Paul Gilding, and original Limits to Growth co-author William W. Behrens. These brief contributions, which Randers endorses fully or in part, appear throughout the text, and are listed together on pp359-365, but not in the table of contents.
Most important, some of the 2052 assumptions and oversights deserve highlighting and critique.
The most questionable assumption is the startling core forecast of world population peaking at 8.1 billion in the early 2040s, and then declining to the present level of 7 billion by 2075. Randers justifies this by assuming rapid decline in fertility rates offsetting more gradual decline in mortality rates. But decline in fertility may be slower than expected in Muslim areas and among religious fundamentalists, while decline in mortality may be faster by conquering cancer and other diseases, and perhaps even aging itself. In contrast, the just-issued 2012 World Population Data Sheet, by veteran demographer Carl Haub of the Population Reference Bureau, projects world population at 9.624 billion in mid-2050, a slight increase from Haub’s 2010 projection of 9.485 billion (see Global Foresight Books' Book of the Month, Aug 2010). The difference of >1.5 billion in Randers' and Haub’s forecasts is significant, and deserves debate. (Also note that Haub’s forecast for 2050 has been slowly creeping upward over the last decade!)
Randers' assumption of 2oC temperature rise by 2052 with a maximum of 2.8oC in 2080 may be somewhat conservative. See, for example, the discussion by Clive Hamilton in Requiem for a Species (Global Foresight Books' Book of the Month, May 2010), reporting that the new consensus among a select group of worried climate scientists, revised upward, is for a warming of a very worrisome 4oC or more by the 2070s or 2080s, or possibly the 2060s. Hamilton also cites Hans Schellnhuber, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, warning that if much of the methane trapped in permafrost is released, “we will be toast.” Randers makes some reference to this trend (which is already apparent), but is more restrained.
Randers does briefly mention several negative “wild cards” such as methane (more accurately a “not-so-wild card” possibility, if not a probable development). But wild cards can also be positive, and Randers does not mention possible game-changing contributions that might be made by nanotechnology and new energy technologies such as ultra-low-cost designed biofuel from algae, or small modular nuclear reactors. Similar to widespread release of methane, the possibility of major new technology is also a “not-so-wild card”— a critical distinction that, unfortunately, is not made in the futures literature (a major development of 10-30% probability is far different than a “wild card” of literally 2% probability, or a “black swan” event that is even more improbable).
Randers' assumption that unemployment will more or less stay at current levels should also be questioned, as well as his lack of attention to potential climate tipping points.

Anyway, despite these complaints, Randers' forecast deserves widespread attention, and will hopefully accelerate the long-term sustainability trend and rekindle attention to the limits to undifferentiated growth as defined by obsolete industrial-era measures.
Michael Marien WAAS Fellow; Director, Global Foresight Books
Email: mmarien@twcny.rr.com, Website: www.globalforesightbooks.org

1535. A Summary of 2052: A Global Forecast for the Next 40 Years

By Jorgen Randers, 2052: A Global Forecast for the Next 40 Years, December 2, 2013


The Limits to Growth study in 1972 addressed the grand question of how humanity would adapt to the physical limitations of planet Earth. Its authors, of whom I was one, offered these projections about the time period we have now entered:

• During the first half of the twenty-first century the ongoing growth in the human ecological footprint will stop.
• Humanity’s resource use and environmental impact will be brought down to levels that can be sustained in the long run.

We wrote that these milestones would come to pass in one of many ways—for example through catastrophic “overshoot and collapse” or through well-managed “peak and decline.”
In 2052, I offer my status report—driven by curiosity, and a desire to understand whether, knowing what we know, humanity will rise to the occasion and effectively address the unprecedented challenges we now face. So, 2052 represents my forecast for the next forty years, and based on the projections of other scientists, futurists, and thinkers.
And, here in a nutshell is what I concluded. The process of adapting to the limitations of the planet has indeed started. Over the next forty years, efforts to limit the human ecological footprint will continue. Future growth in global population and GDP will be constrained in surprising ways, by rapid fertility decline as a result of urbanization, productivity decline as a result of social unrest, and continuing poverty among the poorest 2 billion world citizens. At the same time there will be impressive advances in resource efficiency and climate-friendly solutions. There will also be an increased focus on human well-being rather than on per capita income growth.

Still, based on the extensive database that underpins 2052, it appears that the human response will be too slow. The most critical factor will be greenhouse gas emissions from human activities. These emissions will remain so high that our grandchildren most likely will have to live with self-reinforcing, and hence runaway, global warming in the second half of the twenty-first century.


Main messages of 2052
• The global population will stagnate earlier than expected because fertility will fall dramatically in the increasingly urbanized population. Population will peak at 8.1 billion people just after 2040 and then decline.
• The global GDP will grow more slowly than expected, because of the lower population growth and declining growth rates in (gross labour) productivity. Global GDP will reach 2.2 times current levels around 2050.
• Productivity growth will be slower than in the past because economies
are maturing, because of increased social strife, and because of negative interference from extreme weather.
• The growth rate in global consumption will slow because a greater share of GDP will have to be allocated to investment—in order to solve the problems created by climate change, resource scarcity, and biodiversity loss. Global consumption of goods and services will peak in 2045.
• As a consequence of increased social investment in the decades ahead (albeit often involuntary and in reaction to crisis), resource and climate problems will not become catastrophic before 2052. But there will be much unnecessary suffering from unabated climate damage around the middle of the century.
• The lack of a dedicated and forceful human response in the first half of the twenty-first century will put the world on a dangerous and unstoppable track toward self-reinforcing global warming in the second half of the twenty-first century.
• Slow growth in per capita consumption in much of the world (and stagnation in the rich world) will lead to increased social tension and conflict, which will further reduce orderly productivity growth.
• The short-term focus of capitalism and democracy will ensure that the wise decisions needed for long-term well-being will not be made in time.
• The global population will be increasingly urban and unwilling to protect nature for its own sake. Biodiversity will suffer.
• The impact will differ among the five regions analyzed in the book: the United States; the other OECD nations (including the European Union, Japan, and Canada among other industrialized nations); China; BRISE (Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa and ten other big emerging economies); and the Rest of the World (the 2.1 billion people at the bottom of the income ladder).
• The most surprising loser will be the current global economic elite, particularly the United States (which will experience stagnant per capita consumption for the next generation). China will be the winner. BRISE will make progress. The Rest of the World will remain poor. All—and particularly the poor—will live in an increasingly disorderly and climate-damaged world.
• The world in 2052 will certainly not be uniform or flat—the sentiment and conditions in the five regions will differ dramatically.