2505. Life in the Shadow of the Mong Tan Dam

By Demelza Stokes, Mongabay, December 7, 2016

The riverscape of Kunhing township, whose name means “thousand islands” in the Shan language. Photo courtesy of Action for Shan State Rivers.

Introductory Note: This is the third article in a five-part series exploring Myanmar’s Salween landscape amid galvanizing plans to develop hydropower projects along its course.

Part I outlined plans being made by businesses and governments in China, Thailand and Myanmar to harness the Salween’s vast hydroelectric potential.

Part II looks at Salween dams’ already bloody legacy and the projects’ direct or indirect relationship with perpetuating instability and conflict in Myanmar’s Shan and Karen states.

Part IV, to be published Dec. 14, meets actors involved in creating the ‘Salween Peace Park,” combining wildlife conservation and peace-building in Karen state, where the world’s longest running civil war has raged since 1949.

Part V, to be published Dec. 21, focuses on downstream Salween communities’ livelihoods and ongoing changes facing the broader Salween landscape due to Myanmar’s rapid economic development.

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Before reaching the Keng Kham valley, the bright green Pang river, the Salween’s major tributary running south through central Shan state, splits into three parallel rivers that form myriad channels creating islands and islets, blurring the line between forests and water in a pristine and biodiverse riverscape. Rarely seen by outsiders, these are the famed “thousand islands,” forming a stunning inland delta that gives the “Kunhing” township its name. To the south, the Pang meets the Salween in a cascade of waterfalls. Seen from the air, white water tumbles down through verdant forested islands on an escarpment hundreds of meters long.

The thousand islands’ labyrinthine landscape and its surrounding forests bloom with tremendous ecological and ethnic diversity.  If plans for the Mong Ton dam go ahead, they will all be lost under the giant reservoir.

Early stages of construction have already started on Mong Ton, the biggest hydropower project planned for the Salween. Logging in the future flood zone and gold mining along the river bed is already stripping the land upstream of the project of its natural resources before they sink underneath the Salween’s murky waters. The dam site is located in a heavily militarized area in southern Shan state between territories controlled by Shan and Wa forces, and its flood zone is projected to be roughly the size of Singapore at 640 square kilometers. In addition to the huge environmental and social costs of building the Mong Ton dam, observers are also concerned that the dam lies near an earthquake fault line, in the “most earthquake prone region in Myanmar”, Hla Hla Aung, a senior researcher at the Myanmar Earthquake Committee told The Third Pole earlier this year.

ETHNIC AND ECOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AT STAKE

Shan state is Myanmar’s largest and most ethnically diverse state, populated by dozens of ethnic minority groups, including the Shan, Palaung, Pa-O, Wa, Lahu, Padaung, Akha and Lisu, all with divergent dialects or languages, customs, traditional dress and beliefs. In Kunhing township, and throughout the Pang and Salween watersheds, rural populations depend on the river and the forest to survive. They grow rice and vegetables in the lands surrounding the river, their lowland farming tracts dependent on river water for irrigation. The river is harvested for fish, crab, prawns, snails and oysters. The surrounding forests provide vegetables and mushrooms, traditional medicines and firewood. For the moment, some communities here get their electricity from mini-hydropower on the Salween’s tributaries. Kunhing township is dotted with historical sites of deep significance to Shan people, including ancient pagodas, traditional Shan chiefs’ houses and sacred cave temples, Nang War Nu, Director of the Kun Heing Foundation and ex-member of parliament for the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party told Mongabay.

The Keng Kham temple is immensely significant to local Shan people and an important part of their cultural heritage. According to local villagers it was built before World War II, when individual Shan states were were ruled by “sawbwas.” Image courtesy of Action for Shan State Rivers.

The significance of the land to its residents is profound. Forests, fisheries and waters are assigned not just economic, environmental and political value, but also deep cultural, social and spiritual meaning.  “My spirit is there; I am connected to this land. If I die, my spirit will be there.” a Paw Tao Ma Ha, a villager from the Keng Kham valley living in exile in Thailand, told the Shan Sapawa Environmental Organization in 2009.

The forests bordering the Salween were once home to a rich catalogue of mammals. In an account written at the turn of the 20th century, colonial administrator Sir James George Scott described “secluded and jungly slopes” teeming with tigers, panthers and other cats, rhinoceroses, “all kinds of deer,” otters, bears, badgers, porcupines and monkeys and apes “in great variety.”

