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| Bolivian indigenous people march in Trinidad August 15, 2011 |
By Federico Fuentes, Bolivia Rising, September 9, 2011
The decision by
leaders of the Sub Central of the Indigenous Territory and National Isiboro
Secure Park (TIPNIS), to initiate a 500-kilometre protest march on Bolivia's
capital of La Paz capital has ignited much debate about the nature of Bolivia’s
first indigenous led-government.
The Sub Central of
TIPNIS unites the 64 indigenous communities within the park.
Much analysis has
focused on the supposed hypocrisy of the government headed by Evo Morales,
Bolivia's first indigenous head of state. The Morales government has been
criticised for pursuing pro-capitalist development and trampling on the rights
of its own indigenous people.
Many analysts have
also highlighted the contradiction between Morales’ public discourse in defence
of indigenous rights and Mother Earth, and the proposal of his government’s to
build a new highway that would run through this protected area of the Amazon.
According to Raul
Prada, until recently a key figure in the Morales government and now ardent
critic, the protests are forcing Morales to choose between “defence of life, of
forests, of human beings and the vital cycles of the system of life or the path
of narcotrafficking, of corrosive trade, extraction-based dependency, of the
highways of dependency on emergent powers [a reference to Brazil ] and the
empire”.
However, what the
protests have actually revealed is the complicated reality of Bolivia’s social
movements. It has shown the deep challenges they face in overcoming centuries
of underdevelopment and internal fissures, which both threaten to undermine the
process of change underway since Morales was first elected in 2005.
Exploitation
Attempts to
counterpose the “developmentalist” policies of the government against the “communitarian”
logic of the indigenous marchers fails to take into account the long running
tensions that underpin the dispute.
For more than 500
years, Bolivia’s indigenous majority have seen their natural resources and
wealth continuously pillaged by foreign powers (Spain, Britain and the United
States).
The wealth ripped
out from this small Andean nation helped fuel the growth of global metropolises
such as London. But its local indigenous peoples were forced into a life of
extreme poverty and oppression.
Despite sitting
upon the second largest gas reserves in South America, and at one time supplying
almost 50% of the world’s tin, Bolivia is general considered the second poorest
country in the Americas.
The disaster
created by imperialist domination not only impact on the livelihoods of
ordinary Bolivians. Through the super-exploitation of its wealth, Bolivia’s
economy was subsumed into the world market in a subordinate position.
Its economy
revolved around the interests of foreign capital rather than the needs of its
people.
To ensure this
subordination, the Bolivian state was dominated by foreign interests. The local
white oligarchy was entrusted with running it.
The state was
successful in putting down numerous internal revolts. But it was ineffectual in
asserting any real sovereignty over Bolivia and integrating its far flung
regions into a dynamic national economy.
One consequence of
this was that since independence, Bolivia has lost more than half of its
national territories to neighbouring countries.
This included
losing its access to the Pacific Ocean to Chile in the 1879-1883 Pacific War.
This has cost Bolivia more than US$30 billion since 1970.
Rolling 'social
revolution'
The onset of
neoliberalism in the 1980s worsened the situation. It fuelled what one US
embassy cable recently released by WikiLeaks called “the country’s rolling ‘social
revolution’”.
The cable, dated
May 17, 2006, noted that US-imposed neoliberalism led to increased poverty,
unemployment, and rural migration towards underdeveloped cities. This left “new
urban dwellers clamouring for access to basic services”.
Worsening poverty
levels, the cable said, had a “clear rural-urban, a growing regional, and a
distinctly racial dimension”.
The cable also
noted “growing ethnic consciousness has fed ‘indigenous’ resentment of the
dominant ‘white’ minority and the political system that allegedly sustained it”.
“In combination,
these factors have undermined the faith of many Bolivians in the old economic
and political order”. It said this led to increased support for the Morales
government, whose largest support base came from those identified in the US
cable as most affected by neoliberalism.
This was the basis
for Morales’ election and the displacement of Bolivia’s white elites from their
traditional positions of power in the state.
In particular,
Morales support base is among the indigenous majority, dividing into 36 peoples
that live in the highlands to the west and lowlands to the east.
The two, larger
indigenous peoples are the Quechas (2.5 million people) and Aymaras (2 million
people). Bolivia’s total population is close to 10 million.
These two peoples
have predominately been based in the west.
But the process of
internal migration by Aymaras and Quechas indigenous campesinos seeking land in
the east (commonly referred to as “colonisers”), has steady increased their
numbers in the lowland.
