Showing posts with label Technical solutions to social problems. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Technical solutions to social problems. Show all posts

Friday, October 7, 2016

2461. Why Carbon Capture Is No Panacea

By Andy Skuce, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, October 4, 2016
The The CarbFix I pilot plant in Iceland in 2014. Photo: Juerg Matter.
A recent experiment in Iceland garnered a lot of press lately, including The New York Times and the “Latest News” section of Science. It’s easy to see why: Scientists showed that carbon dioxide injected more than 1,000 feet underground into formations of basalt rock—which much of Iceland is made of—reacted very quickly with the minerals present in the rock to form new minerals that remain stable essentially forever. Chemically speaking, they turned carbon dioxide (CO2) into calcite (CaCO3), the principle constituent of marble and limestone. Or, at the risk of oversimplifying, the researchers converted gas into stone, using what is essentially soda water.
At first glance, this approach promises to achieve a long-sought goal: to remove carbon dioxide emissions—one of the chief greenhouse gases behind global warming—from the atmosphere, and lock them away deep underground in a carbon “sink,” where they can do no more harm. Known as carbon capture and sequestration, or CCS, the work in Iceland with basalts marks an important technical advance in a line of attack that scientists have long pursued.  
The timing couldn’t be better. For years, many scenarios used in the computerized simulations of carbon emissions mitigation have called for a big contribution from CCS. Indeed, the models used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) require the large-scale deployment of this technology, while the Paris Agreement specifically calls for “removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century.” This language stems from the growing recognition that the world is likely to overshoot the carbon budget required to hold the increase in global average surface temperatures to “well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels” and avoid the problems of rising sea levels, droughts, extinction events, mass migrations, and other disastrous consequences of climate change. As a matter of fact, of the 400 IPCC scenarios that keep warming below the Paris agreement target, 344 involve the deployment of negative emissions technologies, wrote Kevin Anderson in Nature Geoscience.
But is carbon capture and sequestration ready for prime time? Will CCS technology work on a large scale? How expensive is it, how practical, and how soon can it be deployed? Is carbon capture and sequestration—also known as carbon capture and storage—about to take off in a big way, as some articles in the popular press imply? Or is it more a case of something that is barely out of the proof of concept stage, with years (or decades) of further R&D needed—time that we do not have? In other words, while it is important to continue studying this approach, is carbon capture and sequestration in basalts something more likely to prove useful in the more distant future—and not on a scale and a time frame that will be anywhere nearly as effective in our lifetimes as cutting back on carbon emissions and switching to renewable energy?
Sequestering CO2 in basalts. To get a better idea of the current situation, we first need to  better understand the CCS process in these rock formations.
Basalts are natural CO2 sequestration sites. Geologists estimate that exposed basalts, especially in the tropics, absorb about 180 million tons of carbon dioxide every year, while basalts on the sea floor react with dissolved CO2 in the seawater to take up about 150 million tons of carbon dioxide annually—although there is considerable uncertainty in both estimates. These processes, along with other weathering activity, are important for absorbing the CO2 emissions from volcanoes (estimated at around 500 million tons per year) on geological timescales. Weathering and volcanic emissions over the past 10,000 years have at least provided a stable equilibrium of CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere of around 280 parts per million—until the Industrial Revolution came along, that is.
Although the eruptions from volcanoes appear mighty, their outgassing is dwarfed by the human emissions of CO2 caused by the burning of fossil fuels, which are approximately 100 times greater than these natural processes. Eventually, weathering reactions with minerals will take up the excess human emissions and return the atmosphere to a pre-industrial condition, but this could take hundreds of thousands of years—essentially forever on a human timescale. For rock weathering to help solve the climate crisis in the immediate coming decades, a way has to be found to greatly speed up these reactions. One solution may be to expose the rocks to concentrated doses of CO2 at high temperatures, in the presence of water—which is what the scientists in Iceland did.
In a peer-reviewed article in the journal Science, Juerg Matter—associate professor of geoengineering at the University of Southampton—and his colleagues reported on their experiment, in which volcanically-sourced CO2 was dissolved in water and injected into basalts at depths between 400 and 800 meters. Using isotopic and chemical tracers, they were able to demonstrate that 95 percent of the CO2 they injected had become mineralized in the space of two years—much faster than expected. Once CO2 has reacted with the calcium, magnesium, and iron-rich minerals naturally present in the basalt, stable and benign carbonate minerals like calcite are formed. This process holds out the hope that CO2 sequestration can be permanent, and that long-term monitoring can be dispensed with. This is in line with some of the latest thinking about solving the climate crisis.
Why CCS? According to the International Energy Agency: “Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is the only technology able to deliver significant emissions reductions from the use of fossil fuels.”