In the succeeding century, hunting and deforestation took a heavy toll on the region’s biodiversity, but even today the unique ecosystems of the Salween watershed support globally endangered species. In pockets of remote mountainous forest habitats, the Indochinese tiger, (Panthera tigris corbetti), clouded leopard (Neofelis nebulosa), Sunda pangolin (Manis javanica), a type of wild cow called banteng (Bos javanicus), can still be found, among hundreds of other globally important species. But decades of conflict and the remoteness of the Salween mountains and valleys have left the river and its ecosystems woefully understudied, meaning current information on the ecological health of the watershed is extremely scarce. As well as unleashing a myriad other environmental and social consequences on the biodiversity and local people, the Mong Ton project’s vast reservoir would inundate unexplored areas of global ecological importance.

Par Zoi lived in a village in the Keng Kham valley until she was 18, when she was forced to relocate to Nar Sae village. Before the forced relocation due to the Myanmar Army’s offensives began in 1996, the Shan Sapawa Environmental Organization estimated the total population of the Keng Kham community to be 14,800 - in 2009 they reported the population had dwindled to about 3000 people. Photo courtesy of Mong Pan Youth Association.

A $10 billion hydropower project backed by Thai and Chinese developers, the Mong Ton dam will export 90 percent of its energy to China and Thailand. Critics of plans to develop the Salween’s hydropower potential lament that China and Thailand will purchase most of the energy produced by the dams, leaving some of the poorest people in Myanmar — and indeed the world —  to deal with the consequences. The project threatens to evict tens of thousands of people, including approximately 50,000 from Kunhing township, many of whom have already suffered from decades of conflict and displacement. For ethnic minorities that face flooding, their way of life will be over. “The forest and the river are so important not just for me, but for everyone living along the river basin. All of our livelihoods rely on the water and the forest,” 61-year-old Par Zoi from Nar Sae village in Kunhing township told a researcher working for Mongabay.

These riverine communities, who are almost wholly dependent on agriculture, are already increasingly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. In recent years, they have noticed increased sediment in the river, changes in its depth, or unusual floods. “Even before they are building the dam, we are already experiencing strange changes in the weather,” Kham Mai, campaign coordinator at the Shan Sapawa Environmental Organization, told Mongabay. “How will they cope when the dam is built? Because some of the villagers live on the islands, small islands in the river, so they are so worried about that.” she said.

The livelihoods of the people living along the Salween and its tributaries depend on the river. Photo courtesy of Mong Pan Youth Association.

The tropical mixed evergreen and deciduous forests in Shan state are some of Southeast Asia’s last remaining “globally significant” tracts. Thanks to projected forest loss due to illegal logging, agribusiness expansion and unregulated infrastructure development, the WWF  has identified the region as one of ten global “deforestation fronts.” The high rates of deforestation prior to the construction of dams, and the loss of forests once reservoirs are filled, will contribute to climate change and incur huge biodiversity loss, further impacting the ability of local subsistence farmers to support their livelihoods.

Hydropower development projects are one of the primary causes of deforestation worldwide, and the Mong Ton dam illustrates how this happens. Preemptive logging is taking place along access roads, as is clearing of forested areas that will be flooded by the dam’s reservoir. “Sometimes I go to the forest to hunt for small animals, vegetables, bamboo, mushrooms and seasonal crops. The forest is very important for people, especially local indigenous people like us,” Sai Lu, also from Nar Sae village in Kunhing township told a researcher working for Mongabay. “We have many kinds of wild animals here. I can’t say if they are less or more now, but what I can say is I think because of the logging we don’t see them near the village anymore.” In a study done earlier this year, researchers working with think-tank CGIAR found that 75 percent of the people they interviewed in a village near the dam site reported a negative change in forest and river ecosystem services, which they attributed to the logging around the dam.

Logging trucks pictured at the Mong Ton dam site in March 2016 by the Karen Environmental Social Action Network. Photo courtesy of KESAN.