It has also
contributed to nearly doubling the size of the city of Santa Cruz in the east
over the past 20 years. It is now home to 1.2 million, making it the largest
city in Bolivia.
At the same time,
rural-urban migration has fuelled the growth of the mostly indigenous city of
El Alto, on the outskirts of La Paz.
Its population
skyrocketed from around 400,000 in 1992 to current estimates of more than a
million.
This overwhelming
indigenous city, key to the successive overthrow of two neoliberal presidents,
is another heartland of Morales support.
Morales, himself an
Aymara, grew up in the altiplano
(highlands)> He later moved to the largely Quechua coca-growing region of
the Chapare, nestled in the centre of the country.
In the mid-'90s,
the Chapare became a battleground of the US “war on drugs”. The cocalero (coca-growers) movement, head by Morales, was the
backbone of a rising anti-imperialist movement.
Together with
predominately Aymara and Quecha campesinos who made up the country’s largest
rural-based organisations -- the Sole Union Confederation of Bolivian Campesino
Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), the Union Confederation of Bolivian Colonisers
(CSCB), and the National Federation of Bolivian Campesino Women “Bartolina Sisa
(FNMCB-BS) -- the cocaleros formed what today is commonly known as the Movement
Towards Socialism (MAS) in the mid-'90s.
It is important to
note that as a result of the land reform carried out by Bolivia's 1952 National
Revolution, most of the indigenous peoples in the west were granted access to
small land plots (via private deeds).
The traditional
union model of organising was imposed upon their traditional communitarian
organisation.
This further
fractured the communitarian bonds that had already begun to be undermined by
centuries of colonialisation.
The result,
however, was a certain fusion of elements of both within these organisations.
In the east, where
the indigenous population was smaller, land reform was never implemented.
Instead, the east,
centred around Santa Cruz, gradually became the new economic motor of Bolivia.
This was due to its huge gas deposits and the rise of powerful latifundistas<.em>
(large landowners).
This part of
Bolivia is home to the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the East (CIDOB),
which unites organisations from 34 of the 36 groups of indigenous peoples. It
represents about 500,000 people.
CIDOB and the
National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), which unites some
indigenous communities in the altiplano, took part in the founding meetings of
the MAS.
But the two groups
never became organic components of this “political instrument”.
Instead,
relationships were maintained between these organisations in two ways. First,
the different campesino and indigenous groups came together to form the Unity
Pact. And second, various CONAMAQ and CIDOB leaders, such as its current
president Adolfo Chavez, were elected as MAS parliamentarians.
Conflicts
At the same time,
conflicts between these groups have emerged at different times.
At the root of some
of these divergences have been the differing visions between the lowland
indigenous movements, with their strong ties to NGOs and the church and their
focus on the environment and indigenous control over territory and natural
resources, and those of the highland campesino movements.
The highland groups
political and anti-imperialist outlook was heavily influenced by the 1952
National Revolution and the 1980s mass emmigration of mine workers into the
countryside in search of work.
These differences
have played out in TIPNIS over the past decades, especially since “colonisers”
from the west began settling in the area as of the '70s and '80s.
After a historic
march by the indigenous peoples of the east in 1990, then president Jamie Paz
Zamora declared the 1.2 million hectares that comprise TIPNIS an ancestral
territory of the Mojeno, Yuracare and Chiman peoples.
However, this move
was unable to put an end to the constant disputes between local indigenous
communities and indigenous “colonisers” who have moved in to occupy land for
agriculture.
This led to a state
of semi-permanent confrontations.
The conflict only
subsided after a demarcation agreement was signed in 1992 between Marcial Fabricano,
then head of the Sub Central of TIPNIS, and Morales, as head of the cocalero
federation that includes the “colonisers” in the southern part of TIPNIS.
The agreement gave
existing colonisers the right to land currently occupied while halting further invasions.
These differences
were also reflected in the roles played by the various organisations during the
period of social rebellion that began in 2000.
US interference
As the uprising
against neoliberalism grew in strength, overthrowing a neoliberal president in
2003, US imperialism sought to use money to increase divisions within the
indigenous movements.
In late 2005,
investigative journalist Reed Lindsay published an article in NACLA that used declassified US documents to expose how
US government-funded agency USAID was used to this effect.
USAID was already
planning by 2002 to “help build moderate, pro-democracy political parties that
can serve as a counterweight to the radical MAS or its successors”.
The downfall in
2003 of president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada triggered a step-up in this
subversive activity.
A particular target
was CIDOB.