And Oxford University climate scientist Myles Allen claims: “A global ban on fossil fuels is neither affordable nor enforceable, so capture and disposal of CO2 is the only option. Assuming we don’t want to turn the world over to cultivating biofuels and resort to eating insects, then there will always be some uses of fossil fuels for which there is no effective non-fossil substitute, much as environmentalists hate to admit it.” 
One major reason for the pro-CCS enthusiasm is that, according to the modellers cited in the latest IPCC report, deploying CCS on a large scale is cost effective. In cases where atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are limited to 450 parts per million, mitigation costs increase by 138 percent, compared to the baseline scenarios in which no CCS is deployed.
But there are naysayers, such as climate expert Joe Romm, who wrote in an article for Climate Progress: “CCS simply hasn’t yet proven to be practical, affordable, scalable, and ready to be ramped up rapidly.”
So, who’s right?
Obstacles. There certainly are some key snags that need to be overcome if CCS is to be used on a wide scale in basalts. (There are several different ways in which to approach carbon capture and storage; we are focusing primarily here on the method that has caught the most attention lately: converting carbon dioxide gas to solid form in basalt rock formations.)
For one thing, whatever type of CCS technology that is used, human beings would have to develop a huge carbon capture and sequestration industry that is about triple the size of the entire current fossil fuel industry. And we’d have to do it fast—at a rate of about one new CCS plant completed every working day for the next 70 years, or from now until the year 2087.
For another thing, the CCS-in-basalts process used in the Iceland experiment requires almost unimaginable amounts of water. And once the water and CO2 have been processed, an equally large area must be found to store that volume of resulting material. And at this point it is unknown how well the results in Iceland can be applied at large scale in other locales.
Let us examine some of these problems in more detail, one at a time.
A huge new industry to capture and store carbon would have be created from scratch, very fast. As I wrote elsewhere earlier this year, there are currently only 14 CCS plants beyond the proof of concept stage, of any kind, in operation in the world. Each one has an average capacity of about two million metric tons of carbon dioxide per year. That means that if we were to use this CCS-in-basalts approach, we would have to scale up phenomenally fast, if we are to meet the role of carbon capture and storage in some IPCC scenarios.
For example, a prominent published model that limits warming to 2 degrees Celsius envisages primary energy use in the year 2100 to be approximately 25 percent renewables and nuclear energy; 15 percent fossil fuels without CCS (mostly natural gas); and 60 percent fossil fuels and bioenergy with CCS. In this model, 30 billion metric tons of CO2 from fossil fuels would be sequestered annually in 2090, in addition to 10 billion tons of CO2 from biofuels. To put these figures in perspective, the mass of all coal, oil, and gas currently extracted from the Earth amounts to around 12 billion tons. If CCS is to provide a solution to the climate crisis, then over the span of 60 to 70 years, a new industry about three times the size (measured as mass) of the current fossil fuel industry would have to be developed.
That means that if we started in 2020 we would have to build 250 CCS plants the size of the current ones every year, or about one every working day for 70 years. University of Manitoba energy historian Vaclav Smil has argued convincingly that it is impossible to imagine that such a rapid transformation of the global energy system could take place. Smil says "... [I]n order to sequester just a fifth of current CO2 emissions we would have to create an entirely new worldwide absorption-gathering compression-transportation- storage industry whose annual throughput would have to be about 70 percent larger than the annual volume now handled by the global crude oil industry, whose immense infrastructure of wells, pipelines, compressor stations and storage took generations to build.”
The process requires almost unimaginable amounts of water. The technique used in Iceland requires huge amounts of water, approximately 25 tons of water for every ton of CO2. (Using less water and higher concentrations of CO2 would run the risk of the CO2 coming out of solution at the temperatures and pressures of the disposal zone.)
To use a real-world example: One of the best onshore candidate areas for basalt sequestration in the USA is the Columbia River Plateau, located in eastern Washington, northeast Oregon, and western Idaho. As an illustration of how much water might be required, if attempts were made to sequester all US carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels (5.2 billion metric tons in 2014), some 130 billion tons of water would be used, or approximately half the annual flow of the Columbia River(240 billion tons). Of course, sequestration on such a scale would never be attempted there, but the calculation at least points up the potential conflict between future projects and agriculture in this semi-arid region, which depends on irrigation from river water.
And sites undersea aren’t much better.
The most extensive area of basaltic rock on the planet lies on the ocean floor, in places such as the Juan de Fuca plate in the Pacific Ocean west of Washington, Oregon, and Northern California. One advantage of offshore sequestration is, of course, the ready supply of any amount of water needed. A second is that the basalts are capped by 400 to 800 meters of impermeable marine sediments that would provide a seal preventing any gas leaks. The size of this sequestration resource would provide for more than a century’s worth of capacity for current US emissions. Perhaps the biggest advantage of such a marine location is that there are no people living above the disposal site.