An environmental impact assessment (EIA) and social impact assessment (SIA) conducted for the Mong Ton dam was conducted by an Australian company, the Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporation (SMEC) in 2015, but has been lambasted by critics of the dam. The company’s consultations were branded a “rubberstamp” by ethnic communities from the area, who were enraged that SMEC appeared to be downplaying the negative effects of the dam. SMEC were unable to complete their survey work in all of the projected dam-affected areas due to some villagers vehemently opposed to the project refusing to take part in surveys, or blocking SMEC from entering villages altogether. They were also blocked from entering the affected area in the Wa region by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in July 2015. Clashes had broken out between the UWSA and the Tatmadaw in June just north of the dam site. Attempts to contact SMEC by Mongabay were unsuccessful, but in a statement sent to the Irrawaddy magazine last year the company warned that disruption to the EIA/SIA process and their data gathering could lead to “suboptimal outcomes for the affected communities”.

In a set of recommendations sent to the NLD this September, the Save the Salween Network – a group of ethnic civil society organizations – said, “Agreements on the Salween hydropower projects cannot be determined by environmental and social impact assessment mechanisms as they remain illegitimate, lack accountability, transparency and the direct and representative participation and consent of local communities.” 

Incongruities between research done by SMEC and that done by local communities themselves has left locals deeply mistrustful of the company’s activities. Activist and ex-parliamentarian Nang War Nu told Mongabay of the massive discrepancy between her civil society group’s study of the projected affected area and SMEC’s: “I requested to see their mapping, and they showed it to me. I saw SMEC’s map, including Kun Heng, but it was very different from the real map. The original map from the locals shows there are altogether about one hundred villages. But the project has said only about 10 villages will be in the flood area.”

The river and its banks are sites of both daily life and religious observance. Photo courtesy of Mong Pan Youth Association.

Furious with SMEC’s handling of its Mong Ton work, campaign group Action for Shan State Rivers said in a statement released in August 2015, “SMEC had angered locals by blatantly promoting the dam in public meetings, downplaying negative impacts, and promising them electricity, even though the dam’s main purpose is to export power to China and Thailand.” The group also delivered a petition with 23,717 signatures opposing the dam’s construction to SMEC’s Yangon office. “The government should recognize the voice of the people and they should cancel all of the Salween dams because there are no benefits for Myanmar at all, mostly the benefits will go to neighboring countries,” Sai Khur Hseng, a representative of the Shan Sapawa Environmental Organization, and a vocal critic of the dam projects, told Mongabay.

The Myanmar government’s estimated completion date for the Mong Ton dam is 2030-2031. President Htin Kyaw announced a new commission on Aug. 12 this year to evaluate all the planned hydropower projects on the Irrawaddy River, but the Salween has been afforded no such providence. The launching of a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) across Myanmar’s hydropower sector in September this year by the World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC), and Myanmar’s MOEP and MOECAF, has been given a cautious welcome by some observers, who hope it could encourage the government and dam developers to adhere to international standards of practice.

Others are deeply skeptical of the process and worry that the SEA assumes large hydropower development in Myanmar is a foregone conclusion. The World Bank Group and the Asian Development Bank have advocated for and provided loans to construct large dams across Southeast Asia, leaving many to question the objectivity of an assessment guided by IFC. “The SEA starts from the assumption that large-scale hydropower is a given, rather than enabling consideration of alternatives that could inform open discussion on the best means of meeting Myanmar’s energy demands and priorities,” Pai Deetes, Thailand campaign coordinator for International Rivers told Mongabay. The cumulative effects of the Salween dams will also have transboundary impacts in China and Thailand, but these appear to fall outside of the scope of Myanmar’s SEA, which will only involve assessments and consultations within Myanmar, said Deetes.

Clouded leopard, one of the endangered species whose habitat is threatened by the Mong Ton dam. 

Activists, environmentalists and renewable energy experts in Myanmar are urging the government to call a moratorium on the Salween dams. They advocate for greener energy alternatives in place of mega-dams, such as mini-hydro, solar and wind power, which they say can be deployed more quickly to feed Myanmar’s growing need for electricity. “Because 70 percent of Myanmar’s population live in off-grid rural regions, prioritizing small-scale and decentralized energy sources over mega-dams is a better way to meet the immediate needs of local people,” said Deetes (more in Part 5).

“No other rivers in … the region continue to run free and support such lush and pristine forest areas and abundant biodiversity,” Deetes told Mongabay. Without a comprehensive consultation process and consensus, dam developers, “cannot simply press forward with a project that will cause severe and widespread impacts on a globally important ecological system,” she said.