The group was in a
crisis after Fabricano was accused of profiting from illegal logging and he
accepted the post of vice-minister of Indigenous Affairs under Sanchez de
Lozada.
Through USAID
funding to the Brecha Foundation, an NGO established by CIDOB leaders, the US
hoped to further mould the organisation to its own ends.
Referring to
comments made by Brecha director Victor Hugo Vela, Lindsay notes that during
this time, “CIDOB leaders allied with Fabricano have condemned the cultivation
of coca, helped the business elite in the department of Santa Cruz to push for
region autonomy and opposed a proposal to require petroleum companies to
consult with indigenous communities before drilling on their lands”.
The CSUTCB (divided
between followers of Morales and radical Aymara leader Felipe Quispe), CSCB,
FNMCB-BS and organisations such as the neighbourhood councils of El Alto
(Fejuve), and to a less extent worker and miner organisations, were at the
forefront of constant street battles and insurrections.
CIDOB, however,
took an approach marked by negotiation and moderation.
It was not until July
2005 that CIDOB renewed its leadership, in turn breaking relations with Brecha.
CIDOB was not the
only target for infiltration.
With close to
$200,000 in US government funds, the Land and Liberty Movement (MTL) was set up
in 2004 by Walter Reynaga.
As well as
splitting the Movement of Landless Peasant’s (MST), one wing of which operated
out of his La Paz office, Lindsay said Reynaga, like Vega, tried to win control
of the “MAS-aligned” CONAMAQ.
All these groups
came behind the campaign to elect Morales in 2005.
Gains
Since then, the
Morales government has taken important steps towards breaking Bolivia’s
dependency on foreign capital. His government has nationalised Bolivia's gas
reserves and refused to follow International Monetary Fund-diktats.
The government has
also moved quickly to tackle the urgent and deeply felt needs of its base.
Data collated by
the Unit of Analysis of Social and Economic Policies (UDAPE), a government
think tank from the National Institute of Statistics (INE), show just how much
progress has been made.
Poverty levels have
fallen from 60.6% in 2005 to 49.6% in 2010.
The biggest drop
came in rural areas (77.6% to 65.1%). Extreme poverty also fell from 38.2% in
2005 to 25.4% in 2010.
In 2005, the
wealthiest 10% received 128 times the amount of income than the poorest 10%. By
2009, this had been reduced to 60 times.
Recent figures from
the IMF back these findings and indicate that 1.1 million Bolivians were lifted
out of extreme poverty between 2007 and 2009.
Along with tackling
poverty, another priority of the first Morales administration (2006-2009) was
focusing on the needs of indigenous communities in the lowlands.
This was seen as
essential in nurturing social movements that could help counteract the attempts
by the right-wing opposition, centred in the east, to overthrow his government.
In regards to
TIPNIS, Morales directly intervened in 2006 to expel colonisers who had
occupied further lands in the TIPNIS. Many of them were associated with the
cocalero federation he still headed despite becoming head of state.
In 2009, the 64
indigenous communities of the TIPNIS, about 12,000 people all up, were finally
handed over the title to over 1 million hectares of land. The remaining 200,000
hectares went predominately to the roughly 100,000 colonisers present in the
south of the park.
Former
vice-minister of land Alejandro Almaraz, who together with Prada is a key
spokesperson of a group of former government members turned dissidents,
explained in a July 29 interview posted by Rebelion that of the 25 million hectares of land
redistributed under Morales until the end of 2010, 16 million was handed over
as communitarian lands belonging to original indigenous owners.
In comparison, the
campesino sector received less than 3 million hectares in the form of
individual or family titles.
Crucially, the
unity forged between indigenous peoples of the east and west, and urban and
rural areas, was critical to defeating the September 2008 coup attempt by the
right-wing opposition sectors in the east.
It was also vital
to Morales record re-election vote of 64% in the December 2009 elections.
'Industrial leap
forward'
A big part of
Morales’ election campaign was his promised “industrial leap forward”.
Speaking to
supporters in El Alto at his campaign closing rally, Morales emphasised
industrialisation, the physical integration of the country and social inclusion
as key goals of his second government.
The MAS’s election
program included a section entitled “roadway revolution for an integrated
country”.
This focused on the
need to expand and build key highways that could integrate isolated regions,
and help promote economic development at the local and national.
Among the proposed
roadways was one that would link the northern department of Beni with
Cochabamba.
Some have
criticised this highway. They point to the fact it is part of the Initiative
for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America, a
Brazilian-led project to economically integrate the continent, as proof of
Bolivia’s subordination of Brazilian “sub-imperialism”.