But there are considerable technical and financial problems to operating CCS plants offshore. The water in the area is more than 2700 meters deep, requiring the use of floating injection and drilling platforms. The most suitable areas are 200 to 400 kilometers from land, which means that long undersea CO2 pipelines would have to be built, in addition to any overland gathering systems. Even a test project along the lines of the Icelandic experiment would be very expensive.
We don’t know how well the results in Iceland can be applied elsewhere. Mineralization occurs so quickly that the pores and fractures near the injection site might clog up so swiftly that further injection in a scaled-up deployment could be hampered. Such complications could perhaps be overcome by drilling new wells or hydraulic fracture treatments. Then there’s the problem of magnitude: The Icelandic experiment is very much a pilot project and the amount of CO2 sequestered by it is small, just 220 metric tons. When that amount is scaled up to thousands or millions of tons, the rocks may react very differently. To make an impact on the global climate requires the technology to be scalable to billions of tons per year.
The consequences of injecting large volumes of fluid into geological formations are unknown. The usual, favored sequestration technology involves injecting CO2 into geologic formations such as depleted oil and gas fields, or saline sandstone reservoirs. In these cases, the carbon dioxide would be injected as a supercritical liquid—a phase having very low viscosity and a density about half that of water, rather than the carbon dioxide solution in water used in the Iceland experiment. Calculations based on the most detailed published two-degree mitigation scenario by Detlef van Vuuren and others at Utrecht University in 2011 estimate that the mass of carbon dioxide in need of disposal by the end of this century would be 40 billion metric tons annually. Converted to a supercritical fluid—in other words, into something that takes up even less space than the soda water experiment in Iceland—this would be would be more than 60 billion cubic meters per year. For comparison, this is about three times the average annual discharge of the Hudson River, or one-eighth the volume of Lake Erie. Even though the volume of the compressed carbon dioxide fluid is much less than the volume it takes up in the form of a gas at the surface, the quantities are still colossal.
And the consequences of injecting such large volumes of supercritical CO2 into geological formations are unknown. Displacement of existing fluids could create problems, including raising pore pressures and triggering earthquakes. Any disposal site would have to be monitored for leakage over centuries. Slow leakage would defeat the purpose of sequestration, while fast leakage could contaminate overlying aquifers. Catastrophic leakage could pose a health hazard. In view of this, it seems likely that large-scale onshore geological sequestration of CO2 would face just as much public resistance as hydrofracking for oil and gas extraction currently does.
There is currently no economic case for deploying CCS. There is at least one other hitch to the use of any kind of carbon capture and storage: The economics of CCS are marginal, even in cases where CO2 is stripped from natural gas—which has to be done anyway to make the gas saleable—and then injected into ailing oil fields to enhance recovery. To extract CO2 from the combustion exhausts of fossil fuel or biofuel power stations and sequester it can cost from $50 to $100 per ton of CO2. In the absence of carbon pricing or enhanced oil recovery, there is no economic case to be made for undertaking this. Private capital is likely to avoid funding CCS until there are clear signs that a high carbon price, or equivalent emissions cap regulations, are imminent.
More research needed. What all this means is that we should realize that there is a very long way to go before the technology to capture carbon and sequester it in basalt formations or other geological reservoirs can be considered feasible at the needed scale, despite the headlines. Given the formidable technical, political, and funding obstacles, it seems unlikely that this particular approach to carbon capture and storage will ever live up to the projections made by IPCC modellers. (In some parts of the world, CCS technology is a non-starter. As Juerg Matter told The Guardian: “In Europe you can forget about onshore CCS.”)
But despite that, pure research into carbon capture and storage should continue, even if the odds are long against the success of the large-scale use of this technology in basalt formations or other geological reservoirs in the coming decades.
Some application of CCS, in some form, is likely to eventually be necessary. To stabilize rising global temperatures requires not just greatly reducing emissions, but getting them to zero. Even if it were possible to greatly reduce emissions, the last few billion tons could be very hard to eliminate from processes like cement manufacture, agriculture, steel-making, some forms of transportation, and fossil-fuel back up for electrical generation to supplement renewable energy. To get to net zero will require at least some CCS and negative emission technologies.
CCS in conjunction with biomass burning, or air capture of CO2, appears to be one of the best bets for achieving negative emissions. There are other measures that can be taken at the margins, such as enhancing soil carbon take-up, and encouraging reforestation. But because of delays in reducing emissions, and the likely consequent overshoot in safe carbon emission budgets, there will be a need for a range of technologies capable of reducing the concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. But all negative emissions technologies will take time to implement, and time is the one commodity that humans are certainly squandering.
Eventually, negative emissions technologies, including CCS, may have to be developed and deployed as a kind of emergency planetary liposuction. But it would be far better to first reduce our diet of fossil fuels as quickly as possible through conservation, increased energy efficiency, and the deployment of emissions-free technologies.