Experience from around the world of large dams — from the cascade along the Mekong that threaten the food security of tens of millions of people living in the Delta Region, to those that are being removed in the US to repopulate salmon runs — leaves critics of the Salween dams dumbfounded that Myanmar’s civilian-led government has decided to continue the projects. The environmental and social costs of the mega-dams, and their role in potentially exacerbating conflict along the Salween, are compounded by the fact that almost all of the electricity they produce will be sold to China and Thailand. 

Upstream of the Mong Ton dam site, where rural communities in the Keng Kham valley and throughout Kunhing township depend on healthy rivers, forests and fisheries to survive, knowledge of the potential impacts of the dam is minimal. Shockingly, some have never even heard of the $10 billion infrastructure project just a few miles south of their homes. Nang Phaung, a 45 year-old from Wein Lon village in Kunhing township told a researcher working for Mongabay, “I never heard about the dam will be built on the Than Lwin River.”

2465. Hydropower Is Dirty Energy

By Gary Wockner, EcoWatch, September 30, 2016

TheItaipu Hydroelectricity Power Plant on the Brazil  is the second largest power plant in the world with 20 generator units and 14,250 MW of capacity.

TheItaipu Hydroelectricity Power Plant on the Brazil  is the second largest power plant in the world with 20 generator units and 14,250 MW of capacity.

Over the last two years, I've written four articles about the massive problem with methane emissions from hydropower dams and reservoirs. Finally, the mainstream media covered this story Thursday after an international team of scientists released a new study that synthesizes more than 100 scholarly articles on the topic.

The Seattle Times headline read, "Hydropower Isn't Carbon Neutral After All" and the Washington Post headline read, "Oh Great—Scientists Have Confirmed A Key New Source Of Greenhouse Gases”

The scientific study featured in these news articles will appear next week in the journal Bioscience and is co-authored by 10 international researchers including scientists at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. As reported in the Seattle Times and Washington Post, key findings in the scientific study include:

 • Methane emissions from dams and reservoirs across the planet, including hydropower, are estimated to be significantly larger than previously thought, approximately equal to 1 gigaton per year.

 • The international boom in the construction of hydropower projects is rapidly accelerating this increase in methane emissions.

 • Reservoirs in mid-latitude areas of the planet, including in the U.S., can have as high of methane emissions as those in tropical countries which have been measured to emit as much greenhouse gases as coal-fired power plants.

 • The United Nation's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) should now better account for these massive methane emissions and include them in climate change scenarios.

In the four articles I wrote:

 1 Why Hydropower Is Not Clean Or Cheap

 2 Hydropower Will Undermine COP21 As False Solution To Climate Change

 3 The Hydropower Methane Bomb No One Wants To Talk About

 4 Dams Cause Climate Change, They Are Not Clean Energy

I laid out the science behind why dams and reservoirs cause methane emissions. I explained how there are hundreds of dams under construction right now and thousands in the planning process, and I described how the U.S. government and the IPCC need to address this issue because countries around the world are sweeping it under the rug.

Inspiring news & a great example of what a few people can accomplish w/ dedication.

Now I'm taking it a step farther. I'm calling for a global moratorium on the construction and permitting of all hydropower projects.

Hydropower is being pushed forward as "clean" and "carbon free" by an industry that is making hundreds of billions of dollars per year building dams. Countries, including the U.S., are in denial about how hydropower is contributing to climate change. Corruption in developing countries is undermining democracy and endangering the lives of local people who are fighting these projects. The murder of dam-fighter Berta Cáceres in Honduras got widespread international attention, but it is only the tip of the iceberg for the human rights abuses faced by local people fighting hydropower across the planet.

A moratorium on hydropower is the only just path forward.

2143. Story of a Disaster Foretold

By Ian Steinman, Jacobin, January 2, 2016

The devastation in Minas Gerais, Brazil.

In November 5, a dam used as a waste dump owned by the mining company Samarco broke, causing a flood of toxic mud and water which killed twelve, injured many more, and completely destroyed the nearby town of Bento Rodriguez in Brazil. The waste from the spill has gone on to poison the Rio Doce, a major river linking the interior of Brazil’s Minas Gerais State to the eastern coast of Espirito Santo.