Brazil is footing
80% of the bill for the disputed highway.
Others have noted
that the highway is critical to breaking the department of Beni’s dependency on
Santa Cruz.
At the moment, all
agricultural products must go via Santa Cruz to the east before being able to
be transported westward.
The proposed
highway would directly connect Beni to Cochabamba. This would reduce costs for
agricultural producers (and consumers) and travel distance from 848 kilometres
to 306 kilometres.
Given Beni’s status
as the largest meat producing department, this would break the hold that Santa
Cruz-based slaughterhouses have on imposing meat prices.
This is one of the reasons
why important sections of the Santa Cruz elite are opposing the highway.
Also, criticisms of
subordination to Brazilian interests have not been made in regards to the many
other roadways being funded by Brazil as part of IIRSA. These are strongly supported
by the communities that will benefit from greater access to transportation and
basic services.
In fact, on August
15, the same day marchers from TIPNIS headed off to La Paz, two other protests
were held in the important MAS strongholds of El Alto and Potosi.
These protests
included in their demands access to basic services, and the building of more
factories and highways. Neither protest raised opposition to the proposed
highway through TIPNIS.
In many ways, these
protests reflect the increased tensions the MAS government has faced since
defeating the right-wing coup attempt and winning re-election.
Various sections of
its base, feeling their time has come, are now protesting to demand the
government turn its attention towards them.
In all these cases,
the demands have been for more, not less development.
In some cases, this
has led to increased conflicts within the different social movements. This is
reflected by the divisions within the Unity Pact over the push by campesino
organisations to redirect government attention towards this sector in its land
reform program.
Highway dispute
This is also true
in regards to TIPNIS. The various indigenous and campesino movements that are
part of it are far from united in their opposition to the roadway.
The main campesino
groups (comprised overwhelmingly of indigenous peoples), and leaders from the
Bolivian Workers Central (COB), have declared their support for an eventual
highway, while maintaining that any final plan take into consideration the
needs of local indigenous communities.
Important
indigenous organisations have also stated similar positions.
Despite the
presence of CONAMAQ leaders such as Rafael Quispe in the march against the
roadway, its affiliate organisations from La Paz and Potosi have rejected
opposition to it.
The Indigenous
Council of Communities of the South (CONISUR), which groups indigenous
communities in the south of TIPNIS as well as colonisers that inhabit those
areas have come out in support of an eventual roadway.
The Yuracare
Indigenous Council, that unites the Yucare, Mojeno and Trinitario peoples, has
as well.
All these groups
have highlighted the benefits the highway will bring in regards to access to
basic services, ability to sell products and travel.
Attempts have been
made to equate these organisation’s positions with their vested interests in
accumulating land.
This is in line
with recent moves by the CSUTCB to shift the government’s land reform policy
away from prioritising collective indigenous titles towards providing
individual or family titles to its traditional base.
There are elements
of truth (and much exaggeration) to this claim, but this should come as no
surprise.
The same CSUTCB,
and other campesino organisations which led the protests between 2000 and 2005,
have always defended this position. This is shown by the history of conflict in
TIPNIS.
Demands
And it is also true
that the demands of the Sub Central of TIPNIS, and in particular CIDOB, are far
removed from any notion of communitarianism.
Although initially
focused on opposition to the highway, protesters presented the government with
an original list of 13 demands, then extended to 16, on the day the march
began.
Among those were
calls for indigenous peoples to be able to directly receive compensation
payment for offsetting carbon emissions.
This policy, know
as REDD+, has been denounced as the privatisation of the forests by many
environmental activists and the Peoples' Summit of Climate Change organised in
Bolivia in 2010.
It has also been promoted
as a mechanism to allow developed countries to continue to pollute while
undermining the right underdeveloped to develop their economies.
Another demand
calls for the replacement of functionaries within the Authority for Control and
Monitoring of Forests and Lands (ABT).
This demand
dovetails with the allegations made by Morales against CIDOB leaders, and never
refuted, that they want to control this state institution.
Much focus has been
made of the potential environmental destruction caused by a highway that would
open the path to future “coloniser” settlements.
But these arguments
have only focused on one side of the equation.
Much has been made
of a study by Bolivian Strategic Research Program that concluded that 64.5% of
TIPNIS would be lost to deforestation by 2030 as a result of the highway.
Few, though, have
noted that the same study found that even without the highway 43% of TIPNIS
would be lost if the current rate of deforestation continues.
The biggest cause
of this is the illegal logging that continues to occur, in some cases with the
complicity of some local indigenous leaders and communities.