Sunday, March 13, 2016

2243. Biofuel or Biofraud? The Vast Taxpayer Cost of Failed Cellulosic and Algal Biofuels

By Almuth Ersting, Indepedent Science News, March 13, 2016

Biofuels consumed today are usually ethanol made from the sugar in sugar cane (or sugar beet) or they may be made from starch in grains. In the US this is mostly corn starch. Alternatively, biodiesel may be made from plant oils such as soybean or canola oil.

Cellulosic biofuels, on the other hand, are biofuels made from crop residues (e.g. corn stover), wood, or whole plants, especially grasses (e.g. switchgrass). Cellulosic biofuels include cellulosic ethanol (made by isolating, breaking down and then fermenting the complex sugars in the cell walls of plants), as well as ‘drop in biofuels’. These biofuels are chemically almost identical to fossil-fuel based kerosene, diesel or gasoline.

In November 2014, cellulosic biofuel company KiOR filed for bankruptcy, having shut down their refinery in Columbus, Mississippi earlier that year. There have been many unsuccessful biofuel ventures of this type, but KiOR’s stands out for four reasons:

1)  They had sold the first-ever cellulosic biofuels made in a commercial-scale facility in the US and produced the first cellulosic gasoline ever accredited as such by the US Enviornmental Protection Agency (EPA);

2)  They were the highest valued ‘advanced’ biofuel company backed by venture capitalist Vinod Khosla and his company, Khosla Ventures, having been valued at over $1.5 billion when they launched on the stock market. Khosla has been one of the most influential advocates of cellulosic biofuels in the US.  Back in 2010, the EPA set a target for cellulosic ethanol, that relied almost entirely on Khosla’s promises about what another company he’d invested in – Cello Energy – could deliver. Cello Energy filed for bankruptcy that same year, after they had been found guilty of fraud;

3) KiOR had obtained a $75 million loan from the State of Mississippi of which they had repaid just $6 million by the time they filed for bankruptcy.  The Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood has described this as “one of the largest frauds ever perpetrated on the State of Mississippi.” He has initiated a fraud suit against former KiOR executives as well as against Vinod Khosla, alleging that they misled investors about the quantities and yields of biofuels they could achieve.  A separate class suit has been raised on behalf of shareholders who claim to have incurred financial losses because they bought shares as a result of misleading claims by KiOR executives and Vinod Khosla about the company’s achievements and capabilities.
4) As a result of the bankruptcy proceedings and the fraud suits, information about what went wrong are entering the public domain.

The Now-Bankrupt KiOR Site in Columbus, Mississippi 
The reasons behind KiOR’s failure are simple: Most of the time, they couldn’t get their technology to work enough to produce biofuels and when they did manage it, yields were far lower than KiOR had claimed.  The plant, built to produce 13 million gallons of biofuels a year, produced a mere 133,000 gallons in 2013, sold another 97,000 gallons in early 2014, and then shut down. KiOR had claimed to achieve a yield of 67 gallons from each ton of dry biomass and to be working towards a target of 90 gallons/ton. Yet according to internal documents cited in Mississippi’s lawsuit, KiOR’s actual yields remained a mere 20-22 gallons/ton.

The fraud for which Cello Energy was sued and ultimately convicted involved mislabelling fossil fuels as biofuels for ‘test’ programmes. KiOR on the other hand is alleged to have knowingly misled investors and possibly the Securities and Exchange Commission about the amount of biofuels they could produce and the yields they could gain.  Yet similarly hyped claims about ‘advanced biofuels’ are widespread and commonplace on different companies’ websites, in industry magazines and press releases.