60 million cubic meters of waste water has choked off life in and around the river. More than a quarter of a million people have been left without usable water. Entire communities, towns, and cities spread along the Rio Doce and in the waters nearby find their livelihoods and futures threatened.

The exact causes of the breach are still under investigation, however recently released information points towards a construction project that was meant to connect the dam with another nearby dam, quintupling the size of the facility. Samarco has maintained that the waters have not been contaminated with toxic material and that it represents no threat to people or the environment. The government has largely supported those claims.

Nevertheless a recent test showed levels of arsenic and mercury over ten times the legal limit. The United Nation’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has also criticized the reports by Samarco and has declared the company’s and the federal government´s responses so far to be inadequate.

While the true scale of the disaster is still unknown, the devastating effects will be felt for years to come. Responsibility for this disaster lies not only with Samarco but also the destructive economic trends of the last few decades, the privatization of Samarco’s co-owner Vale, and widespread collusion between the ruling political class and mining corporations.

A Global Trend Towards Disaster

The disaster comes in the middle of a major economic crisis in Brazil which acutely affected the mining industry. The global drop in the value of raw resources like iron has contributed to Brazil’s economic downturn.

Mining companies have responded to the crisis by laying off workers and focusing on cost-cutting measures. 2,097 workers in the mining industry of the state of Minas Gerais were fired in the first semester of 2015. In Espirito Santo, one of the states through which the Rio Doce passes on the way to the coast, Samarco’s parent company Vale fired more than four thousand workers.

While Samarco maintains that the dams passed a government inspection in July and were considered safe, the method they are using to deposit waste in dammed local waters is a cheap — and risky — solution. In Chile, where earthquakes are a consistent threat, many mining companies rely on dry storage techniques which cost ten times as much.

The construction of water-based storage areas from scratch on virgin land would also be safer but cost twice as much. This is nothing compared to the death, displacement, and devastation visiting the environment and communities along the river. Yet for a capitalist business, especially under recessionary pressures, the cheapest method possible will always prevail.

This kind of disaster is not exclusive to Brazil and the developing world. It is in fact part of a global trend in the mining industry towards more and more catastrophic failures of water-based waste storage techniques. A report by Lindsay Bowker and David Chambers shows a growing trend towards more “serious” and “very serious” failures starting in the sixties and increasing up to the present.

When companies refuse to opt for costly overhauls, safer storage techniques, and repairs they turn towards makeshift solutions which often expand the storage dumps far beyond their originally intended and designed limits. Targeting the industry’s financial markets and investment trends, the report concludes that there is “a clear and irrefutable relationship between the mega trends that squeeze cash flows for all miners at all locations, and this indisputably clear trend toward failures of ever greater environmental consequence.”

The crisis of waste dump failures looks much like the general crisis of capitalist investment in production. It is not profitable to invest in major overhauls, safe storage techniques, or new, more technically advanced mines.

Facing the crisis of over-production triggered by the fall in global ore prices, private companies are attempting to cut costs, raise productivity, and extract as much as possible from existing mining facilities. Yet pushing extraction to the breaking point has dire consequences for entire communities, regions, and ecosystems.

The costs of cleanup and long-term economic and environmental damage are never fully borne by the company — often itself a subsidiary used by larger corporations to evade liability — but instead are passed on to local and national governments.

In Brazil this is exacerbated as the costs of adopting safety measures or even operating legally often far outweigh the token fines imposed on companies which violate the law. Fees imposed on Samarco are so far some of the largest but still fall far short of the overwhelming economic, environmental, and human cost of this man-made disaster.

Vale was once a national mining company and seen as central to the development of the Brazilian economy and national independence. But the state company was privatized in 1997 under the neoliberal administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in a sale widely considered to have substantially undervalued the company.

Its $3.14 billion price tag glaringly omitted the value of its patents, mineral rights, reserves, and stock in other companies. Though it accounted for infrastructure, many mines were still missing from the assessment. On the day the sale was finalized thousands of protesters clashed with police in front of the headquarters in Rio de Janeiro with similar protests across Brazil.

Today the company has an estimated value of over $53 billion and has established itself as a global multinational with a reputation to match. Behind the illusion of South-South solidarity the international operations of the company are just as bad as and often even worse than the practices of European and American multinationals.