An environmental
impact studies by the Bolivian Highway Authority have found the direct impact
of the highway on TIPNIS to be 0.03%.
But this has to
weighed up with the fact that the highway would provide the state with access
to areas currently out of its reach.
This would enable
not only access to services, but a greater ability to tackle illegal logging
and potential narcotrafficking in the area.
At the same time,
the government has asked the indigenous communities of TIPNIS to help in
drafting legislation that would impose jail terms of 10 to 20 years on those
found to be illegally settling, growing coca or logging in TIPNIS.
Meeting the
needs of the majority
What becomes clear
is that far from some polarised debate between "indigenous
communitarianism" and the government’s savage “developmentalism”, there is
more in common than there is differences between both sides of the debate.
One the one hand,
there is the progressive sentiment of wanting to defend cultures and access
basic services. On the other, a scramble for control over resources (land,
forests, gas).
In this context of
competing interests, the Morales government has made clear its intention to
construct a highway in the region.
This has included
the option of having the highway go around TIPNIS if this is economically and
environmentally feasible -- although no such alternative has yet been proposed
by the protesters.
In doing so, its
decision (right or wrong) has been based on prioritising what it sees as the
basic needs of the majority, which if not met risks losing support for the
government.
At the same time,
it has predicating any final route (of which at the moment there are eight
options) on a process of consultation with all communities affected.
This stress on
dialogue and willingness to consult all those involved has being a running
theme in the government’s approach.
In the place of
repression (as would have occurred under pre-Morales governments) police have
provide protection.
Also, 20 high-level
government ministers, vice-ministers and presidents of state institutions have
travelled to the remote areas to listen to community leaders in meetings open
to all march participants.
One complication
that has come relates to the issue of who gets to be consulted. The marchers
have ruled out the right of the colonisers, and even some indigenous
organisations, to take part.
March leaders also
subsequently rejected outright the government's proposal to carry out a
consultation of the 64 indigenous communities within TIPNIS.
A further
complication has been the increasingly hostile nature of the debate.
From the government’s
side, it has strongly denounced the role of NGOs, USAID and opposition forces
from Santa Cruz in fomenting the protests, as evidenced by their offers to
provide financial support to the marchers.
Some have noted
that opposition forces would like to see sections of the indigenous movement
come out opposing the elections of judiciary authorities scheduled for October.
This is a
far-reaching measure, which would transform a traditional corrupt judiciary
dominated by the old right-wing parties into a popularly elected institution.
It would no doubt
lead to indigenous people occupying posts they were previously barred from.
This makes it
obvious why such forces are seeking to undermine the vote.
Some CIDOB and
CONAMAQ leaders, and the group led by Prada and Almaraz, have come out against
the election of the judicial power.
Dangerous
positions
It is dangerous to
deny, or downplay, the presence of forces such as USAID, NGOs and anti-Morales
parties in this dispute -- fishing around to win support among disgruntled
sectors of Morales bases.
Only the most naive
could imagine this was not the case, particularly as there is ample evidence to
back up such claims.
However, just as
dangerous is the actions of the government that have created an atmosphere were
mutual denunciations and accusations take precedence over the much more
necessary debate regarding Bolivia’s future.
This has been made
worse by the sexist remarks of Morales himself, who called on the “colonisers”
to “seduce the Yuracare and Trinitaria women, so that they don't oppose the
road”.
The same is also true
of attempts by critics to portray support for the highway as somehow equivalent
with support for “narcotrafficking”.
This is a common
attack made by the US against the Morales government, and before that the
cocalero movement.
On the surface, the
issue of TIPNIS revolves around whether the economic interests of uniting Beni
and Cochabamba, and the benefits it will bring regarding access to services and
ability to sell agricultural products, override those of the local indigenous
communities and their ancestral lands, or whether a comprise can be found that
takes both factors into account.
But behind this
specific issue lies a deeper debate of how Bolivia can promote an economic
system that can navigate through the difficulties of overcoming centuries of underdevelopment
while respecting Mother Earth.
Such a debate is
essential. The current situation provides an opportunity for all involved to
open a path in that direction.
This debate can,
and should, entail protests such as those occurring now. These could aid in
tackling some of the tradition developmentalist mentality prevalent within
sections of the government.
But to be
successful, this will require going beyond fragmented organisations mobilised
behind individual or sectional interests. It will require a movement united
behind a radical program for change.
Otherwise the risk
is that such fissures within the movement for change become openings for a
return to the right.
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