A closer look at another cellulosic biofuels company – Red Rock Biofuels – suggests the federal government has not learned any lessons from KiOR or Cello, nor for that matter any of the other failed cellulosic or algae biorefineries. They are still eager to offer grants and loan guarantees on the basis of wildly hyped up claims about unproven technologies.

Red Rock Biofuels: Another KiOR in the making?
On 19th September 2015, the federal government announced a total of $210 million in grants, split evenly between three companies each of which was to build one biorefinery, paid under the Defense Production Act.  The three refineries are to produce biofuels for the military.  One of the three companies – Emerald Biofuels – has been secretive about their precise feedstock but their technology relies on the same kind of process as conventional biodiesel, i.e. plant oils and animal fats.  Their facility (based in Texas) is to be the largest of the three refineries, the technology is proven and already used in several large biofuel refineries worldwide, including for refining palm oil.  The other two companies – Fulcrum and Red Rock Biofuels (RRB) –  are to build refineries which produce cellulosic biofuels.  Here we will focus on RRB, although the technology that Fulcrum plans to use is nearly identical to RRB’s.

RRB was recently acquired by Joule Unlimited, an advanced biofuels companies which has so far focussed on a very different technology and feedstock, albeit at a demonstration rather than commercial-scale. RRB’s technology relies on a process that was invented in Germany in the 1920s.  It consists of three stages: In the first stage, fuel (in this case wood, but fossil fuels can be processed in the same way) is exposed to high temperatures under controlled oxygen conditions – called gasification.  This turns most of the fuel into a gas that consists mainly of hydrogen and carbon monoxide but still contains many impurities which then need to be removed.  The cleaned gas – called syngas – is then put through a series of chemical reactions, using chemical catalysts – a process called Fischer-Tropsch reforming.  It is used to create different fuels and chemicals with almost identical properties to ones derived from mineral oil, including jet-fuel.

So far, nobody in the world has successfully operated a commercial-scale plant which gasifies biomass and turns the syngas into liquid fuels using the Fischer Tropsch process, despite decades of Research and Development. The company that appears to have got furthest with this technology was a German firm, Choren.

Between 1998 and 2011, Choren moved from operating a very small pilot biomass gasification plant (initially just producing gas to burn for electricity) to a demonstration gasification and Fischer-Tropsch plant.  At one time Choren attracted investment from Shell, Daimler and Volkswagen, but those investors withdrew when it became clear that Choren were unable to move towards commercialization, instead spending years in a cycle of temporary operations, shut-downs and plant modifications to resolve one technical problem after another.  Choren declared bankruptcy in 2011.  In the US, two companies, Coskata and Range Fuels, built commercial-scale plants using this technology.  Range Fuels – another Khosla-funded venture filed for bankruptcy in 2011, having produced just small quantities of methanol rather than large quantities of ethanol.  According to a Wall Street Journal article, “taxpayers have committed $162 million (along with at least that much in private financing) to produce four million gallons of a biofuel that others have been making in quantity for decades.”  Yet another Khosla-backed venture, Coskata, received a $250 million loan guarantee from USDA, failed to produce any commercial quantities of biofuels using gasification and Fischer-Tropsch technology, and in 2012 switched to fossil-fuel natural gas as a feedstock instead.

Each of these projects failed because of technical challenges, which, for this technology, include build-up of tars, which can clog up vital parts, difficulties with removing impurities from the gas, problems with finding the right catalysts, and with achieving the required ratio of carbon monoxide and hydrogen.

It is impossible to predict whether it might one day become possible to overcome those challenges.  But that is what it would take to allow a plant like the one now proposed by RRB to operate successfully.  What seems clear from past experience is that any credible contender would have to spend large sums of money and many years on Research and Development, moving very slowly from pilot to demonstration scale and beyond.  Even so, there would be no guarantee of success: An EU-backed biomass gasification/Fischer-Tropsch project in Austria has so far failed to move beyond the laboratory stage since 2004.

RRB meanwhile, has no experience with the technology at all.  They have never operated any plant, however small. The partner companies chosen to provide the most important technologies appear no more credible.  TCG, who are to supply the gasifier, say on their website that they are operating a gasifier which was built in Denver in 2007 and moved to Toledo, Ohio in 2010.  In Toledo, TCG’s gasifier formed part of a demonstration project, which had received a grant of nearly $20 million from the Department of Energy (DoE) in 2009. According to the final project report, problems with the gasifier in Denver had prevented any syngas sample from being collected.  After it had been re-engineered in Toledo, syngas was obtained in late 2008 but it was too contaminated with tars to produce any biofuels.  After major investments and modifications, clean syngas was finally obtained over a four day period in late 2009, after which the project came to an end.  TCG’s record of producing clean syngas from biomass – syngas clean enough for biofuel production thus appears to be limited to just
four days of operation.