Samarco, the company formally responsible for the disaster, is itself is a joint venture owned by Vale and the Anglo-Australian multinational BHP Bilton.

The PT’s Complicity

While Vale may have been privatized under the neoliberal leadership of Cardoso and the right-wing PSDB the new owners of the company quickly found willing partners in the Workers Party of former President Lula da Silva and current President Dilma Rousseff. Legal efforts to challenge the privatization over irregularities in the sale received no support from the PT, who instead embraced Vale, the mining industry, and the banks that own and finance much of industry.

In 2014 alone Vale invested r$8.25 million in the electoral campaigns of the PT and r$23.55 million to the PMDB — a PT ally which controls the Ministry of Mines and Energy as well as the National Department of Mineral Production. Dilma Rousseff’s reelection campaign counted on r$14 million in donations from Vale – far outstripping the r$2.7 million that went to right-wing opposition candidate Aecio Neves — as well as another r$14 million from a variety of other mining companies.

One of the largest stockholders in the privatized Vale is Bradesco Bank. Joaquim Levy, Rousseff’s main economic minister and architect of recently implemented austerity programs, formerly worked as a director for Bradesco. Bradesco recorded record profits of r$4.47 billion in the second trimester of 2015, an 18 percent growth compared to the previous year. The banking sector as a whole has seen unprecedented growth and rates of profit under the PT’s administration and has been a willing partner of the government.

In Minas Gerais, the disaster’s epicenter, the PT’s Fernando Pimental is serving as governor. Far from using the crisis as an opportunity to impose tougher regulations, he and the PT legislatures have instead rushed a bill once championed by the PSDB’s Aecio Neves that speeds up environmental licensing for mining companies. What emerges at the state and national level is a web of complicity and support in which the PT has often been Vale’s party of choice to ensure its economic interests are defended.

Additionally, under pressure from the economic crisis and deeply affected by the corruption scandals, there is now a major proposal to privatize huge sections of Petrobras, the Brazilian state oil company. Petrobras has been moving forward with a plan to sell $15 billion in assets by the end of this year with more sales to come in 2016 and beyond. The estimated cost of the Lava Jato corruption scandal has been as much as $6 billion and along with the fall in oil prices has left the company heavily indebted and facing a serious crisis.

Workers at Petrobras have attempted to resist this trend towards privatization. Petrobras workers recently ended one of the largest strikes in recent history in which workers in many locals occupied platforms and workplaces as well as defied the union bureaucracy’s attempts to end the strike early. Opposition to the privatization plan was a major demand of the strike and a source of rank-and-file disillusionment with the PT government.

However, the main trade union responsible for representing Petrobras workers is deeply linked to the PT and Petrobas management. The discontent expressed in the strike was substantial but still far short of the kind of mass workers movement which would be needed to block the proposed assets sale.

The threat of both ongoing and future privatization represents not only a major issue for Petrobras workers but potentially poses a substantial environmental threat. If privatized sectors of the oil and gas industry follow the same path as Vale the likely consequence will be even more environmental disasters.

Fighting Back

The disaster shows the irreparable damage which capitalist businesses wreck upon the environment and the growing trends across the mining industry towards ever more risky and damaging techniques. Corporate models in environmentally risky industries like mining socialize the dire risks of extraction while privatizing the financial benefits.

Yet while defending state ownership is important, it is far from enough. The crisis of Petrobras and its growing trend towards privatization has itself been driven by the looting of its assets by the governing PT party and its allies. The ability of the ruling and allied parties to steal from Petrobras in league with private business and company management is a weakness of its state-owned and state-controlled character.

The right opposition has until now been able to use the corruption scandals to push for further privatization. Rousseff and the PT have themselves advanced the partial privatization of Petrobras by asset sales as a solution to the immense costs of corruption and the deepening economic crisis.

In the aftermath of the disaster there is a political opportunity to strike a blow against the whole project of privatization. The only alternative which the ruling parties have to offer Brazil is more privatization at a slower or faster rate with more environmental disasters sure to follow.

Against both state and corporate corruption, the Left must retake the old slogan of nationalization under workers’ control — not just as a labor demand but also an environmental necessity. With a crisis at Petrobras and growing popular hatred of Vale, workers’ management represents the only real alternative to a future of private profit and socialized devastation.