Velocys, part of the Oxford Catalyst Group, are to provide the Fischer-Tropsch technology for the RRB refinery.  Back in 2010/11, Oxford Catalyst Group participated in the Austrian laboratory-scale trials mentioned above.  There are plans to finally move the Austrian project to a larger (but still small) demonstration phase, but the company is no longer on the list of project partners.  Their biggest contract before RRB’s had been one with Solena, a company that had entered into partnerships with various airlines, to build waste-to-kerosene refineries, including in London. 

 However, Solena never built a single plant and went bankrupt in October 2015.
At the time the federal government announced the $70 million grant for RRB in September 2014, KiOR’s refinery had already closed and the government had been provided with evidence that they never came close to their claimed yields of 67 gallons per dry ton of wood, which was hardly surprising since there is no evidence of anyone ever having achieved such high yields of cellulosic biofuels.  Yet KiOR’s claims look modest compared to RRBs: RRB claims they can make 16 million gallons of biofuels from 175,000 dry tons of wood, a yield of more than 91 gallons per dry ton.  Apparently, lessons have not been learned.

The bigger picture:
The disastrous experience with Fischer-Tropsch biofuels is just one part of a much larger failure of cellulosic and algal biofuels, on which billions of dollars of public subsidies have been spent.  At the end of 2015, Spanish energy company Abengoa mothballed their cellulosic ethanol refinery in Kansas due to financial problems – after receiving a $97 million grant from the DoE. Their facility officially ‘opened’ in October 2014, but an article in July 2015 indicated that it was still not operating – and there is no evidence that it ever had.  Here, too, technical problems appear to have preceded the company’s financial troubles.  Another company that obtained generous subsidies for a cellulosic biofuel plant was Ineos-Bio. They attracted a $50 million DoE grant and a $75 million loan guarantee from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) for a plant in Florida, which officially opened in 2013.  By early 2015, the plant had been closed for some time because this company’s process released a toxic gas that poisoned the bacteria needed to ferment the biomass into ethanol.  There are no reports of the facility having re-started.

Those are just the largest subsidised cellulosic biofuel refineries that have failed.  They don’t include the even far greater number of ‘demonstration’ projects supported with government funds – such as a small refinery by American Progress Inc., who took a $22.3 million grant from the DoE and a $4 million grant from the State of Michigan and then formally closed their plant last year.  Just one company might have ensured its ‘success’: Quad County Corn Processors have slightly modified a standard corn ethanol refinery in Iowa.  They now add enzymes supposed to break up cellulose in the corn residues to the process.  The assumption is that this increases yields by 6% and that 2 million gallons of the corn ethanol will actually be ‘cellulosic’.  There seems to be no easy way of testing whether it really is.  Simply by continuing to run their corn ethanol plant, Quad County appears to be guaranteed credits for 2 million gallons of cellulosic ethanol annually – which happens to account for almost the total production of such fuels in the US in 2015.

Algal biofuels have fared no better.  A small number of companies have successfully used their public subsidies to get algal oil production off the ground – but alas, not for use in biofuels.  Sapphire Energy took $50 million from the DoE to develop algal biofuels in Florida.  They are selling limited amounts of algal oil for nutritional supplements instead.  And there is Solazyme, a Californian company who took $22 million from the DoE and another $2 million from a public institute for making algal biofuels.  They sold one batch to the Navy for a “Great Green Fleet” trial for the exorbitant cost of $149 per gallon. Since then they have been making most of their income from anti-wrinkle skin care products.  A great deal more subsidies for such unproven and so far failing technologies can be expected under Obama’s Clean Power Plan, and his “Mission Innovation” plan to massively boost spending on “clean tech”.

Cellulosic and algal biofuels are still regarded as a sustainable alternative to corn ethanol and other conventional biofuels, even by many environmental organizations.  It is time to put the myths to rest and prevent this colossal waste of public funds still being spent on obviously ill-fated schemes.  This is funding could instead help reduce carbon emissions if they were spent, say, on insulating homes or on supporting solar power, a proven technology with a tiny land footprint compared to that of biofuels.


Almuth Ernsting, Co-Director, Biofuelwatch (www.biofuelwatch.net)